

***Research on the effectiveness of Police
practice in reducing residential burglary
Report 4***

**Case Study of the Manurewa
Police Area**

Karen Johns

December 2005



Research on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary

- Report 1: *Surveys of Household Burglary part one (2002): Four Police Areas and national data compared*, Dr Sue Triggs, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 2: *Surveys of Household Burglary part two: Four Police Areas compared between 2002 and 2004*, Dr Sue Triggs, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 3: *Literature review: Police practice in reducing residential burglary*, Dr Sally Harvey, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 4: *Case study of the Manurewa Police Area*, Karen Johns, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 5: *Case study of the Rotorua Police Area*, Tanya Segessenmann and Karen Johns, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 6: *Case study of the Lower Hutt Police Area*, Alison Chetwin and Helena Barwick, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 7: *Case study of the Sydenham Police Area*, Dr Sue Carswell and Karen Johns, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 8: *Victims of burglary*, Garth Baker and Alison Gray, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
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Foreword

Burglary is a problem that considerably affects many New Zealand households. From victimisation surveys we know that it can have a profound effect on victims and that householders are concerned about it. Burglary is also costly both to government and to the New Zealand public. Reducing burglary is a key priority in government's Crime Reduction Strategy and an important outcome for the justice sector.

Although recorded burglary rates show a declining trend since the late 1990s, there is considerable room to achieve further reductions. The extensive research published here helps us understand what strategies might be effective in which contexts, as well as the reasons why they are effective. The research has revealed a wealth of practical and workable strategies and initiatives that can be shared from one Police Area to another.

The research project is the result of a highly productive collaboration between the Ministry of Justice and New Zealand Police. We are grateful for the substantial funding support for the project provided by the Cross Departmental Research Pool (CDRP) administered by the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology. In the spirit of the CDRP, it has been an excellent example of cross-departmental research on a subject of high priority to government.

The real commitment of the New Zealand Police to reducing crime is evident throughout the ten reports of the Burglary Reduction Research Programme. This substantial series of reports is published to be used in part or in its entirety by front-line Police, as well as managers, advisers and policy makers, all of whom play a variety of roles in the wider justice sector in the effort to reduce burglary.

Belinda Clark
Secretary for Justice

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Abbreviations

AFIS	Automated Fingerprint Identification System
BTS	Burglary Takings Squad
CIB	Criminal Investigations Branch
CIU	Criminal Investigation Unit
Comms	Northern Communication Centre
CYF	Child, Youth and Family
ER	Emergency Response
ESR	Hamilton Institute of Environmental Science and Research
FGC	Family Group Conference
GDB	General Duties Branch
Intel	Intelligence Section
LES	Wanganui Computer Database
LET	Law Enforcement Team
MO	modus operandi
NIA	National Intelligence Police Database (replacing LES)
NZDep	New Zealand Deprivation Index
OC	Officer in Charge
OR	Offence Report
SCC	Safer Community Council
SOCO	Scene of Crime Officer
TCU	Tactical Crime Unit

Executive summary

The Ministry of Justice, in partnership with the New Zealand Police, has conducted research over three years (2002–2004) on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary. This case study report is the final report examining burglary initiatives undertaken in the Manurewa Police Area. Three other Police Areas in New Zealand are also part of the project—Sydenham, Rotorua and Lower Hutt.

The evaluation involved an in-depth case study approach conducted in the four Police Areas from 2002 to 2004 in an attempt to discover which Police practices work in which contexts and through what mechanisms. The case studies involved:

- a community profile
- interviews with key respondents from the Police, the criminal justice sector and community organisations who had a knowledge of burglary
- Household Burglary Surveys in 2002 and 2004
- interviews with burglars and victims of burglary
- analysis of quantitative data from New Zealand Police and the Ministry of Justice.

Community profile

Manurewa Police Area (later Counties/Manukau Central) serves a population of 66,081. Of this population 43% were under 25 years of age in 2001; 51% identified themselves as New Zealand European, 26.5% as Maori, 23.8% as Pacific people, and 9.7% as Asian. A score of ten on the NZDep indicates an area has a high level of deprivation, being in the most deprived 10% of all areas in New Zealand. In the Counties-Manukau Health area, 35% of the population was either a nine or a ten on the deprivation index. In 2001, 41% of those aged 15 years and over earned less than \$20,000, compared to 46% nationally, and 34% of the population (15,843) relied on the state for their income.

Police strategies

Manurewa Police Area had several strategies in place for the reduction of burglary. These included:

- bail checks
- specialised burglary squad
- directed patrols
- special operations.

After restructuring in late 2003, there was an increase in intelligence (Intel)-focused Police resource deployment. This included:

- directed patrolling for bail, curfew and parole breaches
- strategies to target the top five offenders and 'hot' locations and decrease repeat victimisation
- initiatives to locate stolen property.

Effectiveness of Manurewa's strategies

Cross-focused initiatives

These initiatives target burglary by focusing on it in more than one way. Some were based at the District level and others at the Area level. They include:

- District Law Enforcement Team (LET) (until mid-2003)
- Area Tactical Crime Unit (from early 2004)
- emergency response
- Intel.

The LET operated from the District headquarters in Otahuhu and utilised intelligence and forensic data to develop profiles on the key offenders and bring them before the court. The two LET teams covered several Police Areas each and were loosely based in the north and the south of the District. They covered commercial as well as domestic burglaries, and were hindered by several high profile murder cases depleting them of detectives during the research period. In 2004 they were relocated in the new Areas, and became Tactical Crime Units (TCUs) supported by enhanced Area Intel. The main change was that they came under the direction of the Area Commander rather than acting independently at the District level.

Offender-focused initiatives

Manurewa Police have placed high priority on offender-focused initiatives. These include:

- directed patrols and targeting offenders
- specialised burglary squads
- bail checks
- special operations such as Card (offender-focused)
- the collection of DNA samples and fingerprints.

The ability to undertake proactive targeting of offenders has been dependent on staff numbers and the quality of Intel. Manurewa was severely understaffed from 2002 until mid-2003 and this meant that proactive initiatives could not be sustained. Specialised burglary squads were initiated to undertake proactive work on burglary and were effective when they

were operating, but staff shortages and the generally high crime rate in Manurewa meant that these were unsustainable.

The seeking of bail conditions at court and the active policing of those conditions has been a key aspect of policing in Manurewa throughout the research period. In 2002 Police reported that bail checks were a high priority. In late 2002 and early 2003 the shortage of staff meant that they were sometimes not able to conduct as many as they wanted. In 2004, Intel introduced a matrix which cross-referenced each top offender with their bail conditions and risk factors. This information was checked for accuracy. It provided a template for conducting bail checks and was updated daily.

In 2003 a special operation called Card was initiated in which fifty-two files on hot offenders were allocated to staff in all sections of the Police in Manurewa. The strategy was to focus a lot of attention on the person in that file, and, for example, if they were out at 2.00am they would be stopped and questioned. The assigned Police officer would then follow up and ask what they were doing out at that time.

Manurewa Police also undertook to collect voluntary DNA samples and fingerprints from offenders and suspects. The importance of this was emphasised at weekly crime meetings and was resulting in an increased number of 'hits' from burglary sites.

Location-focused initiatives

Manurewa Police had been using directed patrols since before the research began in 2002. This was incorporated into standard operational practice throughout the three-year period covered. Intel provided maps which detailed the most recent burglaries, theft from cars and unlawful takings. These maps were tailored by local Intel to produce a Patrolling Report for each shift. The quality of the maps had greatly improved in 2004, with more highly trained Intel staff and better information being received.

In 2003 Manurewa Police identified that 25% of their burglaries were from just 24 streets in the Area. Operation Monopoly, which ran for a month in September 2003, involved the identification of the worst 24 streets (for burglary). Each of these streets was allocated to two officers to police. The Police were encouraged to take a range of proactive initiatives to police the street, including random checking of cars at checkpoints, active bail checks, covert patrols, visible patrols and similar measures.

Victim-focused initiatives

Manurewa Police described three victim-focused initiatives: Neighbourhood Support, Victim Support and the provision of security advice.

There were 260 Neighbourhood Support groups in Manurewa in 2004. However, the number of Manurewa respondents who were members of Neighbourhood Support dropped from 22% in 2002 to 14% in 2004. Those who did belong found it helpful. Neighbourhood Support groups were supported by one part-time coordinator based in Manukau Shopping Centre. Her role as the shopping centre lost property and complaints person prevented her

from getting out into the community to develop groups. They relied heavily on community constables to support the groups, but they were increasingly being loaded with other duties.

Victim Support has been operating in Papakura for over 13 years. This group covers the Manurewa Police Area. Victim Support is based in the Papakura Police Station (outside the Manukau Police Area), and has a close working relationship with and is supported administratively by Police. The Police provide them with copies of the burglary offence report, usually within three days of the burglary and often within one day. Victim Support then makes contact with the victim by letter or phone to see if the person needs support.

Manurewa Police developed a training programme in 2004 for officers attending burglaries and this had increased information on support for victims and security advice. The aim of the programme was to ensure attending officers provided consistent advice to victims.

Property-focused initiatives

Members of LET liaised with second-hand dealers in the District, as had members of specialised burglary squads in Manurewa when they were operating. Intel also established an 0800 number for dealers to call to check serial numbers on items people brought in to sell. In 2004 the TCU in Manurewa undertook liaison with this sector. One of the issues raised by TCU was that dealers had several ways of circumventing the legislation; in one case the licensee blamed an employee for receiving stolen goods and fired him when the Police identified the goods, but then re-hired him. Second-hand dealers emphasised the need to have a consistent liaison person within the Police and had a range of suggestions which would improve the exchange of information.

General crime reduction initiatives

Manurewa Police are involved in a range of programmes whose aim is to reduce or prevent offending, such as:

- Youth Aid
- community policing
- Youth Development Project
- Police in schools
- Youth Patrols.

The Youth Development Project is based in Clendon Police station and provides a 'wrap around' service for highly recidivist youth offenders. The Manurewa Police also had officers based part-time in three local high schools. Their role was to deal with the range of petty offending at the school and also with care and protection issues. Key partners in crime prevention in the area are Manukau City Council, Housing New Zealand, and Counties/Manukau Sports Foundation.

Conclusions

In the first years of the case study Manurewa was hindered in its burglary reduction strategy by the lack of staff and the lack of direct control over significant resources. Under the new structure, launched at the start of 2004, the Area Commander was able to utilise these increased resources directly and build a more effective approach through increased Intel capability and tactical coordination but utilising the same kinds of strategies which had proven effective in the past.

The crime statistics and household surveys indicate Manurewa's increased effectiveness.

- Overall, the total crime rate decreased in Manurewa from 1997 to 2004 by 21.7%, whereas nationally, there was a 20.1% decrease in the same period.
- In 2002 the dwelling burglary figures increased dramatically, by 15.5%, coinciding with staff shortages and the absence of proactive units.
- Dwelling burglary figures decreased in 2003 by 13% and in 2004 by 16.2%.
- The dwelling burglary rate per 10,000 population decreased by 47.2% between 1997 and 2004, and by 25.8% from 2000 to 2004.

1 Introduction

The Ministry of Justice, in partnership with the New Zealand Police, has conducted research over three years (2002–2004) on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary. This case study report is the final report examining burglary initiatives undertaken in the Manurewa Police Area. Three other Police Areas in New Zealand are also part of the project—Sydenham, Lower Hutt and Rotorua.

1.1 The objectives of the research

The objectives of this research were to:

1. examine Police best practice, including Police initiatives in partnership with communities, in relation to residential burglary reduction; to understand which practices are effective in which contexts and why
2. gain an understanding of some wider contextual factors that influence the effectiveness of burglary initiatives
3. examine effectiveness in relation to the incidence of burglary, the resolution of burglary, public satisfaction and perceptions of safety
4. examine any unintended effects of burglary initiatives, such as displacement.

This report starts with a community profile to provide information about the Manurewa Area, as it was recognised that contextual factors are important to take into consideration when examining what works and how it works in a particular environment. The community profile gives an overview of demographic and geographical information and general crime in the Area. This is followed by a description of at-risk groups of offenders and victims, locations and property identified by key respondents interviewed for the evaluation.

Section 3 looks at Police structures and strategies for burglary reduction at the National, District and Area levels during the research period. Cross-focused initiatives that utilise a number of approaches are examined in Section 4. The rest of the report organises the burglary initiatives by their focus on offenders, victims, location or property. General crime prevention initiatives developed by the Police and other key partners which have some impact on reducing potential burglars are discussed in Section 9.

Section 10 provides an analysis of crime statistics for the Manurewa Police Area over the period of the research and compares Manurewa with New Zealand as a whole. Results from the Household Burglary Survey (2002 and 2004) undertaken with 500 households in each of the four Police Areas are incorporated into the report.

Section 11 discusses the overall effectiveness of the Manurewa burglary reduction effort.

1.2 Methodology

This section gives an overview of the methodology used for the evaluation.

1.2.1 Study design

This evaluation aims to find out about effective burglary reduction initiatives in order to communicate best practice to Police and community partners. It was recognised that different environmental factors such as demographics, geography, crime rate, community involvement, and local Police organisational structures could impact on the development, implementation and effectiveness of burglary initiatives. The design therefore involved an in-depth case study approach to be conducted in four Police Areas over a period of three years (2002–2004).

This type of design is known as realistic evaluation, and was developed by researchers working on various crime prevention evaluations sponsored by the British Home Office in the 1990s.¹

1.2.2 Police Area selection

The four Police Areas were selected based on a scoping study conducted in 2001 that took into consideration:

- the above environmental factors
- what could be learned from each Area
- the Police Area's willingness to take part in the study.

Police Areas with middle to high burglary rates and a range of different environmental factors representative of the majority of New Zealand were chosen so that lessons learned from these study sites would be informative for other Police Areas.

1.2.3 Conceptual framework for burglary reduction initiatives

In any community, a range of initiatives is likely to be in place for the purpose of addressing and preventing burglary. Initiatives range from specific Police interventions, such as targeting offenders, to interventions delivered to victims, such as security advice, through to more generally focused interventions, such as programmes for at-risk young people. The conceptual framework for the evaluation organised particular initiatives under the following categories:

- 'hot' offenders—initiatives which targeted known burglars
- 'hot' victims—initiatives which aimed to increase the security of victims
- 'hot' locations—initiatives which involved targeted patrolling of locations with high burglary concentrations

¹ Pawson, R. and Tilley, N. 1997. *Realistic Evaluation*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

- ‘hot’ property—initiatives which aimed to reduce the market for burgled goods and identify stolen property.

1.2.4 Information collection methods

The study design included a range of information collection methods to examine the burglary initiatives in each study Area and identify the mechanisms that led to burglary reduction. For example, enforcing bail conditions for known burglars might be expected to lead to a reduction in repeat offending through the mechanism of incapacitation. Using a range of methods allowed for verification of the results because if diverse kinds of data lead to the same conclusions, then more confidence can be placed in the validity and reliability of those conclusions.

The information collection methods for the current report included:

- Community profile
 - demographic and socio-economic data on each Area
 - general information on crime in the Area
 - identification of contextual factors, including risk and protective factors, that impacted on the incidence of burglary
- *Interviews*—Semi-structured face-to-face interviews were conducted with key respondents who had knowledge of burglary from the Police, the criminal justice sector and community organisations.
- *Household Burglary Survey 2002, 2004*—A survey of 500 households was conducted in each of the study Areas in 2002 and again in 2004 to find out:
 - fear of crime
 - burglary victimization
 - security measures people use
 - satisfaction with Police practice.

The surveys were conducted face-to-face with one householder aged 16 years and over in 2002 and in 2004.

- *Quantitative data from New Zealand Police and the Ministry of Justice*—Data was analysed to assess the effectiveness of burglary initiatives by examining burglary rates in regards to incidence and resolution of burglary. Unintended effects of burglary initiatives such as displacement to other Police Areas or types of offences were examined.

1.2.5 Ethics and project management

The evaluation proposal was submitted to the Justice Sector Research Group for ethical advice. The ethical standards of the Australasian Evaluation Society and the Association of Social Science Researchers have been followed. An advisory group consisting of representatives of key stakeholder agencies provided advice on the design, conduct and management of the project and review of draft reports.

1.2.6 Reporting


In addition to the Area case studies, the full study includes reports on interviews with victims and offenders, Household Burglary Surveys in 2002 and 2004, a review of the international literature, and an overview report that analyses all information gathered over the three-year evaluation period.

2 Community profile

Manurewa Police Area is part of the Counties-Manukau Police District, which is the southernmost District of the Auckland Metropolitan area. The Manurewa Police Area was renamed Counties-Manukau Central in 2004, after restructuring of the District. Manurewa Police Area serves a population of 66,081, which is primarily based within Manurewa Township and in the fast-growing suburbs of Clendon and Weymouth. The Police Area extends from Manukau City Centre in the north to Weymouth Rd in the south. There are two separate shopping centres in Manurewa Police Area: Manukau City Centre and the older West Plaza in Manurewa's South Mall.

Manukau City Centre is the seat of local government and central government services. It has a large shopping complex with all the major chain stores as well as the cinema complex for the area. A feature of the area is the Manukau Harbour, which provides the western border, and some green open spaces of mangrove and tidal inlets.

Figure 2.1: Counties-Manukau Police District 2004



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2.1.1 Census and other data

Unless otherwise stated, population statistics discussed in this section are from the 2001 census, matched to the Manurewa Police Area boundary.

2.1.2 Population

The total population in the Manurewa Police Area in 2001 was 66,081, with 43% of these being under 25 years of age. Of the total population, 51% identified themselves as New Zealand European, 26.5% as Maori, 23.8% as Pacific people, and 9.7% as Asian. The population is growing quickly, and Police estimate the population had increased to 74,900 by 2003.

Manurewa has a much younger population than the New Zealand average and a much greater proportion of young Maori and Pacific Island people. For example, young Maori people (under 20 years) made up 14% of the total population in Manurewa compared to 7% nationally, and Pacific Island youth constituted 9% of the total Manurewa population compared to 3% nationally. Counties-Manukau District is projected over the next five years to have the fastest growth rate for Maori youth of any of the Police Districts. Meanwhile, European-origin youth constituted 10% of the Manurewa Area population compared to 19% nationally.

2.1.3 Socio-economic status

The New Zealand Deprivation Index (NZDep), based on census data, is commonly used as an indicator of an area's socio-economic status. The NZDep is a weighted average of:

- income
- income support
- employment status qualifications
- home ownership
- access to motor vehicles and telephones
- household occupancy
- family type.

A score of ten on the NZDep indicates the area has a high level of deprivation, being in the most deprived 10% of all areas in New Zealand. In the Counties-Manukau Health area, 35% of the population was either a nine or a ten on the deprivation index. An analysis of population mesh blocks rated Clendon ten, East and Central Manurewa nine, Weymouth eight and Hill Park four on this index.

2.1.4 Income

Manurewa Police Area's distribution of income was similar to that for New Zealand as a whole. In 2001, 41% of those aged 15 years and over earned less than \$20,000, compared to 46% nationally

Thirty-four percent of the population (15,843) relied on the state for their income. The population was generally unskilled, with 29% of people over the age of 15 years having no formal qualifications. In the Maori population 43% had no qualifications, compared with 28% of Europeans. Of the households at the time of the last census, 24.5% were comprised of one parent plus one or more children, compared with 17% for New Zealand generally.

A higher proportion of people in Manurewa Police Area receive state benefits than for New Zealand overall, except for fewer receiving student allowances and government superannuation or veterans pension. The proportion of people in receipt of the Domestic Purposes Benefit is almost double that of New Zealand (6.3% versus 3.7%).

2.1.5 Employment

Manurewa Police Area had similar proportions of the population in full-time paid employment (44.6% versus 44.1%), a lower proportion in part-time paid employment (9.3% versus 12.6%), and a higher proportion of unemployed (7.4% versus 4.8%). When analysed by ethnicity, a relatively high proportion of those unemployed were Maori and Pacific people. In a total labour force of 32,874 in Manurewa, 3453 (10.4%) were unemployed². Of these unemployed, 40% were Maori, 22% were Pacific peoples, 21% were Pakeha and 9% were Asian. For those aged between 21 and 30 years who were unemployed, 60.6% were unemployed Maori and 19.2% were unemployed European.

According to Manukau City Council, 47% of the working population of the Manukau District are employed as professionals, managers or clerks, whilst 20% are employed in the manufacturing industry³.

2.1.6 Qualifications

Manurewa has a lower proportion of qualified people than New Zealand overall. Almost 30% of the population had no qualifications at all and fewer had any qualification compared to the national average. Lack of education and low valuing of education were noted by many respondents as a contributing factor in the pattern of offending. When analysed by ethnicity, all four ethnic groups had a higher percentage of people without formal qualifications than in New Zealand as a whole:

- 42.9% of Maori in Manurewa had no qualifications versus 37% of Maori nationally
- 28% of Europeans compared to 23% nationally
- 20% of Asians compared to 12% nationally.

Pacific peoples had a similar proportion of people without qualifications as in New Zealand as a whole. Similarly, in Manurewa there was a smaller proportion of people with university degrees in each ethnic group compared to national figures (Maori 1.2% compared to 3% nationally, European 4% compared to 7% nationally, Asian 9% compared to 14% nationally, and Pacific people 1.4 % compared to 2.4 % nationally).

² This figure is taken from the total labour force figure as compared to the population 15 years and over.

³ Manurewa Ward census 2001 results.

2.1.7 Household composition and family type

The Manurewa Police Area had a total of 19,278 private occupied dwellings in 2001. Manurewa Police Area had a lower proportion of the population residing in one-family households (75% compared with 79% nationally), and many more residing in households with two or more families (12.5% versus 4.7%). In Manurewa 11% of the households consisted of one parent and children compared with 9.7% nationally.

According to the Manukau City Council statistics for Manurewa ward (based on the 2001 Census), 58% of households live in dwellings owned by the residents and 32% live in rental accommodation, with 10% not stated or unidentifiable.

Census data classifies families in terms of the presence or absence of couples, parents and children. The Manurewa Police Area has a relatively high proportion of sole parent families (20.0%) in comparison to New Zealand as a whole (14%).

2.1.8 Differences between the communities

Most of the Manurewa Police Area scores low on the NZ Dep, with one or two exceptions. Respondents commented on the difference between Manurewa Central and wealthier places such as Hill Park. The main differences within the Area can perhaps be attributed to the older established community and the new 'satellite' estates, such as Clendon, which were developed in the 1980's.

Clendon is one of the fastest growing areas of Manurewa, with a population of 9,000. On the WINZ register for Clendon, 3764 residents were on a benefit, 1319 of whom were unemployment beneficiaries. There were 1850 residential properties, and Housing New Zealand is landlord to approximately 500 of those properties. Of the total residential properties, 35% of the residents were homeowners.

The older established areas of Manurewa have correspondingly strong community structure—reflected in voluntary groups, clubs and other organisations. Newer suburbs have less capacity to respond to perceived needs or threats. This is reflected in the difficulty of getting Neighbourhood Support groups started in areas such as Clendon and Weymouth. On the other hand, City Council community advisers report a range of active community networks and organisations that attempt to deal with complex issues such as truancy. The Clendon Community Network provides an opportunity for community agencies, residents and government departments to share information and develop joint projects.

Despite factors such as high unemployment, low average income, and a high percentage of single parent families, local residents seem to have a sense of community pride and enjoy living in this area. In a 2001 house-to-house survey in Clendon, 81% rated it above five on a scale of 0–10, with 10 being the highest.

2.2 Householders' perceptions of crime in Manurewa

The Ministry of Justice commissioned NFO New Zealand to conduct household surveys in 2002 and again in 2004 in the Police Areas of Manurewa, Rotorua, Lower Hutt (Hutt City) and Sydenham (Spreydon/Heathcote). The 2002 survey asked about household burglaries over the period January 2001 to August/September 2002, as well as current information on other aspects of crime and crime prevention. The 2004 survey did the same for the period January 2003 to August/September 2004.

In Manurewa all respondents agreed that Manurewa faced a very large crime problem across all kinds of offences. Not only was there a high rate of burglary, there was also a great deal of serious crime which placed demands on Police resources. All respondents seemed to be well aware of the connection between deprivation and crime, and were conversant with programmes which sought to address issues from a variety of angles.

The Ministry also analysed crime data for each of the Police Areas for burglaries committed in 2002 and 2004 to provide an indication of impacts of Police strategies in these Areas. Points from the Household Survey are highlighted in shaded boxes in this report.

New Zealand had a lower crime rate than Manurewa for the period 1997 to 2001. There was a steady decrease in the national crime rate, whereas in Manurewa, the crime rate increased and decreased from 1997 to 2001.

Overall, the total crime rate decreased in Manurewa from 1997 to 2004 by 21.7%, whereas nationally there was a 20.1% decrease in the total crime rate from 1997 to 2004. The crime rate increased nationally in 2002, but it was greater in Manurewa (5.3%) than in New Zealand (1.7%). There was a decrease in 2003 in both Manurewa (4.6%) and New Zealand (1.2%). The crime rate continued to decrease in 2004, with much larger decreases occurring in Manurewa (14.1%) than in New Zealand (9.3%)⁴.

⁴ See Section 10 for full crime statistics for Manurewa and New Zealand.

Household Survey (2002, 2004)

Concern about crime in Manurewa was higher than in the other Areas surveyed. Of those who thought crime is a problem, burglary was almost universally considered to be a problem, although this may be partly due to the fact that this was known to be a survey about burglary. The next most likely crimes to be mentioned were graffiti (28%), car theft (24%) and vandalism (19%). The number of people concerned about crime in Manurewa dropped from 62% in 2002 to 55% in 2004, although burglary remained the highest concern.

Manurewa also had a significantly higher proportion of respondents than other Areas who thought there had been more crime in the last 12 months than before and who were very worried about being the victim of crime. In 2002 and 2004 around three-quarters of Manurewa respondents were either very worried or fairly worried about being the victim of a burglary, a higher level of concern than about other types of crime. However, by 2004, the proportion of people who thought there had been 'a lot more crime' had halved and there was a significant increase in the proportion of people who thought there was 'a little less crime'.

2.2.1 Perceived risk factors for burglary offending

The following are some of the issues specifically noted by those interviewed as contributing to the risk of offending. The Police District plan identifies the following sociological factors that impact upon policing in Counties-Manukau District and provides a succinct summary of issues identified by respondents for Manurewa.

Much of the Area features highly in the national deprivation index with the socio-economic status of the community being reflected in correspondingly high levels of crime.⁵

The Police Business plan outlined the following sociological influences which impact on policing in the area:

- low per capita incomes
- high levels of unemployment compared to the national average
- high rates of dependency on welfare assistance
- insufficient provision of social services and community support amenities
- strained resources of partner agencies such as Child, Youth and Family (CYF) and mental health providers
- high-density areas of low-cost state housing
- poor public health amongst Maori and Pacific peoples
- poor levels of educational achievement
- high numbers of low decile schools

⁵ *Counties-Manukau District Policing Plan 2003/2004.*

- a large Maori and Pacific Island community
- a disproportionately large population of young people
- large numbers of dysfunctional families
- high numbers of sole-parent families.

The Police and other agencies were very aware of the issues facing a community where many households were on low incomes and had inadequate formal education. This manifested in issues such as truancy and transience. Due to the high number of children living with one parent, there was a great deal of movement of children between parents and other family members within and outside the area. This made it more difficult for schools and youth agencies to remain in relationships with at-risk young people.

Respondents reported that while there were a range of sports clubs and facilities in the Area, there were barriers to participation for at-risk young people. Barriers identified included:

- lack of parental support to drive them to an event
- inability to afford the equipment or fees
- lack of adult role models (male role models in particular).

The other aspect mentioned was an inability of young people to commit to regular structured practice and a preference for informal activity.

Another risk factor identified was the cycle of unemployment, poverty and debt. One officer spoke of the vicious role of loan sharks who lend people money on a short-term basis to cover bills, at an extremely high interest rate. People are unable to pay it back and as the amount escalates, they are driven to crime such as burglary to get them out of the cycle.

2.2.2 Truancy

A Police exercise carried out several years ago found that on one day in Manurewa 1200 children were absent from one of the local primary or secondary schools without reason. Police believe that truants were committing many of the burglaries in the Area; Police statistics indicate that a lot of the burglaries were being committed between 11.00am and 5.00pm. There were a number of Police and community initiatives to reduce juvenile offending and truancy.

2.2.3 Youth culture

With a young population and a high youth offending rate it is important to understand what issues were facing young people in Manurewa. Most people interviewed were acutely aware of the issues and mentioned their links with youth organisations and networks.

A representative of CYF said:

Burglaries seem to occur in groups with young people—they feel that there is nothing to do so that is what they do. The kids attach themselves to different groups—there is a lot of peer pressure—girls too

over the past few years—they have no qualms in dealing the same way as boys—sometimes worse. There is a real identity problem—it's Maori primarily; they've lost their respect for older people.

A Pacific Youth court adviser said:

With Polynesian young people they were caught up in quite different cultures—there's the school culture, the family and church culture and then there is the 'freedom' culture so when you get a young person coming here to court, their parents will say 'he's a good boy and goes to choir practice'—whereas when he is with his friends he is in a different culture with different rules—so this is the struggle these kids were having.

A Scene of Crime Officer (SOCO) said:

We have families here who were third generation of families who have never worked and who have lived from crime.

2.2.4 Parenting

Many people spoke about the attitudes of people in the Area to crime—that there was a high tolerance of crime and truancy within families and social groups. This was reflected, according to some, in a range of things, including poor parenting and abuse by parents.

2.5.5 Transience

Police initiatives were seen to be impaired due to there being a high degree of transience—not only with young people moving between households, but with high turnover of tenancies in rental accommodation, with people visiting the Area to drink and socialise. Housing New Zealand was addressing the issue by improving the houses in their jurisdiction. In 2002 they had begun to notice some effect, with turnover slowing down in the Area.

People also travel between other South Auckland communities such as Otaru and Mangere, with children moving around to stay with relatives in different areas. Adults are moving between these areas to socialise with drugs and alcohol, which often leads to offending. Such transience makes it difficult to maintain profiles of offenders.

2.2.6 Gangs, alcohol and drugs

Another factor mentioned by respondents was the high number of liquor outlets in the Area. There are twelve liquor outlets in the South Mall centre alone. The presence of gangs in the Area and their connection to drugs was noted by many as a key factor in burglaries. Young people are recruited to burgle houses to keep cash coming in and to purchase drugs.

2.2.7 Perceived risk factors for burglary victimisation

In the Household Burglary Survey respondents were asked whether they perceived any particular groups in the community as more at risk of being victims.

Household Survey (2002, 2004)

In 2002, a significantly higher proportion of Manurewa respondents (51%) thought it would be difficult to get into their home compared to the average of other Areas. Specifically, 21% thought it would be very easy, 29%⁶ thought it would be fairly easy, 32% thought it would be fairly difficult, 15% thought it would be very difficult, and 2% didn't know.

The use of security measures did not significantly change between 2002 and 2004. In Manurewa a higher proportion of people used security measures than in other Areas. In 2004, 76% of respondents had relatively comprehensive security—with deadlocks, security lighting, burglar alarms and window latches. Sixty-one percent of respondents said they had alarms in 2002, and this dropped to 54% in 2004.

In 2004, of the 260 Manurewa respondents who thought it would be easy to get in to their homes, the most common reasons mentioned (unprompted) for not doing more to protect their home from possible burglary were:

- can't afford to (29%)
- someone home most of the time (17%)
- wouldn't work (17%)
- because it's a rented property (17%).

Although burglaries occurred throughout the Area, respondents believed that poor security measures contributed most to the likelihood of being a victim of burglary. Some sections of the community were perceived to be at less risk due to them being more financially secure and able to alarm their homes, and provide better locks and fastenings.

2.2.8 Burglary victimisation

The Household Survey conducted in Manurewa asked the 500 respondents if they had experienced any burglaries since the previous January. Of those who had, the survey asked for details of the most recent completed burglary they had experienced, including whether the burglary had become known to the Police, and if it had, their satisfaction with the Police.

2.2.9 Burglary prevalence and incidence rates

Concern about burglary in Manurewa appears to be well founded, as the Area had a significantly higher burglary rate than the other Areas studied. In 2001, 60 of the 500 households surveyed in Manurewa experienced a burglary, giving a prevalence rate of 12.0%. This was the highest rate of the four Areas surveyed. In 2004, the number of households which had experienced a burglary had dropped to 48, a prevalence rate of 9.4%.

⁶ Household Burglary Survey results marked with a ^[+] are significantly greater than the average of the other three study areas, whereas ^[−] indicates a result significantly lower than the average. Other results are not significantly different from the average of the other three study areas.

More households experienced an attempted burglary (7.6%) than a successful burglary (6.2%). In 2004 3.5% experienced attempted and 6.5% completed burglaries.

The estimated incidence rate of 18.6% from the survey was much higher than the incidence rate of 6.1% for burglaries recorded by the Police in 2001 (i.e. the number of dwelling burglaries recorded by the Police per 100 dwellings for the Manurewa Police Area). In part this discrepancy is because not all burglaries are reported to the Police. For example, the most recent successful burglary was reported to the Police in 70% of cases. In addition, not all reported burglaries are recorded in the Police burglary statistics. In 2003 the incidence rate from the survey was 13.9%.

The total burglary prevalence rate was significantly higher in Manurewa than in any of the other Areas. The difference was quite marked, with total prevalence rates of 6.8% in both Hutt City and Spreydon/Heathcote and 8.8% in Rotorua, compared to the 12.0% in Manurewa. Manurewa had a higher prevalence rate than any of the other three Areas for both attempted and successful burglaries, although the successful burglary rate was not significantly higher than that in Rotorua.

2.2.10 Details of most recent burglary

Details of the burglary were gathered for the *most recent* completed burglary (i.e. where the burglar successfully gained entry), in Manurewa a sample of 93 burglaries. All but one Manurewa respondent used one or more household security measures, the most commonly mentioned being simple precautions such as closing and locking windows and doors. Manurewa households were more likely than other Areas to have specialised security devices, including:

- alarms
- deadlocks and other types of door security
- window safety latches
- security lighting.

Property was stolen in 80% (76% in 2004) of burglaries where the burglar successfully gained entry, while damage was somewhat less common (65% in 2002, 48% in 2004). Violence or a threat of violence was relatively rare (two cases in Manurewa), even though 26% of burglaries occurred while someone was at home in the 2002 survey. The percentage of people at home at the time of the burglary increased in 2004 to 33%, and the percentage at work went from 26% in 2002 to 33% in 2004.

2.2.11 Reporting of burglary and satisfaction with Police services

The most recent completed reported burglary was reported to the Police in 72% of the cases in 2002. This increased in 2004 to 78% of the cases. The most common reason given for not reporting a burglary was that the Police would not have been interested, or that the Police could not have done anything.

Of those who did notify the Police in 2002, a significantly higher number (47%) were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with how the Police dealt with the burglary compared to the average of the other three Areas. Six respondents (16%) were very satisfied with the way the Police dealt with the burglary, seven (18%) were satisfied, seven (18%) were neutral, 13 (34%)^[+] were dissatisfied and five (13%) were very dissatisfied.

In 2004, the percentage of those who were either satisfied or very satisfied with the Police had increased from 34% to 36% and the percentage of those who were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied decreased from 47% to 39%. The percentage of those who were neutral increased from 18% to 24%.

3 Overall Police structures and strategies

3.1 Police strategies

This section describes the burglary reduction strategies at the National, District and Area levels in relation to meeting crime reduction outcomes, and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the overall strategies to reduce burglary. It also describes the relationship between Police and other government and community agencies in the Area.

3.2 National strategies

One of the goals of the government's Crime Reduction Strategy was to focus on burglary, which it identified as a high-volume crime that has a serious impact on victims and communities. In June 2000, the Justice and Police Ministers announced a new major burglary strategy. Over \$13 million in additional funding was awarded to the Police to be spent during 2000–2003 to reduce burglary, particularly repeat burglary. Government priorities were translated into Police objectives in the annual *New Zealand Police Departmental Forecast Report* and the *New Zealand Police Strategic Plan to 2006*. The *Strategic Plan to 2006* identified two strategic goals of community safety and crime reduction, and included a stated commitment to achieving national targets for violence, youth safety, organised crime, burglary and road safety.

The Police National Dwelling Burglary Reduction Strategy, developed during 2002, provided Police Districts and Areas a framework to work within in order to reduce residential burglary rates. The strategy:

- encouraged Police to establish lead roles with communities to prevent burglaries
- advocated intelligence-led policing to identify burglary problems and develop appropriate responses, with an increased emphasis on the use of informers and extended interviewing of burglary offenders
- stressed the need for Police to evaluate their burglary related strategies and share good practice.

The strategy also encouraged each Police Area's burglary strategy to focus on repeat offenders, victims and locations, and disrupting stolen property distribution networks, with initiatives within each of these focuses directed towards the prevention of burglary, identification and resolution of burglary problems, and enforcement. The strategy also outlined how Police intended to achieve a national target of reducing residential burglary for the 2002–2003 financial year by 3% and increasing resolutions to 18%.

The national priorities were communicated to the District Commanders within these documents and during the Police Executive Conference; however, District Commanders had considerable flexibility and discretion in developing local strategies. District Commanders were held accountable by means of an annual District appraisal based on specific performance measures. In the case of residential burglary, these measures were in the form of population-based recorded residential burglary rates and resolution rates.


3.2.1 Policing Development Unit

District Commanders have a great deal of autonomy in what strategies they employ and in how they allocate their resources to support these strategies. The national headquarters Policing Development Unit provides an internal consultancy role to support District and Area Commanders. They provide support and disseminate information through seminars, workshops, conferences and newsletters.

The Police have been promoting the problem-solving approach to reducing crime, which involves more analysis of the conditions which encourage crime and victimisation. For example, when a lot of crime is happening in one area, instead of just increasing the patrolling in that area Police are being asked to think about what factors in that area might be encouraging crime.

A review of intelligence in the three Police Districts in Auckland in 2003–2004 by Australian criminologist Gerry Ratcliffe⁷ produced a series of recommendations involving the use of crime mapping, greater use of intelligence and the adoption of the ‘3I’ model, which shows the interrelationship between interpretation of the criminal environment, analysis, and then impacting on that environment through decision makers deploying resources in the right way.

Figure 3.1: 3 ‘I’ Model



⁷ For a description of this model see Ratcliffe, J. 2002. Intelligence-led policing and the problems of turning rhetoric into reality. *Policing and Society* 12 (1): 53–66.

In order to successfully operate this model, Police have had to greatly increase their Intel capacity and change traditional policing methods. The key means of disseminating the new approach has been Intel training at the Police College. In over two years 460 analysts have attended basic and advanced courses.

Problem analysis involves building in the problem analysis components—people, products and processes—with the result that people are more professionalized. The tactical tasks involve meetings once a week, establishing priorities, making decisions, allocating clearly assigned tasks and bringing in key partners.

The new approach has been taken up by enthusiastic District and Area Commanders. The adoption of the model has not been made a requirement, but Commanders are required to report back their crime reduction strategies and the evidence being provided by the problem solving model has convinced many others to adopt it.

3.3 District strategy

In Counties-Manukau the strategies are described in the District plans developed each year. Burglary reduction has featured as one of the top five outcomes for each year of the research period. In July 2001 the District released the *Counties-Manukau Police District Burglary Strategy Paper*. The strategy outlined in the paper aimed to:

- maintain rates of offending at below 121 per 10,000 of population
- increase the resolution rate to a minimum of 15% of the reported offences in the first year
- increase community capacity to respond to security issues
- increase services to victims
- reduce the crime rate by at least 15% in the first year of implementation
- reduce recorded burglaries by youth offenders
- reduce the fear of crime and repeat victimisation
- improve Police performance.

The main implementation mechanisms described in the paper were:

- Q-car scene attendance with Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU) investigative support
- Law Enforcement Team (LET) proactively targeting 'hot' spots based on Intel assessments of offender and offence trends
- A dedicated burglary squad which would provide:
 - targeted patrols
 - scene attendance
 - investigative responsibilities
 - integrated file management system.

Support for the implementation of strategies at Area level would be from the local Intel officer, Youth Aid, Youth Education and community constables.

The Area Controllers were required to develop initiatives in line with this strategy and were answerable to the District Commander for the performance of their Area.

3.4 Manurewa Area strategies

3.4.1 Area strategies in 2002

Manurewa Area strategies in 2002 were developed from the District business plan. They focused on targeting of 'hot' offenders and 'hot' locations. The Area Controller regarded burglary as one of her top five priorities. She was severely understaffed in 2002, and said that many initiatives which had proved to be effective were being disbanded due to staffing demands.

Manurewa Police operated directed patrols to target the top ten offenders for the week, and the locations which had higher incidences of burglary. Each shift was encouraged to conduct bail checks and this was regarded as a routine behaviour by frontline Police, but depended on staff levels and to some extent the enthusiasm of the shift sergeant. In 2000 and 2001, Manurewa operated a Street Crime Unit, whose role was to undertake proactive initiatives to reduce burglary. This unit was ring-fenced from other duties and when it was operating at full strength was regarded by Police to have been very effective. In 2002 this unit had been more or less disbanded due to severe staff shortages.

3.4.2 Area strategies in 2003

In 2003, Manurewa continued with their strategies of bail checks and directed patrols and also introduced a dedicated burglary officer who attended all burglaries, dealt with all the files and followed up investigations. Later in 2003, the acting Area Commander expanded this to a small burglary squad named the Direct Targeting Unit. This squad consisted of one officer and two constables on a rotating shift from General Duties Branch (GDB). The idea of this squad was to:

- attend all burglaries
- follow up summonses and arrest warrants
- free up the GDB staff for proactive policing.

The acting Area Controller developed a high media profile which focused on the aim of reducing crime in the Area and reducing burglary in particular. He introduced some month-long initiatives such as Projects Card and Monopoly. The former focused on the top 52 offenders in the Area, and the latter on streets which had high levels of offending. These are described in detail in Section 5.5 and Section 6.2. These initiatives were highly publicised through local media, national television and in person by the Area Commander, who spoke to many groups to explain the strategy.

3.4.3 Area strategies in 2004

The Area still took its direction from the District Plan, but developed key action points, each with its own performance standards and measures.

The key action points on burglary were:

- improved Police performance through specific focus on 'hot' locations, victims, offenders and commodities
- reduced repeat victimisation through
 - target hardening
 - joint problem-solving
 - increased community crime prevention advice
 - provision of a graded response for repeat victims
- risk management of each Area's top five suspected offenders with a focus on youth and recidivists
- revitalisation of Neighbourhood Support groups and crime watch
- Intelligence-focused Police resource deployment including directed patrolling for bail, curfew and parole breaches
- increased focus on the disposal of commodities obtained thorough burglary
- quality examination of scenes by SOCO.

Integral to the strategy was the lifting of performance in routine procedures, such as taking of ORs and processing of files. One hundred percent compliance was required to the standards outlined in documentation developed by Intel. Training and supervision was increased on these key requirements.

Compliance was also required on the giving of crime prevention advice, increasing Neighbourhood Support groups, and following directed patrol plans.

3.5 Police structures

3.5.1 Police structures in 2002

In 2002 Counties-Manukau District delivered a number of burglary responses from the District level. These included LET, Emergency Response (ER) and Intel. Two ER response teams covered the whole District. I-cars, which attended priority calls, were dispatched from Papakura to attend calls in Manurewa. This southern response unit covered callouts from Howick to Tuakau in the south. The SOCO teams covered several Police Areas, and those covering Manurewa were based in Papakura. There were several Metro policing units which supported the wider metropolitan policing strategies.

The LET was set up in 2000 to address serious crime. In Counties-Manukau the LET teams were loosely based in the north and south of the District. Those responsible for Manurewa

were based at the headquarters in Otahuhu. The LET was tasked to focus on burglary through the use of intelligence and forensic data to identify key offenders. District Intel had two full-time staff working on burglary analysis. They provided weekly information to Police Areas on 'hot' locations, top offenders and patterns of modus operandi (MO).

In 2002 the Manurewa Police were eight staff below their official allocation of 57 full-time equivalents (including sworn and non-sworn staff). The Area Controller had five sergeants reporting to her, and three of these sergeants had patrol staff of six or seven. The Youth and Community services included Youth Aid, three community constables and two Youth Education Officers. They also include the Youth at Risk project, which is made up of three non-sworn staff. There were eight staff members in the CIU based in Manurewa. Lock-up facilities were at Papakura, twenty minutes drive from Manurewa.

3.5.2 Police structures in 2003

In October 2003 approval was given for the Counties-Manukau Police District to restructure and reduce from seven Police Areas to four: Eastern (previously Howick and Otara), Western (previously Otahuhu-Papatoetoe and Mangere), Central (previously Manurewa), and Southern (previously Papakura and Pukekohe).

The changes included reorganisation of key functions within each Area. These were:

- Area Controller rank was increased to Band 2 Inspector
- three core functional streams were developed: Response, Investigations, Youth and Community
- response function provided total response within the Area
- resources for Area investigation function increased
- Youth and Community Services delivered services across the Area
- Supervisors were aligned with staff on a shift-by-shift basis.

The main result of the changes was that emergency response resources (I-cars), the LET and Intel would be based in and managed by the Area Commander. District would retain Strategic Traffic Unit, SOCO, Fraud Squad, Child Abuse Team and an administrative Criminal Investigations Branch (CIB) function. It also resulted in the Intel capacity being developed at the Area level rather than at District Headquarters. Manurewa went from one Intel officer in 2002 to three Intel analysts in 2004.

For Manurewa this meant that not only did staff move in to a new purpose-built station in July, but within a few months the staff numbers increased to 110, with 94 sworn and 16 non-sworn staff. The restructuring and rebuilding/relocating required a period of readjustment in the latter half of 2003 (for the new station) and the end of the year for the roll-out of the new structure. Leadership changes at the top and the recruitment of new staff from overseas were other factors being managed.

An acting Area Controller was in place from July to December whilst the restructuring took place. He instituted several high-profile campaigns aimed at reducing crime in Manurewa which also did much to develop a team approach from the many different units which came

together. The new Area Commander was appointed before the end of the year and took up his position in late January 2004.

3.5.3 Police structures in 2004

The new Area Commander had the challenge of integrating the new staff, developing internal processes, and developing a strategy for crime and crash reduction at the Area level. The new Police station (built for the previous structure) was quickly filled to capacity. However, the Police were pleased to have lock-up facilities and the ER cars based at the station. The key changes made by the Area Commander tightened the tactical deployment of Police resources. He did this through:

- the introduction of the tasking coordination group (composed of the senior officers)
- the weekly crime meeting (composed of all staff and key partners)
- better-directed daily briefings.

A Burglary Takings Squad was established composed of a sergeant plus six staff who were rotated from GDB. This Squad handled all enquiries and files as well as security information and support for victims. The Tactical Crime Unit (TCU) (ex LET) was focused on emerging crime problems and trends. The Intel section had an officer in charge (OC) plus two analysts, one who had burglary as his focus.

4 Cross-focused initiatives

4.1 Introduction

The following positions, practices and initiatives within the Manurewa Police Area had a broad focus across offender, victim, location, and property strategies.

4.1.1 General burglary response

In 2002 and 2003, section staff would attend historical burglaries. Manurewa patrol sections were operating two eight-hour shifts to attend priority two jobs. These shifts were 7.00am–3.00pm and 3.00pm–11.00pm. Eighty percent of their workload involved dealing with burglaries. In 2002, they averaged six to seven burglaries per shift. Each burglary required a minimum of 30 minutes to take the information if there was no evidence. If there was evidence they dusted for fingerprints, made enquiries of neighbours and followed up other leads. The file was then completed, logged and sent to District Intel.

The Manurewa officers were required to complete their files in detail, with diagrams of entry points and other evidence. The offence report (OR) was then entered into the system. Intel mentioned that this was more information than many other Police Areas fed into the system, and despite the time it took, it helped to build up a profile of offending in an Area. Attending officers were trained to take prints, but if there was other significant forensic evidence at the scene they would call in SOCOs. The attending officers were also required to provide advice on how to improve security in the home.

In 2004, the Burglary Takings Squad took over burglary attendance during their shift, with GDB attending at other times. The squad had been trained to meet an agreed set of standards and was responsible for security advice and following up enquiries. They were also tasked with proactive activities when time allowed.

4.2 Law Enforcement Team 2002, 2003

In 2000 Counties-Manukau Police District received government funding to establish two LETs whose purpose was to focus on burglary reduction and an increased rate of resolution for burglary. They were comprised of ten staff, half from CIB and half from GDB. The role was ring-fenced so that the officers involved were not called for other duties. Their role was not to attend burglaries but to utilise intelligence and forensic data in order to develop profiles on the key offenders and bring them before the court. The two LET teams covered several Police Areas each and were loosely based in the north and the south of the District. The first was established in Papakura in April 2000, and covered Papakura, Tuakau, Manurewa, Manukau, Weymouth and Clendon.

LET members did not attend historic burglaries, but files were sent to them if they had some identifiable MO. This may be a particular pattern of breaking in, the kind of items taken, or a signature that denoted a particular burglar. The LET followed up this information and combined it with forensic and Intel data in order to construct a profile of offenders or offences. They used informants and surveillance to gather more information and evidence. When they had gathered enough evidence they conducted searches of known offenders. At this point the team might discover a range of other offences, such as drug-related offences or fraud. This often led to convictions for other crimes.

A key strategy of the LET was to interview burglars who were being held in Papakura Police Station who had yet to be bailed. Such interviews generated a lot of information as well as being a source of voluntary DNA samples. Burglars facing charges were encouraged to confess to all their historic burglaries and thus 'clear the slate'. This meant that the files on these offences were cleared—as in 'achieved a resolution'.

4.2.1 Strengths to Law Enforcement Team

LET team members had access to files and intelligence covering the District. As burglars might live in one Area and offend in a range of Areas, the LET was able to build up a picture of offenders over the region rather than in just one Police Area. The combination of CIB experience and uniformed constables meant that the team had access to all the skills required and together they developed a strong practice.

Another strength identified was having their own clerical staff to manage the files and other paperwork. The team was not tied to other duties, so they were able to be flexible in responding to situations as they developed. They also had strict reporting requirements and this made them more accountable than other areas of Police.

The LET provided good training to young Police new to the Area. They gained a wide range of experience and learnt from having senior uniformed members as well as CIB members on the team.

4.2.2 Barriers to Law Enforcement Team

Despite the fact that the LET was ring-fenced from other duties, it was also called on to help with serious crime investigations at the discretion of the District Commander. This meant that the proactive work would be put to one side for the duration. While the LET operated at the District level, there were several high-profile murders, such as the pizza deliveryman and the RSA murders.

One of the issues raised by other Police was that in order to achieve good resolution figures, the LET cleared files through providing warnings. This meant that a burglar was able to clear the record, the file was resolved, but according to some Police this meant that the victims got no opportunity to apply for reparation, and the offender might serve only one or two years, despite committing perhaps thirty burglaries.

Despite the fact that the LET was established to focus primarily on burglary, the figures remained high for south Auckland. It was difficult to ascertain how much impact the LET

was having. Another issue faced by the team was that in conducting a search on a property, the LET might encounter other crimes. This meant for one burglary conviction, they might also have a drug, fraud, or car theft conviction. This occupied their resources but was not reflected in their burglary resolution statistics.

A complaint made by Manurewa Area staff was that the LET did not keep them informed, and there was an occasional breakdown in communication. The local staff may have turned up to carry out a search on some premises looking for stolen property only to find that the LET had been there and the offender had already been 'warned' for that burglary. This meant that they could not be charged for that offence, the property could not be recovered and the victim missed out on recovering their property or receiving any reparation.

4.3 Tactical Crime Unit 2004

As a result of the 2003 review of Counties-Manukau, the LETs were disbanded and reformed at the Area level as TCUs. Their role remained the same as before, but with the Area Commander attempting to protect them from being called to other duties. The TCU team now comprised 10 staff: four from CIB plus a detective sergeant, and four uniformed constables plus a sergeant. Their focus was to work on serious crime (including burglary) by targeting active offenders, locations and victims. The priorities of the TCU were to some extent determined by the files they were working on, which can take weeks to bring to conclusion, but they were also able to get direction from the weekly tasking coordination meetings. The down side of the Area-based TCU was that there was now a gap in the regional focus for criminal gangs operating over the Auckland metropolitan area.

Another issue raised was that of the use of informants. In the past much of the rationale for informants was in relation to drugs. In the past few years Police policy around using informants has changed. According to some comments, they are still a vital source of information about crime in general and about burglary, but Police have found it harder to get approval from their seniors to recompense informants or act on the information provided. Failure to follow up on information (e.g. in relation to drugs) undermines the relationship with the informant.

4.4 Emergency Response

The ER system was established in Counties-Manukau in 1997. The aim was to have a team which could respond quickly to serious priority one calls over the whole District, thus improving the response rate. The structure involved having I-cars with two staff, made up of staff allocated from each station, based at Papakura and ranging across the whole south Auckland area during their shift. The system was based on the assumption that the Area-based Q-cars would handle the historic burglaries and follow-up. The ER team was available to respond to 'burglars on' (i.e. on the property). They also responded to other emergency call-outs.

Most comments made by Manurewa Police were not favourable to the District ER system. The coverage was such that it could take 30 minutes for an I-Car to reach an incident, so Q-

cars who heard the call over Police radios often responded themselves. This resulted in Manurewa's priority two jobs falling behind. There was some resentment that whilst the Manurewa staff helped out with priority one calls, there was no reciprocity.

The Northern Communications Centre (Comms) made the comment that I-cars had to cover too great an area. They were aware they might have to send cars from Papakura to Howick, and that the number of cars they had available was insufficient.

In 2003, after the District review, the ER was placed under the control of the Area Commander and based at Manurewa station. This meant that the Area Commander had control over all the response resources.

4.5 Intel

4.5.1 District-based Intel—2002, 2003

In 2002 Counties-Manukau District Intelligence Unit consisted of nine staff members based at the District headquarters and at least one Intel officer in each of the Areas. Of the nine analysts, 1.5 full-time equivalents were devoted to burglary and 0.5 to youth offending (which often involved burglary). Intel provided a weekly report back to the stations of burglaries committed in the past week, with a trend analysis (for example if there has been a run on laptops). They provided maps of the 'hot' spots, which were put on the station noticeboard and were used to direct patrol plans for each shift. They also provided information back to the station on repeat victims and this was followed up by the investigation team or the community constable, depending on the station policy.

At the Area level the Intel officer based at the station prepared a list of ten offenders for the week and this was also passed on to the District to build a wider pattern. These top ten were used by each shift to conduct bail checks and enforce curfews. The local Intel officer looked at the pattern in the Manurewa Area.

4.5.2 Strengths to District-based Intel

Police commented that they found it helpful to have a picture of what was happening in the whole region. At the Area level they utilised crime pattern information (e.g. if there was a spate of daytime burglaries while people were in the garden) and passed it on to patrols and to others such as Neighbourhood Support. The strength of the Area Intel was that they were in direct contact with the people on patrol and could supplement the information from the District. They were able to provide a range of information to drive the directed patrols, bail checks and top offender lists, despite the limitations of their situation.

4.5.3 Barriers to District-based Intel

Despite the belief that District Intel was providing regular quality information to the Area, the flow of information was inhibited by many factors. There were delays in having the files entered into the system. Once an OR was completed by the attending officer, they were required to send it to District so it could be entered into National Intelligence Application

(NIA). As the local Police might want immediate patterns to show up they would often have their own databases to keep track of files. If there were a delay or backlog in data entry at the District, the information on the weekly MAPs and offence patterns would be compromised. This undermined confidence back at the station.

Another problem was that Manurewa did not have continuity of Intel staff over the period, and often experienced significant gaps between Intel officers. The people they did have in the Intel role were rarely trained and as they worked alone, did not have collegial support in an area of work that was taking on more significance. Manurewa Police also commented that they were not able to access the information they wanted, in the format they wanted. For example, if they requested a report on a type of MO, they might receive a 62-page list without analysis.

Finally, CIB, Youth and Community and the burglary staff also complained that they often had to share one computer between five or six staff and this meant that any advantages provided by having access to NIA were mitigated by lack of access.

4.5.4 Area-based Intel—2004

The new Area Commander was enthusiastic about applying the evidence-based models he had seen tried in other Areas. A key aspect of this model (see Figure 3.1, 3'I' Model) was a well-functioning Intel. The Area now had three Intel officers plus a clerk. The OC and the two analysts were Intel-trained (in the UK) and were able to quickly pull together the systems and processes required to have high-quality information coming into the system, quick analysis and quality reports, which would be crucial to the tasking and coordination group. In 2004, the Intel section trained the members of the new Burglary Takings Squad with a template of what was required in attending burglaries. This included:

- the information on security for the victims
- the depth of information required
- the line of enquiries
- deadlines for having all the information fed into NIA.

Counties-Manukau District maintained a small Intel team of three to provide a wider perspective. This comprised an OC Intel and two analysts. The District Commander met weekly with the four Area Commanders and the Crime Manager. This meeting was called the strategic tasking and coordinating meeting. If a problem were identified in two or more Areas, a strategic response would be developed which was resourced from the Areas.

In 2004, the following services were provided by Manurewa Intel:

- *Bail matrix.* Intel provided an analysis of top offenders who were on bail. They weighted them on a range of factors such as seriousness of the crime, likelihood of breaching, and whether they were thought to be active. The ranking directed the bail checks for the following week. They were updated if factors changed, such as the offender being arrested for breaching. The benefit of this system was said to be that it ensured that

Police were following the processes outlined in the new Bail and Sentencing Act, and thus were able to provide evidence for the bail conditions sought at court.

- *Directed patrols.* Intel analysed the MOs and the location of offences which had occurred in the previous few days and prepared a directed patrol sheet. This named the top offenders to look for as well as the locations which needed attention. Intel staff were trying to increase the details of offending in time and space—so they would be able to match more correctly with MOs of offenders. They had subdivided Manurewa into seven subareas and analysed them further in terms of their crime risk. They were then able to produce a crime profile for the Area. Intel handed a targeted patrol sheet to each person coming on shift. The sheet had addresses to check and activities to be aware of. At the end of the shift the sheets were submitted with the results of the shift. This was then fed back to Intel.
- *Weekly tasking and coordination meetings.* Intel provided an analysis of the weekly crime trends, which was discussed at the weekly tasking and coordination meetings on Tuesday mornings. All Manurewa OCs attended this meeting and they developed a strategy to respond to the crime problems raised. A follow-up meeting was held on Fridays in order to report back on actions taken.
- *Crime meetings.* The strategy developed at the tasking and coordination meeting was presented to the weekly crime meeting, held on Tuesday afternoon. All staff members were expected to attend if they could. Neighbourhood Support and Victim Support also attended these meetings.
- *Statistics.* The Area Commander wanted to ensure that the information on recorded crime was correct and a true reflection of the actual crime in the Area. Processes had been streamlined and checked for accuracy of coding. Intel said that since they had been auditing the files, the accuracy had greatly increased. By the end of 2004 they were getting 100% accuracy, whereas earlier they were finding 15–18 ORs missing or incorrect per month.

4.5.5 Strengths of Area-based Intel

All those interviewed said that the new system for Intel being based in the Areas was far more effective than before. The focus at the Area level was well-directed and the daily and weekly focus on crime problems was said to be producing results. The fact that the staff members were required to report back from their patrols was also seen to be a strength. This meant that the senior managers could keep a focus on what was working and what wasn't.

The training and the development and implementation of standards for burglary attendance was also seen as a strength.

4.5.6 Barriers to Area-based Intel

The District and Area commanders believed that the full potential of Intel was still not being realised because they were still underresourced. A three-person Intel team was not thought to be sufficient for the demands for information. Part of the problem was insufficient data entry

staff members who were able to have the information entered in a timely enough fashion to be useful to directed patrols. In relation to statistics, some commented that the information system was still inadequate.

I know the week before last I had 39 burglaries. Of those 11 were commercial and the rest were residential. I go into LES and they tell me I have 24 burglaries. I go into NIA and they tell me I have got two burglaries. I create a spreadsheet on Excel with the data that I know is right.

Another barrier from the Intel perspective is the need for more investment in training across the whole Police force so that they understand the importance of quality notings, ORs, what to look for on patrols and how to follow up with what may be small incidents but which may fit into a bigger picture.

4.6 Northern Communications Centre

Comms provides the key interface between the public and the frontline staff in Manurewa. Based in Central Auckland, the staff receives all 111 calls and attempts to have all incidents attended to in order of priority, as quickly as possible. Comms fields a range of calls in relation to burglary—reports of suspicious behaviour, burglars on the premises, and historic burglaries. The call takers record name, address and details of incidents. They code the call according to the type of incident, and assign it a priority of one or two. The information from the caller is typed in to the CARD database and this information is relayed to the dispatcher if it requires immediate attendance. The quality of the information is crucial to the ability of Police to respond effectively.

Comms covers the upper half of the North Island, from Rotorua and Gisborne across to New Plymouth. The centre is open 24 hours per day and managed by a shift manager. The staff comprises uniformed and non-sworn staff. New recruits are required to serve a block of time at Comms as it gives them an understanding of the whole Police activity in the Area. The non-sworn members of staff tend to have been there longer and as such develop more expertise in call taking and dispatching.

The dispatchers were allocated Police Areas. Usually two people cover each shift and work their breaks in with each other. The dispatchers become familiar with the staff in their Police Area and with the different procedures, specialised squads and the status of all the units on call in the Police Area. They were able to direct Q-cars and I-cars but did not direct other specialised squads such as the LET or the Street Crime Unit when they were operating. The dispatcher also had access to the Police helicopter, could call in dog handlers and could arrange a cordon around an area.

The call takers' role is to get the information as quickly and accurately as possible but not to be the investigator. Their role is primarily to serve the public who call in and ensure that they are satisfied that their call is being handled. Call takers will call the person back to tell them the outcome, or keep them on the line in order to reassure them in times of danger. The technology available—in particular the MAP system, where addresses come up on screen—is valuable.

One potential problem with centralising the call taking is lack of familiarity with local areas. Auckland staff may not know about shortcuts and alleys, and from the screen they cannot tell whether the terrain has bush or hills or ravines if they need to set up a cordon somewhere. In such circumstances good rapport with local Police is important so they can work together to get cars or officers in the right place. In order to develop local knowledge Comms staff spoke of the need to visit the Area and get to know the Area and the staff. Despite the fact that they had regular opportunities to undertake familiarisation trips, they were so understaffed they said they could not afford the time away.

Some comments were made that the Police staff at Comms were becoming more familiar with Police procedures, and the six-week training was not enough for the civilians to be able to make good decisions in urgent situations. On the other hand, civilians tended to stay in the job longer and gradually built up more expertise than uniformed staff.

The Police spoke of the need to have as much detail as possible to give them what they needed in time to make use of it. With the ER system for priority one call-outs, the dispatchers might have had to call on cars twenty minutes away for a burglary taking place, and this caused frustration to the local Q-cars, which often responded anyway as they heard details from their radio.

North Comms staff reported a good working relationship with the Manurewa Area. They were aware of the problems they had being short-staffed but believed that the cooperative attitude was an important factor in Comms' effectiveness.

I always find Manurewa a pleasure to deal with. That is not to say that other Areas aren't but I find Manurewa quite energetic and that may be because I have the perception that there were more staff and I think they have more cars. I am not talking about Emergency Response, I am talking about the station-based staff who go out and will do priority one jobs with enquiry cars. Manurewa to me is a very 'can do' Area.

A dispatcher commented that the Comms centre could receive the top offender lists so that they were aware of who the station was targeting. They received a lot of information which they might be able to give higher priority if they could tie it to a targeted offender. On the other hand they would not be able to cope with too much information—probably for a special operation this would work. Comms received a lot of calls with information on people acting suspiciously and so on, and they didn't always know if the information collected would be useful.

5 Offender-focused initiatives

5.1 Introduction

Offender-focused initiatives and practices are those which aim to reduce the incidence of burglary by apprehending or curtailing the activities of those who commit burglary. This chapter discusses six offender-focused initiatives and practices of the Manurewa Police. They are:

- directed patrols
- bail checks
- specialised burglary squads
- special operations
- street sweeps
- the collection of DNA samples and fingerprints

5.2 Directed patrols

5.2.1 Mechanisms

Directed patrols have been an essential tool of Manurewa Police for several years. In 2001 and 2002 the patrol sheets were compiled by District Intel each week with 'hot' locations identified. They also prepared lists of top ten offenders with photo IDs. Section staff would use the 'hot' location and top ten lists for patrolling. The strengths and weaknesses of the directed patrols depended on the quality of the information provided and also on how busy the officers were in attending general enquiries. The 'hot' offender list would also have bail conditions recorded. Regular checks would be made during the shift on those on bail to check they were meeting their conditions. In 2004 the patrols were being much more clearly defined, and there was a requirement to report back at the end of the shift with the outcomes. Supervisors were being told to enforce the patrolling, rather than having people 'fit it in'.

5.2.2 Strengths of directed patrols

The strength of the directed patrols was said to be that it helped staff become familiar with the worst offenders and gave them specific things to address such as checking addresses, associates and car registration.

Another outcome reported was that heightened Police visibility on the streets was acting as a deterrent to crime. After the review in 2003, when Manurewa had a greater number of cars out on the street, Intel began to notice that if they focused on one area, the crime level

dropped markedly. Even though they were unable to keep up visibility at that location, just a few patrols through the area seemed to give the message that they were out and about. Undercover surveillance was also being used for some of the 'hot' locations, and on one occasion the mistaken use of Police radio seemed to inform criminals about their presence and stopped all the crime in that targeted area for that period.

5.2.3 Barriers to directed patrols

Before the restructuring, and particularly in 2002, Manurewa was short-staffed and also only had access to Q-cars for patrolling. They were often responding to priority one calls as the I-cars were often more than 10 minutes away. At times there were only one or two cars available and as Manurewa has a serious crime rate, staff would not get the opportunity to carry out the patrolling of 'hot' locations. They were also conducting bail checks, so any other offenders on the list were unlikely to get attended to. Another barrier mentioned was that the Police were not consistent at taking notings of people or places checked and there was no formal process for reporting back the outcomes of their patrols.

There was some suggestion by Intel that where a location was being targeted by Police, crime was being displaced to other Areas, although there was not enough evidence to be sure. Intel was looking to see if this was consistent.

Frontline Police were under pressure from responding to incidents and some found it difficult to make the patrolling as high a priority as the senior managers were demanding.

5.3 Bail Checks

The seeking of bail conditions at court and the active policing of those conditions has been a key aspect of policing in Manurewa throughout the research period. In 2002 Police reported that bail checks were a high priority. They had had competitions between different shifts to see who could carry out the most bail checks. In late 2002 and early 2003 the shortage of staff meant that they sometimes were not able to conduct as many as they wanted.

In 2004, Area Intel introduced a matrix which cross-referenced each top offender with their bail conditions and risk factors. This information was checked for accuracy, provided a template for conducting bail checks and was updated daily.

If a person was not at home when Police checked then they were either warned or arrested for breaching their bail. The policy since 2002 has been to arrest for breach of bail without giving warnings. Looking for people who had breached their conditions took time but was regarded as an essential part of the process if it were to be effective. Finally when an offender came before the court for breaching bail, the Police prepared notes for the Judge. In these notes they might provide copies of the last appearance where the Judge said 'this is your last chance', in order that the offender would be given a more serious sentence.

5.3.1 Rationale for bail checks

Police reported that a significant number of burglaries were committed by known offenders who would 'go hard out' before their court case. A common bail condition applied was a nighttime curfew from 7.00pm to 7.00am. The Police would conduct random checks during the night to ensure the person was at home. Due to the experience that burglars would often wait until the Police had been and then go out, the Police identified their top ten offenders and checked them several times during the night. The Police also watched out for the other conditions being met, such as non-association with people who were likely to encourage reoffending.

The rationale given for bail checking was that every burglary prevented from occurring was one less victim and far less Police time taken in attending burglaries.

5.3.2 Strengths of bail checks

Most of the people interviewed agreed that bail checks were successful in reducing burglary and could provide instances of high correlation between intense bail checking and low burglary figures. The following strengths were mentioned.

- The matrix meant that Police were confident that the bail checks were being made on the highest-risk people and that the information would be correct.
- The matrix eliminated the accusation of harassment, as Police could provide proof that those being checked were of high risk and were on bail for serious offending.
- Bail checks kept Police attention on people the court has identified as prolific burglars.
- The Police conducting the checks became familiar with the addresses, vehicles and habits of the offenders.
- Increased accountability and reporting back was seen as a strength; section staff were being required to conduct five bail checks per shift which ensured that bail checks were not overlooked due to other priorities.

5.3.3 Barriers to bail checks

Police identified the following barriers to the effectiveness of bail checks.

- In some instances where the Court had placed a 7.00pm to 7.00am curfew on an offender, the offender was more likely to operate during the day. One officer reported a situation where he reported this fact to the prosecution, and requested a 24-hour curfew. The judge in that instance remanded the person in custody.
- Another factor which reduced the effectiveness was the quality of the information which generated the bail lists and the offender targets. When the information was incorrect it led to wasting time—for example, sometimes the bail conditions had been changed by the courts but the Police were not informed.
- Police found that at times they were too busy to complete bail checks. To some extent this depended on the supervision and direction provided by managers, but there was also a recognition that Manurewa was understaffed in 2002 and 2003. Even in 2004 Police

were reporting that bail checks dropped off when section staff members were too busy and this resulted in an increase in burglaries.

- Intel reported that they were not recording how many bail checks were being carried out due to lack of time.
- Police needed to work closely with Youth Aid to manage juvenile bail enforcement with some sensitivity.

5.4 Specialised burglary squads

5.4.1 Manurewa Street Crime Unit

The Street Crime Unit was formed in May 2000. The initiative aimed to provide a dedicated team of five uniformed officers under a sergeant who would be free from other sectional duties to dedicate their time to reducing burglaries and theft from cars. The members of this unit were not required to answer radio calls and could only be pulled away to other duties in exceptional circumstances. The Unit existed for a year and a half—one year at full capacity (five staff members), six months with three staff members—and has since been abandoned due to staff shortages.

The Unit targeted known burglars or ‘hot’ spots, identified weekly by Intel, and put them under pressure—to make them realise they were more likely to be arrested if they tried to offend, and therefore pressure them to keep to their bail conditions. Their purpose was to prevent burglaries in any way, and they devised a range of initiatives to do this.

The initial priorities for the unit were to:

- serve all outstanding summonses and arrest warrants
- seek strict bail conditions through the court process
- make regular checks on known burglars, particularly those on curfew, to ensure they were meeting their bail conditions
- follow up those in breach of bail conditions and arrest them
- carry out covert patrols of known ‘hot’ spots, particularly those identified in the weekly and daily Intel reports.

5.4.1.1 Strengths of Street Crime Unit

The unit was able to work proactively under the direction of a sergeant, and initiated exercises to address specific problem areas. They employed the assistance of other units for special exercises. Every so often the team would conduct covert patrols with constables on foot, on bicycles, in ‘scruffy’ clothes and beanies, riding around at night visiting places where patrol cars wouldn’t go (alleyways, alongside the railway tracks, etc.). The Unit also had an arrangement with a second-hand car dealer, who would provide an old trade-in vehicle for covert surveillance. This would be swapped for another car every few months so that it wouldn’t become known.

When the unit was formed in 2000, there was an average of 240 burglaries per month. After a year and a half the average monthly figures had dropped to 140. Manurewa then faced severe loss of staff, which resulted in the unit being reduced to three staff in mid-2001 and disbanded in mid-2002.

The unit was responsible for serving summonses. This was managed by devoting half a shift every ten days per staff member. They would keep the active summonses with them and make enquiries to locate the person. Approximately 15–20% of the time was spent on summonses and arrest warrants once the backlog had been cleared. The rest of the time was devoted to targeting burglars in many different ways.

The strength most noted was the ability for the unit to be proactive and respond flexibly to problem areas identified through Intel. They were free from other duties and from responding to radio call-outs. Members of the Street Crime Unit were not required to attend reported burglaries; this was left to the I-cars, although if they saw something suspicious during their patrols they would take action. This meant that the unit was free to be proactive.

Involving all staff in the bail checks meant that all staff became familiar with known offenders and would be on the lookout during their patrol.

The other strength apparent from the interviews was the commitment to and enthusiasm for the single purpose of reducing burglaries, and the belief that they could make a difference.

5.4.1.2 Barriers to Street Crime Unit

Staffing was identified by all interviewees as being the key factor in the success of the initiative. A full contingent of five staff in the unit meant that they could concentrate on serving summonses and arrest warrants as well as keeping up pressure on offenders through bail checks. Once the numbers dropped to three, it was only possible for the Police in Q-cars to do bail checks and the other work began to pile up again. This meant that burglars soon realized that they would not be followed up on, or they could wait for one bail check then go out to offend.

Another barrier mentioned was the lack of resources for the unit. They had to borrow squad cars and mobile phones for their patrols. Otherwise they had an old car and bikes donated by local businesses. This meant that they were not free to run their patrols unless it fitted with other schedules.

The other issue identified was officers being transferred to other duties. Generally the unit was carefully protected from this, but from 2000-2002 there had been several major murder enquiries, so officers were reassigned to cover for staff on the investigation teams.

Even when the unit was at full capacity and everyone was working on bail checks, it was mentioned that it was hard to keep the pressure up, as it became monotonous. Special initiatives were carried out every so often to make it easier for staff members to make a concentrated effort.

Several people mentioned that a key barrier to the reduction of burglaries was the attitude of the public. In the Manurewa Area many neighbourhoods were perceived not to be interested in Neighbourhood Support groups and were reluctant to report suspicious behaviour. This meant that it was far more difficult to catch people in the act of offending. People were also lax, despite education, about leaving doors and windows open, which provided opportunities for burglary to happen.

5.4.2 Direct Targeting Unit

The Direct Targeting Unit was set up late in 2003 to focus on burglaries and drug houses. It consisted of one permanent staff member and two constables on a five-week rotation. This unit followed up outstanding warrants and summonses, attended all burglaries and broke up drug or 'tinnie' houses.

The purpose of the unit, according to the acting Area Coordinator, was to deal with burglary scene examinations and reports as efficiently as possible, thereby freeing up the other staff for proactive work. 'Tinnie' houses fit with this purpose in that they usually operated as receivers for stolen goods.

The aim was to have the officers who attended the scene and took the report also be the ones who were able to follow up on leads. The Direct Targeting Unit therefore allowed other staff to deal with all other enquiries. The unit worked Monday to Friday but not weekends. The shifts were flexible to respond to the pattern of offending.

The OC had flexibility in arranging the shifts to respond to burglaries. He received information from the Intel officer about the offending patterns for the week and put staff on at those times. The members of the unit attended burglaries as soon as they were reported. One worked on a 7.00am to 3.00pm shift and the other on a 3.00pm to 11.00pm shift. The OC worked a normal 9.00am–5.00pm day shift but also overlapped at other times in response to demand.

The burglary squad logged on to Comms with their own special identifiers so that Comms knew that they were the burglary squad. This meant that they would be contacted first when a burglary was located and given the opportunity to follow up the jobs. If they already had too many then they would tell Comms to give it back to the section staff at base.

5.4.2.1 Rationale for Direct Targeting Unit

The Police believed that in order to be able to provide a good service to victims of burglary they had to find a way to make burglary a top priority. Making one group responsible for attending all burglaries meant that burglaries wouldn't be competing with other serious demands such as family violence, rapes and other assaults. They also hoped to increase the quality of the ORs through constables having a concentrated period on the unit.

5.4.2.2 Strengths of Direct Targeting Unit

The following were some of the strengths identified by Police.

- It was hoped that being in the unit would give those in the unit the opportunity to pick up on trends and make linkages with other offences. 'When they return to section they are more likely to recognise a description of an offender's car and be able to go straight there instead of being like blindfolded.'
- The reported burglaries were being followed up on more quickly and the public was receiving a better service. The average time it took to attend the burglary scene was four hours (from the time it was reported) by the end of 2004.
- The staff learnt a lot about burglary and became efficient at burglary scene management. This followed through when they went back to general duties.
- Serving on the unit was regarded as good training for junior constables. They got to understand burglary from the victim's point of view.
- Having a concentrated unit freed up the rest of the GDB staff from attending burglaries.
- It was seen to be an efficient way of dealing with an area of work which would otherwise build up quickly.
- Due to the quick response to reported burglary, there was a greater chance of neighbours remembering relevant details.
- The unit took SOCO to almost all the burglaries so that any fingerprints or other evidence was acted on immediately

5.4.2.3 Barriers to Direct Targeting Unit

The following were identified by Police as being barriers to the effectiveness of the Direct Targeting Unit.

- Staff were busy taking the burglary ORs and were not having much opportunity to do proactive policing.
- The two constables plus the OC could only operate a five-day week, which meant that weekend burglaries built up for Monday mornings and the unit was increasingly unable to keep up.
- The staff did not look forward to this shift because it was regarded as 'one of the more boring jobs'.
- The five-week rotation meant that at the end of the period the staff were just getting up to standard on the quality of the ORs and then would be rostered back to general duties. Then a new intake meant it would have to start over again.
- The unit did not have a sergeant and therefore was not closely supervised.
- They were not protected from other duties so they could be used for other operations, such as the V8 weekend.
- The unit did not have its own car and had to take what was available after the other section staff.

- After a period of operation members of the unit reported that they were becoming overwhelmed by the number of files they were carrying, and that their attendance time was beginning to fall away again. When they got lines of enquiry to follow up, they didn't have enough staff to handle attendance and enquiries as well as the proactive work.

5.4.3 Burglary Takings Squad

In September 2004 the Direct Targeting Unit was revamped and renamed the Burglary Takings Squad (BTS). The squad was increased in number to five constables and an acting sergeant. The number of shifts was increased so that coverage was seven days per week. The rotation was increased from five weeks to three months. The changeover was designed to be scattered so that they had some experienced staff to carry on rather than all experience being lost at once. When the squad members were unable to do a shift (due to leave or illness) the GDB staff took over attendance.

5.4.3.1 Rationale for Burglary Takings Squad

The rationale for the BTS was to increase the quality of the ORs and service to victims. The squad was created in recognition that two constables could not be expected to handle all the burglaries in Manurewa. The expectation was that the squad would be able to conduct proactive activities in terms of 'hot' locations, 'hot' property and target hardening.

5.4.3.2 Strengths of Burglary Takings Squad

By the end of 2004 the Police identified the following strengths of the BTS.

- By covering seven days per week they were able to manage the weekend burglaries and reduce the pile-up on a Monday.
- The squad had conducted some successful proactive initiatives in which they conducted search warrants, recovered property and had several burglars put into custody. This activity helped to keep the squad motivated.
- The quality of the ORs improved. This was due to the development of a template which outlined all the requirements the squad members were asked to meet. The use of the template was supported with training and supervision.
- The squad provided good training. A training activity mentioned was a mock burglary set up in which SOCO took the squad members through the scene, showing them where to look for prints and how to assess the scene.
- The squad provided the GDB staff with a break from serious crime, from night shift and weekends (only needing to do one weekend in five).
- When the BTS members returned to GDB they were able to advise the sectional staff on how to do quality ORs.
- The squad established a dedicated phone number so that victims could call up to find out about their case. The Police operators put such calls through to the number and all were answered by the squad. This provided efficient and effective communication with burglary victims.

- The liaison with Intel was noted as a strength, particularly with the data entry clerk. The daily data entry meant that BTS could pay close attention to emerging patterns.
- Due to the emphasis on correct form filling the data being compiled was much more accurate. An unintended consequence was said to be that the statistics were increasing because incidents were now correctly being coded as burglary rather than theft as per the old legislation.
- The staff reported that they were receiving good feedback from victims—cards and cakes as appreciation.
- Victims were also reporting burglaries in which nothing had been stolen, to help the Police build the crime patterns. This also increased the statistics, but it meant that the statistics were more accurately reflecting the actual incidence of burglary, and reflected an increase in confidence in the Police.

5.4.3.3 Barriers to Burglary Takings Squad

The following barriers were identified by Police.

- When coming on to the section, staff expected to be involved in proactive policing around burglary. However, at times the burglary numbers were still too high for them to be able to do much proactive work.
- The demand for higher-quality ORs and investigation meant that each burglary attendance was taking longer than before. When the work began to pile up the squad members were told to take the OR and then pass the file on to Tactical Crime to follow up.
- Police coming on to this squad often had files from their section work (not guilty and High Court files taking lots of time). The downside was that it took time away from BTS duties and also prevented the proactive work.
- The squad were very aware of when the section staff were too busy to carry out bail checks, as the burglary rate increased quickly.

5.5 Special Operations

5.5.1 Operation Card

In late 2003 the acting Area Controller developed several initiatives which aimed to reduce burglary and increase the public perception that Police were serious about reducing burglary. The first initiative was named Card. Fifty-two files on hot offenders were allocated to staff in all sections of the Police in Manurewa. The strategy was to focus a lot of attention on that person, and if they were out at 2.00am they would be stopped and questioned. The assigned Police officer would then follow up and ask what they were doing out at that time. It required Police to notify the assigned Police officer whenever they had encountered the target.

At the time of the interviews it was too early to measure the impact of Operation Card, but the feedback at the time was that three criminals had moved out of the Area, one person was referred to drug rehabilitation and another declared he was going to get a job.

Take (person x) He is just a walking crime wave that boy. But he is the one that has said 'look, I am giving up. I am getting a job. I am going clean. Just leave me alone. I don't want this pressure any more'. If we have just one person like and he commits just one burglary a week, that is 50 burglaries a year that we don't have to face up to, which is awesome.

5.5.1.1 Strengths of Operation Card

The following strengths were identified.

- The burglars were made aware that they were being focused on and would be more conscious of the risk of being caught.
- It encouraged team building, in that everyone was working towards the same aim—to reduce offending of these top 52 offenders. At the time it was initiated, staff had just moved in to the new station and new people were on board.
- Operation Card provided an opportunity for officers to familiarise themselves with key offenders and work together.
- Staff members were aligned with goals of crime reduction and were given a manageable element to work with.
- In this Area the volume of crime is very high. According to the acting Area Controller, operations such as Card broke the task into manageable sizes and allowed the Police officers to feel they can make a difference.
- The short-term focus (for a month) made it interesting, allowed people to try different ways of working, and involved the staff using their initiative.
- Even when the operation was completed, the Police officers kept an eye on 'their person' so that would continue after the operation finished.
- It got people away from their desks and on to the street.

5.5.1.2 Barriers to Operation Card

The following barriers were identified.

- The acting Area Controller thought that there might have been too many cards allocated, which resulted in some targets not being checked for two weeks if their allocated officer had been working a two-week early shift (and their curfew was after 7.00pm).
- More planning about how to manage the targets—taking into consideration their conditions of bail etc.—would have been more effective.
- It was difficult to sustain in the long term as it would begin to have an impact on other duties.
- Not all the targets were appropriate, for example, one target was a client of Youth Aid and was already undergoing a programme through them and doing quite well. The officer

with the card was encouraged not to harass this young person. More sorting of the chosen targets would prevent this.

- Some feedback was that a number of burglars enjoyed the notoriety of the focus they had by being on a card.

5.5.2 Media campaign

In conjunction with Operation Card was a media campaign in which the acting Area Controller had weekly headlines in the local paper talking about the Card strategy and letting the public know that the Police were going 'hard out' on burglars. One of the impacts of this media campaign was the possibility of the rate of reported burglary going up due to the public now believing that the Police would take action. The acting Area Controller was also on television talking about the strategy.

I have suspected this underreporting but as a result of the publicity they have said they are going to do something about it, therefore I will report it.

5.5.2.1 Strengths of the media campaign

Several people interviewed were positive about the high-profile media strategy.

I think it was the transparency of it all. From the day he came, he told them exactly what he was going to do, and made them aware of projects Monopoly, Card and all that. He let the public know at various forums throughout Manurewa that this was what he intended. There were lots of people at all these meetings, and they knew it. And it was in the Courier, in the local paper so it is not as if people didn't know the consequences of what was going to happen. And I think that assisted with burglary when he did that Operation Card; targeting burglars in this Area.

5.6 Street Sweeps

5.6.1 Description

From time to time Manurewa Police carried out street sweep operations in order to combat crime in the Area. The exercise addressed burglary, unlawful taking of vehicles, other property crimes and alcohol-related problems. The stated objective was 'to proactively patrol the Community of Manurewa to reduce crime'. The focuses of the street sweep were the street kid gangs (CRYPs and BLOODS), transvestite prostitutes and glue sniffers.

5.6.2 Mechanisms

The operation involved the Manukau Traffic Safety Group, Intel, youth and community services, regular Police and the Street Crime Unit when it was operating. The exercise consisted of overt patrols in cars and on foot, checking car registrations and alcohol consumption, stopping and querying people on the streets about their movements if they were out after midnight. Covert teams would patrol parks and alleyways by bicycle and on foot. Young people were taken home after dark and their parents questioned about why the young people were out. Prostitutes and known drug houses were questioned and watched.

5.6.3 Rationale of street sweeps

The intention was that burglars and other criminals would stay at home rather than risk being caught. The Area Controller believed that street sweeps were successful in that there were no burglaries reported in the following days. She believed that the high Police presence was a major deterrent for criminals.

5.6.4 Strengths of implementing street sweeps

The strengths reported were the working together across the teams, and the feeling that the Police had the upper hand for a change. The occasional nature of the operation meant that it was not routine and there was an added excitement to the exercise, while it also caught offenders unaware. This provided a morale boost to the team. Another factor mentioned was being able to utilise expertise and specialist knowledge across the whole group. For example, the Youth Aid officers were experienced in handling the legal complexities of arresting juveniles and were able to provide this support to the patrol officers.

5.6.5 Barriers to implementing street sweeps

The main difficulty in this initiative was coordinating the different units of Police for the operation. Staff numbers were also important, as the effectiveness of the operations reinforced that high visibility of Police is a major deterrent factor for crime generally and burglary in particular. Lack of staff means that due to shift work and leave, the Police presence outside the special operations drops right away, and the word gets out to the criminal world.

5.7 The collection of DNA samples and fingerprints

Matching DNA samples and fingerprints to scene evidence was an important means of linking suspects to offences, or eliminating suspects from enquiries. The national databank held the National DNA Database of individual DNA samples, and the Crime Sample Database of DNA samples taken from crime scenes. The Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) contained individuals' fingerprints and prints lifted from crime scenes. Together, the national databank and AFIS were used to identify matches between suspects and offences.

In 2003 new legislation was introduced which had an impact on the collection of DNA. The DNA Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Amendment Act 2003 amended the Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Act 1995 (the principal Act). The 2003 Amendment Act received the Royal assent on 30 October 2003 and commenced on 15 April 2004.

The amendment sought to strike a balance between extending the use of DNA as a valuable crime-fighting tool, and the recognition and protection of fundamental personal rights. The aim was to extend the potential pool of DNA profiles to significantly increase the chances of apprehending the perpetrators of serious offences.

Voluntary DNA samples could be obtained from those 14 years of age and older, with parental consent required for those 14–16 years of age. Once the offender or suspect agreed, the detective arranged for a registered nurse to take the blood sample. The DNA samples were then sent to the Hamilton Institute of Environmental Science and Research (ESR), where the individual's DNA was profiled and entered into the national DNA database. The officer in charge of a case involving a young person under the age of 17 years was responsible for obtaining voluntary fingerprints. The importance of obtaining voluntary fingerprints was often emphasised at the weekly crime meetings.

It was explained to young people that having their fingerprint in the database could eliminate them as a suspect. To parents Police emphasised the deterrent effect on further offending when young people knew the Police had their fingerprints.

Although all compulsory DNA samples and fingerprints were held in the databank or AFIS, these databases also hold many unidentified crime scene DNA profiles and prints. Manurewa Police encouraged their officers to collect voluntary samples, and actively encouraged the gathering of voluntary fingerprints from youth who came to their attention.

A specialized SOCO team operated for Counties-Manukau area. They had their own vans and equipment. Training was a key aspect to their work; by increasing the skills of the frontline investigation officers, they could increase the collection of samples. Members of SOCO provided training to frontline staff as well as to members of the LET. Training was provided in the taking of samples as well as the analysis of the crime scene and the preservation of the scene. Increasingly Police at the scene were learning to recognize specific MOs of offenders and might call in SOCO. This enabled them, and Intel, to build a profile of the burglar and feed this into the intelligence system.

In 2004 the Police reported that all staff were more aware of the importance of DNA and quality prints. With the introduction of the Direct Targeting Unit in 2003 and then the BTS in 2004, the quality of crime scene examination was improved. This was because the officers were being trained to look at the crime scene and call in SOCO when they recognised opportunities for forensic evidence.

5.7.1 Rationale for the collection of voluntary DNA samples and fingerprints

The matching of DNA samples and fingerprints to crime scene evidence was an important component of clearing burglary offences, as burglars were rarely caught during a burglary. Gathering voluntary fingerprints from juveniles had resulted in a number of matches with burglary scene evidence. Apprehending young people early might interrupt a path to more serious offending later.

When a match was made, Police were then able to examine the MO of the matched offence, and possibly identify other offences with the same or similar MOs the offender was associated with, where no DNA or fingerprints had been found at the scene.

The Police comments made during interviews in 2002 described an increasing use of DNA technology to help in the pursuit of burglars. Those interviewed spoke of the growing relevance of DNA since the introduction of the Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples)

Amendment Act 1995. The provisions of the new legislation extended the powers of the Police to take and use DNA samples from suspects and from persons who have been convicted of criminal offences.

Police reported that increased access to DNA samples would provide a database for future offenders. For example, if young people were found getting into trouble they might be asked (through their parents) for a sample of their fingerprints. Such voluntary fingerprinting was beginning to pay dividends—as was the case in the identification of one of the pizza delivery murder suspects, which was made from previously collected prints.

The crucial aspect in the use of DNA in Police investigations occurs at the scene of the crime, where any prints or other samples may be collected and then matched against known offenders. SOCOs were specifically trained to collect high-quality samples of fingerprints, footprints, saliva, hair, blood, etc. However, the SOCO team was not brought into every burglary. The investigating officers took prints if there were clear surfaces. They were also trained to take note of anything unusual. If there were opportunities for swabs or blood samples, the officers called SOCO in to collect forensic evidence in more detail.

The other important aspect was building up DNA and fingerprint collections of known offenders in order to increase the likelihood of a match.

There were three ways of getting samples of DNA:

- after arrest, a person could be forced to give DNA
- a person could give DNA voluntarily
- a search warrant could be obtained to get the DNA from a person's house (from hairbrushes, toothbrushes, etc.).

5.7.2 Strengths of the collection of voluntary DNA samples and fingerprints

A key aspect of the collection of DNA and fingerprinting was the quality of the crime scene investigation. Training by SOCO staff was regarded as an important element in the maintenance of this quality. During the whole research period SOCO had provided such training regularly. By the end of 2004, however, the training was more targeted to the BTS and therefore seen to be more effective. Unless officers were constantly analysing scenes and getting practice and noticing the likely opportunities for prints and DNA, they 'lost the eye' for it.

SOCOs who were interviewed said that they believed that a dedicated burglary quad such as the BTS resulted in a better quality of scene examination. This was because they were taught to recognise opportunities for evidence collection and knew when to call SOCO in.

Another advantage of the dedicated squad was that they were attending the scene more quickly, so there was a better chance of collecting evidence.

There had been a substantial increase in the number of hits that Manurewa was getting from DNA and fingerprints. A new policy in 2004 required staff to act on a fingerprint or DNA hit within three days.

The fingerprinting section in Auckland had two staff dedicated to the Counties-Manukau area so SOCO could go straight to them if there were urgency on a case.

The District Commander reported in 2004 that the District overall was doing very well in collecting DNA and fingerprints. He said that this was due to having supervisors consistently pushing for them.

5.7.3 Barriers to the collection of voluntary DNA samples and fingerprints

The cost of DNA testing has been a barrier in the past but this has greatly reduced lately, so Police are able to carry out more routine sample testing. The ability of forensic technology to secure burglary convictions is dependent on:

- the quality of any prints or samples left at the scene of the crime
- the quality of the prints taken
- the ability to find a match from the collection of fingerprints.

As the collection of DNA samples is increased, the value of scene of crime samples will be increased.

Police mentioned that they needed to push more to get samples from juvenile offenders. In order to do this the officers needed to be well aware of the legislation.

Burglars are difficult to catch unless they leave fingerprints or DNA samples. In the vast majority of burglaries there are no fingerprints or DNA samples and therefore no leads. This means that the case is filed and is unlikely to be resolved. As criminals become more sophisticated, they tend to leave less evidence behind.


There had been training for staff on DNA collection and this had increased awareness. There were a lot of practice issues which needed to be addressed for the DNA evidence to stand up in court. The training was being provided every five weeks so eventually everyone would be up-to-date. The Police had confidence in DNA collection being useful and so were active in collecting voluntary samples.

SOCO reported that there had been no improvement in their own training and no professional development or career structure. They had few opportunities to meet with other forensic teams to develop themselves.

5.8 Effects of Targeting Offenders

Some possible effects of the practice of targeting offenders were studied. First, the trends from 2000 to 2004 in the average annual burglary conviction rates of a sample of 41 offenders⁸ targeted in 2003 in the Manurewa Police Area were examined.

Figure 5.1: Average annual burglary conviction rates: offenders targeted in Manurewa Police Area during 2003 (N = 41)¹



1 The rate represents the average number of burglary charges for which convictions were obtained per offender per year.


Figure 5.1 shows that, for offenders targeted in the Manurewa Police Area in 2003, the average conviction rate for burglary declined sharply from 2000 to 2004. Over the years 2000–2004, the total number of burglary convictions in the Manukau District Court fluctuated between 500 and 600 (see Section 10). These patterns suggest that the Police targeting activity may have contributed to a deterrent effect for the targeted offenders. However, the decline in their burglary convictions was apparent prior to the year of targeting. Their conviction rate for all offence types shows a similar trend, suggesting either that there was a genuine decline in offending, or that these offenders were becoming more adept at avoiding apprehension.

Secondly, in order to assess whether there was a displacement effect from the Police practice of targeting offenders, the court locations of convictions for offenders targeted in the Manurewa Police Area in 2003 were examined from 2000 to 2004.

⁸ All offenders selected for the sample were aged 17 or over in 2000, so that their convictions could be obtained from the criminal history data in the Justice Data Warehouse.

Figure 5.2 shows that the sample of offenders targeted in 2003 had burglary convictions both in the Manukau District Court and elsewhere (Auckland, Hamilton, Otahuhu, Papakura, New Plymouth, North Shore, Waitakere, and Porirua) in each of the years 2000–2004. There is no evidence of an increase in burglary convictions in other district courts in the year of targeting (2003) or in the year following targeting (2004). This would suggest that the Police practice of targeting offenders in the Manurewa Police Area in 2003 did not result in a displacement effect.

Figure 5.2: Court location of burglary convictions for offenders targeted in the Manurewa Police Area during 2003 (N=41)^{1, 2}



¹ The number of convictions is the number of charges for which convictions were obtained. This is an indication of the number of burglary incidents for which convictions were obtained in each court location.

² The location of the district court in which convictions were obtained has been used as a proxy for the location of the offences for which convictions were obtained.

6 Location-focused initiatives

Location-focused initiatives are those which aim to reduce the incidence of burglary by identifying and applying Police resources to 'hot' spots where burglary is known to be prevalent, or developing initiatives in a location with high crime rates. Directed patrols were the primary initiative Manurewa Police utilised during the research period.

6.1 Directed patrols

Manurewa Police had been using directed patrols since before the research began in 2002. This had been incorporated into standard operational practice throughout the three-year period covered. Intel provided maps which detailed the most recent burglaries, theft from cars and unlawful takings. These maps were tailored by local Intel to produce a Patrolling Report for each shift. The shift sergeant would then direct his or her staff to patrol areas of concern and take notings of suspicious behaviour or vehicles. Traffic section was used from time to time to help patrol areas. They could also utilise road blocks and WOF checks to gather information and possibly pick up known offenders.

6.1.1 Rationale of directed patrols

Police realised that a high percentage of their crime occurs in a small proportion of streets, and they were also aware of the research showing that criminals are predictable and offend within predictable distances from their home. They also have corridors which they move through to offend. By having visible patrols and checkpoints in targeted areas, Police believed they were more likely to pick up burglars (for traffic breaches for example) than catch them actually committing a burglary. They also had a chance of finding stolen property when they stopped someone for other purposes.

6.2 Operation Monopoly

In 2003 Manurewa Police identified that 25% of their burglaries were from just 24 streets in the Area. Operation Monopoly, which ran for a month in September 2003, involved the identification of the worst 24 streets (for burglary). Each of these streets was allocated to two officers to Police. The officers did a letterbox drop introducing themselves, explaining the operation and encouraging the public to make contact with them if they noticed anything suspicious. The Police were encouraged to take a range of proactive initiatives to Police the street—including random checking of cars at checkpoints, active bail checks, covert patrols, visible patrols and similar measures.

6.2.1 Rationale for Operation Monopoly

The rationale behind this operation was that burglars need to move around the Area—through the ‘corridor of crime’. If they got stopped regularly and perhaps picked up with stolen property in the vehicle, the impact was the same as if they were stopped in the process of committing a burglary.

6.2.2 Strengths of Operation Monopoly

The following strengths of the operation were identified.

- The new staff were familiarised with the Area.
- The staff worked together—traffic, youth aid and section staff all partnered up to police their streets.
- As with Operation Card, the focus provided interest and generated enthusiasm from the staff.
- The finite period of one month helped to create momentum.
- The operation utilised many methods—e.g. vehicle checks, drink/drive checkpoints.
- The range of initiatives being employed meant that burglars might be caught for offences other than burglary (e.g. failure to have a Warrant of Fitness), but this would still be effective in keeping them off the road.
- Door-to-door work encouraged people to join Neighbourhood Support.

6.2.3 Barriers to Operation Monopoly

The following barriers to the operation were identified.

- The extra work had an impact on the workload of Police when they had to actively police their streets.
- Some streets chosen were less appropriate than others—e.g. a four-lane highway.
- Some refinement was needed in selection of streets.
- Lack of resources—Police only had access to two cars between six people, and this involved having to organise within shifts.

7 Victim-focused initiatives

7.1 Introduction

Victim-focused initiatives are those which aim to reduce the incidence of burglary by encouraging residents to increase the security of their households, neighbourhoods and communities. Three victim-focused initiatives of the Manurewa Police Area will be discussed below. They are Neighbourhood Support, Victim Support and the provision of security advice.

7.2 Neighbourhood Support groups

In 2004 Manurewa Police Area had 260 Neighbourhood Support groups, which was a slight increase over the previous three years. An overall voluntary coordinator was based in the Manukau Shopping Centre. She was employed by the shopping centre to handle complaints, lost property and other duties for the centre, and was based in the community constable's office located in the centre. The two roles dovetailed well, and the coordinator was able to share telephone and desk duties with the community constable.

The coordinator compiled information from the Police and from the newspaper articles (crime column) which outlined the areas being hit by burglars. The information was sent out to the street coordinators, whose job it was to distribute that information in their neighbourhood. Some groups were more active than others, this being very dependent on the time, energy, resources and to some extent the age of the street coordinators.

The Police responded to requests from the public to establish Neighbourhood Support groups. The coordinator collated an information pack, and the community constable then attended the establishment meeting for the group.

The coordinator kept a record of the weekly burglary statistics and put it in the window of the office.

The main purpose of the groups was to facilitate neighbours getting to know one another and everyone being alert to strange cars or people. They were encouraged to contact the Police if they suspected anything unusual.

7.2.1 Rationale for Neighbourhood Support

All people interviewed spoke of the importance of the Neighbourhood Support groups. The main mechanism the Police have to prevent or apprehend burglars is by acting on calls from the public. Where there were strong groups operating the scheme was thought to be very effective.

Household Survey (2002, 2004)

When asked 'What Police or community activities which aim to reduce burglary in your neighbourhood are you aware of?' the main types of activity mentioned (unprompted) in 2002 were Neighbourhood Watch/Support (37%) and Police patrols (11%). There was a similar response in 2004 (35%) regarding Neighbourhood Support, but awareness of Police patrols had increased to 35% in 2004. In 2002, all other activities were mentioned by fewer than 4% of respondents (e.g. voluntary community patrols, burglary prevention advice/education, community meetings, Police burglary-specific operations, Police focus on sellers of stolen property, Police keeping an eye on known burglars, Police arresting more burglars/more in prison). 51% of respondents didn't know of any activities, a significantly higher proportion than the average of the other Areas.

By 2004, there was a significant increase in the number who were aware of community patrols (9%—up from 3%), informal networks (4%), Police targeting offenders (3%—up from 1%) and media reports on Police initiatives (3%—up from 1%).

The number of people who hadn't heard of any Police initiatives or activity had dropped from 51% in 2002 to 43% in 2004.

The main ways in which respondents were aware of Neighbourhood Support were by Neighbourhood Support, word of mouth, leaflets in their letterbox, community newspapers and television.

However, the proportion of Manurewa respondents who were members of Neighbourhood Support dropped from 22% in 2002 to 14% in 2004. Of those who belonged, 90% said they thought it was helpful, compared to 2% who thought it unhelpful. Specifically, 63% said they thought it was very helpful, 27% thought it was somewhat helpful, 6% thought it neither helpful nor unhelpful, none thought it unhelpful, 2% thought it very unhelpful, and 2% didn't know. Similar responses were provided in 2004.

For the 97 Manurewa respondents who believed Neighbourhood Support was helpful, the reasons mentioned were:

- strengthens communities/get to know neighbours (82%)
- helps us feel safer (45%)
- tells us about local burglaries (10%)
- deters burglars signs/stickers (4%)
- has good/frequent/well-run meetings (4%)
- gives security advice (3%)
- lets us meet Police (1%)
- other (3%)
- no particular reason (0%).

7.2.2 Strengths of Neighbourhood Support

The strength of Neighbourhood Support was in the active participation of people to deter crime in their own neighbourhoods. The most effective way to catch burglars is while they are on site, and a call from neighbours reporting a break-in or suspicious behaviour is the best source of information for the Police.

Nine times out of ten you were catching a burglar, because you have been told by a member of the public. So if everyone was to do that, if they saw their neighbour was getting broken into and rang us, the burglary rate would be down because we would be catching all the burglars and people wouldn't be ringing up to say, we have been broken into.

An active Neighbourhood Support group also increased the sense of safety in a neighbourhood, as people were encouraged to get to know each other and undertake to look out for one another's property during holidays.

In the last year of the research the Neighbourhood Support coordinator was regularly attending Police crime meetings and being involved to a greater degree in Police initiatives. She felt that the improved relationship enabled her to be more effective in communicating with the Neighbourhood Support groups.

Police identified the revitalisation of Neighbourhood Support groups as a key action point in their 2004 business plan.

Manukau City Council was also considering ways to support Neighbourhood Support in 2004–2005. They were considering a proposal to provide some wages for the coordinator.

7.2.3 Barriers to Neighbourhood Support

The Neighbourhood Support coordinator in Manurewa was a volunteer and only able to carry out the role due to her position with the Manukau City Shopping centre. If she were employed specifically as Neighbourhood Support coordinator she would be able to get out and support and develop groups much more proactively.

There were many factors which restricted the effectiveness of Neighbourhood Support groups. In some areas it was due to people being away at work during the day, and these were the areas which were targeted by burglars as they provide 'richer pickings'. In other areas it was seen to be difficult to start a group or to maintain one due to the high transience of the residents. Groups tended to be more stable in areas in which people owned their homes. Some areas of Manurewa, such as Clendon, had high rental populations, which were more difficult to manage.

Another barrier was the frustration people experienced early in the research period because of the delay in Police response when they did call in suspicious behaviour.

I have heard of cases where 111 has been rung and a car was not able to be sent because of other priorities. There was even a case of a report of a guy being in someone's daughter's house on a Sunday afternoon and were told that they were busy and unable to send a car out there. You wouldn't expect it to be so busy on a Sunday afternoon but those things don't happen too often. On the other hand I get people saying they had a good response and that the Police were there really quickly.

Another barrier mentioned was the burden of cost for the street coordinators. The main mechanism for Neighbourhood Support is providing the latest information to the people in the street about recent burglaries. The street coordinator received this information and photocopied it and distributed it to neighbours on the street. This required access to photocopiers, and people having the time and stamina to distribute the material. Older people were more likely to have the time but not necessarily access to photocopying, and sometimes due to age were unable to cover the distances required to deliver the information. On the other hand, younger people were often so busy with work or families they were less likely to get around to it.

Mention was also made of the fact that in some streets, people were afraid of their neighbours and did not want to share their details with everyone. Where there was gang or drug activity, it took a courageous person to be an informant to the Police. An exception to this was mentioned by a church minister who related how he constantly reported activities in gang and drug houses to the Police until they left the area.

Household Survey (2002, 2004)

The 2004 household survey found that only 14% of respondents belonged to Neighbourhood Support (down from 22% in 2002). The main reasons that they provided for not belonging were:

- not approached to join (42% in 2002, 46% in 2004)
- heard of it but not asked further (9% in 2002, 14% in 2004)
- have informal networks with neighbours (5% in 2002, 13% in 2004)
- never heard of it (8% in 2002, 18% in 2004).

7.2.4 Suggestions for improvement

Where groups exist, the Neighbourhood Support system seemed to be operating very well in Manurewa. Suggestions for improvement included:

- the Neighbourhood Support Coordinator needs to be paid for that role so she is not tied to her other position and can focus only on that role
- more resources are required for photocopying, publicity and salaries
- more volunteers are required to door-knock in areas that don't have support groups
- there is a need to continually publicise groups' existence to newcomers to the area.

7.3 Security advice and target hardening

Police provided advice to victims of burglary in the form of a Victim Support booklet called *Reducing the Risk of Burglary*. This booklet was produced by Counties Victim Support, with funding from New Zealand Police and the Ministry of Justice. Support for the project also came from the Fire Service, Chubb and Neighbourhood Support nationally. The booklet contains information on:

- knowing your neighbours
- community support
- burglar profiles
- being away from home
- protecting your property
- personal safety
- security checklist.

This pack is provided by the investigating officer attending each burglary scene. When a victim had been targeted several times by burglars, the Police provided extra advice in terms of locks and alarms. They encouraged the person to apply for target hardening funding, which enabled people to purchase more secure locks.

Household Survey (2002, 2004)

Most Manurewa respondents used some household security measures, the most common being general precautions such as locking doors and closing windows. Manurewa households were more likely than those in other Areas to have specialised security hardware (e.g. alarms, deadlocks and other types of door security, window safety latches, security lighting). The following security measures were used by respondents (from a list of possible measures).

- Always lock doors when no one is home (92% in both 2002 and 2004)
- Always close/lock windows when no one is home (83% in 2002, 82% in 2004)
- Doors with double locks or deadlocks (65% in both 2002 and 2004)
- Tell neighbours when everyone is away (64% in 2002, 60% in 2004)
- Burglar alarm on premises (61% in 2002, 54% in 2004)
- Outside lights on a sensor switch/security lighting (60% in 2002, 56% in 2004)
- Leave lights/radio/TV on when going out (56% in both 2002 and 2004)
- Street lighting (49% in 2002, 52% in 2004)
- Safety latch to prevent window opening fully (48% in both 2002 and 2004^{l +)})
- Leave outside lights on (43% in 2002, 53% in 2004)
- Security chain on doors (35% in 2002, 38% in 2004)
- Security markings on property (35% in 2002, 29% in 2004)
- Security bolts on doors (34% in 2002, 36% in 2004)
- Note down serial numbers of electrical property (31% in 2002, 23% in 2004)

- House-sitter (26% in 2002, 31% in 2004)
- Lights, radio or TV on timer switch (22% in 2002, 20% in 2004)
- A guard dog (23% in 2002, 27% in 2004)⁹
- Member of Neighbourhood Support (22% in 2002, 14% in 2004)

In 2004 the BTS took over responsibility for providing victims of burglary with security advice. This became an integral part of the attendance requirement and was documented in the victim contact sheet. Attending officers were also being encouraged to get as many details from victims as possible about the stolen property so that identification would be possible later. The victim documentation was photocopied back at the station and a copy provided to Victim Support.

7.4 Target hardening

The Target Hardening Programme was developed by the Ministry of Justice to provide increased home security and at the same time provide victims with burglary prevention information. The core of the Target Hardening Programme centres on the provision of security equipment—such as dead bolts on doors, window locks and burglar alarms—to lower socio-economic households that have been burgled twice or more within a year.

Eligibility for Target Hardening Programme relies on holding a community services card. The assessment is made by either the community constable or the Victim Support worker.

7.5 Victim Support

Victim Support has been operating in Papakura for over 13 years. This group covers the Manurewa Police Area. Victim Support is based in the Police station, has a close working relationship with Police, and is supported administratively by them. The Police provide them with copies of the burglary OR, usually within three days of the burglary and often within one day. Victim Support then makes contact by letter or phone to see if the person needs support. In the case of a particularly bad burglary, or if the victim is elderly or alone, Victim Support will be called in to visit immediately.

Victim Support also attends repeat victims and assesses whether the victim is eligible for the Target Hardening Programme. Victim Support expressed the view that not enough people were eligible for the programme under the current criteria, and believed that it should be more flexible.

⁹ The percentage of households with a guard dog is likely to be underreported as properties with a dog or dog sign could be excluded from the survey in the interests of interviewer safety.

8 Property-focused initiatives

Property-focused initiatives are those which aim to reduce the incidence of burglary by reducing the market for burgled goods. Liaising with second-hand dealers and encouraging the public to make property more identifiable and therefore lessen its attractiveness to burglars are initiatives discussed below.

8.1 Liaison with second-hand dealers

Second-hand dealers are required to work within the Secondhand Dealers and Pawnbrokers Act 2004, which requires dealers to:

- be licensed
- maintain a register of the source of all items bought
- retain certain items for 14 days before on-selling.

Before this legislation came in, they came under the Secondhand Dealers Act 1963. This Act had required them to hold certain property for a month. The list of items which the Act covered was very out of date.

CIB, LET, Street Crime Unit and TCU had all focused on the second-hand property market from time to time, but with changes in personnel and restructuring this had not been consistent. The Street Crime Unit had carried out regular visits to second-hand dealers in 2001 informing them of their responsibilities under the Secondhand Dealers Act 1963. The unit had developed a good relationship with some of the dealers, but as the staff shortage began to impact, they were unable to maintain this contact.

The LET and Intel were active in maintaining contact with second-hand dealers during 2002 and 2003. They had registers of dealers and from time to time carried out checks of licences and ensured they were abiding by their obligations under the Act. Intel also established an 0800 number for dealers to call to check serial numbers on items people brought in to sell. The Service Desk at Papakura received these calls and carried out the serial number checks. The problem mentioned by most interviewees was that people did not record their serial numbers in the first place, and also that Police were not probing for this level of detail in the OR report.

In 2004 the TCU in Manurewa undertook liaison with this sector. One of the issues raised by TCU was that dealers had several ways of circumventing the legislation; in one case the licensee blamed the employee for receiving stolen goods and fired him when the Police identified the goods, but then re-hired him.

Another issue facing Police is the use of the internet for selling stolen goods. As a TCU officer said:

Obviously a lot go through things like Trade & Exchange we know it goes on but we haven't really kept pace. Internet crime is a whole new ball game. The Police department just hasn't come to grips with it. We are very much behind. I do think they still do what is basic—take it down the road and sell it.

The TCU commented that they were still unable to focus on the receivers to the extent they would like due to the volume of work and the number of staff.

Second-hand dealers interviewed for this report were mixed in their comments about their relationships with the Police. They were frustrated that when they did try to be proactive in contacting the Police about suspicious people or items, either they were treated as criminals themselves by the Police or the information was not acted upon. They rarely got feedback from Police when property was taken and almost never received restitution from the courts. Suggestions made to improve this relationship were:

- Police faxing dealers a list of known people they were targeting
- Police establishing a regular liaison—'so we don't get fobbed off at the desk by Police who don't know that we are wanting to work with them'
- second-hand dealers looking out for items that have had a run on them (e.g. lawnmowers)
- second-hand dealers getting prior warning that someone is just out of prison
- Police taking them seriously when they phone in a suspicious person or item, and acting upon the issue
- Police being trained about the Secondhand Dealers and Pawnbrokers Act.

Another pawnbroker said that he made good use of the serial number hotline, and as a result has caught a couple of offenders. The Police had recovered stolen property from their premises and they had received restitution in 50% of those cases.

8.2 SNAP

This programme was developed through a partnership of Police and members of the Insurance Council to encourage people to mark their property with invisible identification and record serial numbers of electronic equipment. This information is stored on a central database and can be checked when people call an 0800 number. Few Police mentioned the scheme during the research period, but in 2004, the new Area Intel was very definite about the need to promote it and had made it part of the briefing for the BTS. They had supplies of pens available for distribution. The following description of the programme is taken from the Police website.¹⁰

¹⁰ <http://www.police.govt.nz/safety/home.operationsnap.php>

Of tens of thousands of reported property offences in the Auckland City District each year, just over 9,000 serial numbers will be collected by Police to assist them tracking and recovering the goods. By this time, the goods may have been on-sold many times over, rendering it nearly impossible for them to ever be recovered. It also involves a wide circle of unsuspecting victims in property crime. Burglars or suppliers of stolen goods receive a market or near market price for property which has the serial number intact.

Receiving or buying stolen goods is illegal and helps keep burglars in business, so proceed with caution when buying second-hand goods. Look for the following indicators to determine whether the goods are 'hot or not':

- *Serial numbers—have they been removed?*
- *Where are you buying from—a legitimate store, or have you had an unsolicited approach from a stranger?*
- *What's the asking price—real cheap?*
- *How quickly does the seller want to close the deal?*
- *Is the seller willing to give you any of his/her contact details?*
- *How do they want to be paid—cash or cheque?*

Burglars will try to sell stolen goods through various outlets, including:

- *Flea markets*
- *Classified ads*
- *Direct approaches to sports clubs or public bars*
- *Through a 'friend of a friend.'*

Help break the burglar's business—Police Messages

- *The remote storage of serial numbers should complement the secure private storage of serial numbers—it will back up private initiatives.*
- *Serial number storage will provide Police and victims of crime with a concise and quick checklist of what's been stolen.*
- *Investigating officers can promptly record the serial numbers of stolen goods on their database and cross-reference with recovered goods. This means a higher rate of burglary/theft type arrests.*
- *Once the rate of serial number recording is improved, more goods will be recovered and returned to their legal owners.*
- *It is perceived that fewer stolen goods will find their way to legitimate second-hand stores and outlets, in part due to the support for the project from ALTA.*
- *Legitimate traders will be able to check the authenticity of ownership of goods offered to them, simply by checking with the Police database of stolen goods.*
- *A crackdown on burglars' income will reduce the rate of burglary by putting the burglars 'out of business'.*
- *This will probably also reduce rates of more serious and violent crime in the district, as studies show burglars tend to 'graduate' on to more serious crimes the longer they are in the 'business'.*

9 General crime reduction initiatives

The following structures have a general crime reduction focus as opposed to a specifically burglary reduction focus. They include:

- Youth Services
- Youth Aid
- community policing
- Youth Development Project
- truancy patrols
- youth patrols
- Police in schools
- community crime prevention initiatives
- other justice sector responses to burglary.

9.1 Youth Services

Youth Services has five youth aid officers, including a family violence coordinator. Community Services comprises the community constables, youth education officers, and the non-sworn youth development team. Community constables are based at the three community policing stations at Clendon, Manukau City Centre, and Manurewa.

9.2 Youth Aid

Youth Aid officers were primarily concerned with juvenile prosecutions. The Youth Aid section had developed a range of initiatives which aimed to divert young offenders from a criminal career. Diversion schemes included formal and non-formal agreements ranging from community service—which can be school-based or home-based—to more formal Family Group Conferences as a last chance before full prosecution.

Youth Aid was a proactive crime prevention model. The Police utilised a wide range of encouragements and sanctions for preventing reoffending. Out of an average of 1200 young people who came through Youth Aid per year, 95% of them didn't come to their attention again.

Youth Aid also ran a community work programme which had young offenders paint out graffiti, plant trees, pick up rubbish and so on, generally on a Saturday morning. The scheme was operated jointly with the Youth Development Team.

Youth Aid also worked to support young offenders to complete the programmes imposed both by their own diversion scheme and by Family Group Conferences. They also collected money from offenders as reparation for victims.

9.3 Community policing

Community policing was thought to be effective in reducing crime for a number of reasons.

- Community Police develop a more in-depth profile of the Area and get to know offenders in the Area, both adult and juvenile, and are able to provide valuable information back to Intel.
- Through community-building initiatives (such as sports games), they develop a different kind of relationship with young people and adults who are therefore more likely to come forward when problems arise.
- Local people feel comfortable reporting offences and suspicious activity to community constables.
- Community constables are able to respond quickly to volatile situations and prevent them from escalating.
- Community constables attend inaugural meetings of Neighbourhood Support groups and this gives them a profile locally, which increases perceptions of community safety.

Community constables in Manurewa did not attend burglary scenes in their area but were responsible for following up repeat victims with security and target hardening information. This may have changed in 2004, when the reformed burglary squad may have taken over this function to ensure that the repeat victim was given security information as soon as possible. Community constables helped to establish new Neighbourhood Support groups and spoke at the inaugural meetings.

They participated in initiatives such as truancy operations, community crime watch patrols and youth patrols. Community constables also participated in local networks which undertook projects aimed at addressing such things as truancy and tagging, as well as proactively lobbying for youth facilities along with other community partners. A research project into the extent of truancy in Manurewa was one example of such a project, the development of a skate park in Clendon another.

Community constables dealt with offences reported across the counter at the community policing stations and offences occurring at schools. Two of the community constables spent one morning per week at the local high schools to deal with offences occurring in the schools.

Frontline staff might also refer neighbourhood matters to the community constable as they were more likely to know people and reduce tensions. They provided an important stream of local intelligence into Intel and were more likely to know where certain people hung out and who they associated with.

9.4 Youth Development Project

The Youth Development Project was established 2000 as one of two projects in Auckland funded by the Crime Prevention Unit. The other was based in Mangere. The Manurewa project was situated in Clendon at the Community Police Station and worked with families in the Clendon area. There were three staff members—the coordinator and two social workers. They were employed by New Zealand Police and carried Police ID.

Juvenile offenders picked up by the Police, i.e. those under 17 years of age, came under the provision of the Children, Young Persons, and their Families Act. The file was sent from the frontline officer to the Police Youth Aid section. The Youth Development Project held weekly meetings with Youth Aid, who referred young people to them for the youth development programme. The criteria for being taken on by the Youth Development Project was that the offender had come to the attention of the Police several times, but it was thought that there was a possibility of turning that around through intense work with their families. This approach would be tried before going to the formal court-ordered Family Group Conference process. The court direction was seen as a back-up, but it gave families an opportunity to try a voluntary programme first.

The young people on the programme were in the minimum to medium offender category. The team worked with a small caseload of young recidivists. The social worker worked intensively with the whole family and together they worked out a programme based on the goals identified by the young person. A plan of action was developed for up to a year.

Crucial to the effectiveness of the Youth Development Project was the quality of programmes run by other agencies in the community. The project did not establish programmes itself, but worked in with those already operating in the community. Their challenge was to find a range of programmes to support a diversity of needs. In the Clendon and Manurewa area it was reported that there were a good range of programmes—sports and recreational as well as alternative education—to refer young people to.

The Youth Development Project also had a number of short-term clients they put on diversion programmes, or into alternative education, but who they didn't work with so intensively. One of the social workers was involved with the local youth group, which was attended by some of the clients. She was able to develop a rapport with a wider group who then supported the youth offenders with their programme.

9.5 Truancy patrols

Most people spoken to identified truancy as a major issue in Manurewa. One of the responses to this was initiated by the Clendon community constable. He worked with the truancy officers to develop a truancy patrol which would periodically conduct a sweep in the area and return truants to school. Youth Aid worked on truancy issues over the period of the research. They conducted sweeps for truants and ensured they were returned to school or alternative courses. The OC said that they had developed a streamlined process for the frontline Police to use when looking for truants; they had a standard form which the Police officer took to the school and then brought back to Youth Aid to follow up. This meant that

frontline staff was happy to pick truants up. With the more persistent truants, Youth Aid was following up with house visits to parents and threatening prosecution. The barrier to this initiative is that these parents were generally non-compliant on everything, including paying fines imposed by the courts.

Police said they were receiving positive feedback from schools and the community about the truancy work. The feedback was that the young people were more aware of the repercussions of truanting.

9.6 Youth patrols

During 2003 a youth patrol was established. This involved patrolling the central city area on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights in the month leading up to Christmas. It was manned by Youth Aid staff, community constables, traffic section and GDB staff.

The purpose was to put pressure on the liquor outlets. They visited a dozen or more of those a night to ensure they were not selling to minors. Several licensees had been prosecuted and this had led to greater compliance. The patrol group also checked bail and curfew requirements of juveniles. They also conducted foot patrols of the areas where young people congregated.

There was a District-wide truancy operation in 2003 called Operation Youth Care. This was held over a period of four weeks. Two strategies were alternated. The first week was truancy—daytime Monday to Friday. The second week was Wednesday to Sunday night—late until 2.00am or 3.00am. The third week was truancy again and the fourth, late nights. Some comments were made about the connection between truancy and burglary. A number of truants do carry out burglaries, but some Police were aware that young people truant for a variety of reasons. Many of the truants picked up on such exercises were found to be attending courses from alternative education providers. Some of these courses are not well-organised and the young people were given the day off. The comment was made that the Police can waste a lot of resources focusing on truancy when it cannot be directly related to criminal activity.

In 2004 the Youth Aid sergeant said that they were still carrying out youth patrols on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights and looking for young people under Section 48 of the Children, Young Persons and their Families Act. They were questioning the effectiveness of this as a strategy because young people didn't really congregate around Manurewa as there was no natural place for them locally. The day-to-day activities of the Youth Aid section were said to be more effective in preventing or diverting young people from offending. The whole rationale for Youth Aid was proactive policing. According to the OC, the day-to-day work of the section achieved good results, and the youth patrols were just taking a resource away from what was working well.

9.7 Police in schools

The Manurewa Police had three officers based part-time in three local high schools. They were based in the school one day or half a day per week. Their role was to deal with the range of petty offending at the school and also with care and protection issues. The school booked appointments with the Police officer. Two of the officers were Youth Aid, and one a community constable. This service was seen as positive in creating a rapport with young people by being visible. They also were able to make young people more aware of the impact of antisocial behaviour.

The education officers visited schools and talked about drug and alcohol awareness, traffic awareness and keeping safe. The programmes were designed to foster quality interaction between the Police and students.

9.8 Community crime prevention initiatives

9.8.1 Manukau City Council

Manukau City Council's Safer Community Council (SCC) was a key partner in crime prevention in 2002. They were conducting security audits in areas of high crime throughout the area. They also ran joint initiatives with Police around truancy and drugs. The Area Commander attended SCC meetings as well as other council meetings when crime issues were being discussed.

The SCC was reviewed in 2003 and Manukau City Council decided to disband it and have a more direct role in crime prevention and increasing community safety. In an extensive consultation with the community in 2003 burglary was identified as the highest crime priority by the public. This concern was followed by drugs and family violence, violence: gangs and bullying, and finally the justice system (Police). The council also conducted a citizen's perceptions survey of 503 people, and a Crime and Safety questionnaire with 244 responses. The results of these confirmed that crime and safety were of great importance to Manukau citizens. The Council therefore decided to form a Community Safety Committee which would consider issues of health, environment, road safety, crime prevention, emergency management and youth and family safety. They developed a community safety framework to provide coordination, integration and a strategic focus. Later in 2003, the community safety planner developed Crime Prevention Action Plan, which detailed support for a range of projects and initiatives.

Those which impacted on burglary were as follows:

- community safety networks such as voluntary patrols, Neighbourhood Support, town centre ambassadors, Crime Prevention through Environmental Design and closed circuit television
- programmes for youth at risk of offending
- Maori crime prevention programmes
- Pacific peoples crime prevention programmes.

They had also established formal relationships with Police. The District Commander attended the Community Safety Committee every month to give a 15-minute presentation.

He also does a presentation to the Safer Community Group which is part of the Council's 'Tomorrow's Manukau' structure. Tomorrow's Manukau is a community development model where there are activities at all levels, from the council senior management and politicians through to the seven wards. Each ward is establishing a community safety network. The Community Safety Group hopes to have Police involved at the various levels so that they can work together on practical outcomes, not just policy. The Council community safety planner believed in 2004 that the relationship with the Police was greatly improving despite them having vastly different cultures. One of the issues raised by Council was that they were expected to provide funding for all the initiatives and there did not seem to be reciprocity. Another issue raised by the Council was their concern that comments received during the community consultation with young people identified very negative attitudes towards the Police. The only positive ones came from the work of community constables, who had tried to get involved in community events and provide a positive experience for young people. They mentioned the Ban the Bash, stalls at festivals and sports tournaments as all being positive in developing good Police relationships.

9.8.2 Alternative education programmes

Several alternative education programmes were being provided in Manurewa, including a consortium of seven providers linked under the umbrella of James Cook High School. Some of these provided a tikanga Maori perspective; one provided a learning environment for young mothers, whilst others provided general correspondence classes.

Alternative education provided an opportunity for young people (including offenders) to take some time to get reconnected to a learning environment and get their grades up to a level where they could return to general school or go on to other training courses or employment. The Youth Development Project referred many of their young offenders to these programmes and had some successful results.

Education was seen as a key factor as to why young people commit crimes—when they lose the connection with educational achievement and drop out they are more likely to commit crimes. However, family and friends and many other factors contribute and alternative education was not seen as a solution in itself by those interviewed. The gap identified by respondents was in programmes specifically aimed at juvenile offenders.

A new programme called Ideal Success has recently begun operating in Manurewa as a result of funding from the Crime Prevention Unit. They offered a programme called Incognito specifically targeting youth offenders. The programme worked on Tikanga Maori frameworks as well as utilising an Ideal Practice module developed by horse whisperer Monty Roberts. This programme involved the young people having to develop rapport with horses and manage their emotional cues. The programme also incorporated elements from the Corrections Straight Thinking programme. The young people stay on the course for one year, with ten weeks of intensive work and the remainder of the year following their programme. The strengths of the programme were said to be the wealth of experience of the tutors, the relationship with Youth Aid, and the fact that at the time of the interview, several

young offenders were moving on to full-time work or training courses in line with their personal plans. The course providers had several suggestions.

- There could be more liaison with the Police, such as those who do the education in schools. When the Police had come and talked to the students it had turned their attitude around.
- They would also like to be funded to work not just with the families of the attendees, but also their friends, who exert the most influence on them.
- The Maori advisory committee, which links crime, education and health, needs to be reintroduced.
- It is important to have some positive activities to provide positive Maori role models, such as Maori Day Out.

9.8.3 Sports Foundation—Project Champion

Counties-Manukau Sports Foundation operates a scheme called Project Champion. The purpose of the scheme is 'to get young people off the street through sport and physical activity, using sport as a vehicle for a pathway back into the community'¹¹. The programme had been running for over a year in 2002 with six staff covering the District (Manukau City, Papakura and Franklin District Council boundaries).

One field worker operated in the Clendon and Manurewa area. The field workers took a range of sports equipment with them in their van and when they saw young people out of school during the day or unemployed young people they attempted to engage them in informal recreation, throwing a ball around or organising casual games. Gradually this allowed them to build rapport and they were able to get to know the young people on a more personal basis. They would then encourage them to join regular activities and support them through help with equipment or uniforms.

The strength of this approach was that they found using recreational activity was a safe way of developing rapport with young people. They were then able to find out what the deeper issues were that made them truant from school, and work with them on a plan. Criticisms of the scheme were based on the idea that organising recreation encouraged the young people to keep away from school and in fact rewarded them for playing truant. Project Champion workers believed that the kids would be truant anyway and rather than being punished, they needed to be listened to and worked with to find a path back to school or to other programmes.

9.8.4 Housing New Zealand: Clendon community renewal project

Housing New Zealand initiated a project in Clendon to address social issues such as transience, crime and lack of safety. Housing New Zealand owns approximately 33% of the 1500 homes in Clendon. In August 2002, they opened a Housing Information Centre in Clendon and employed housing advisers and community development workers. They were

¹¹ Counties-Manukau Sports Foundation Annual Report 2002.

working in partnership with Manukau City Council and the Clendon Community. The aims of the project were to:

- improve the quality of life of for the residents of Clendon
- improve safety and security
- get feedback from the community on issues residents felt were important.

The project was guided by community development principles and intended to grow local leadership so Housing New Zealand could step aside to let the community take charge of initiatives. The other principle they adopted was to use local labour wherever possible. They employed local people for house maintenance, building, landscaping and anything else required to manage the housing stock.

They realised that community perception was a key element in how safe people felt. By fixing broken fences, tidying up derelict areas and painting and improving the look of an area it was hoped to increase people's expectations.

Another initiative by Clendon Community Renewal was the Health Housing Project. This involved an assessment of the health of the people in a house to see if physical improvements would have a positive impact on the family's health.

Safety issues were dealt with through the installation of security lights, upgraded locks, creative fencing solutions and solid timber exterior doors. Of particular interest to Housing New Zealand has been the need to mitigate the impact of cross-leased sites with shared rights of way. There were clusters of tightly concentrated houses in one area and these were causing problems. These had a tendency to become 'tinnie' houses, housing gang affiliates and other criminals. Housing New Zealand recognised that their previous choice of fencing material added to the problem as no one could see over the fences. They were gradually replacing the high wooden fences with see-through swimming pool fences.

Another issue identified by Housing New Zealand was the relationship between transience and the quality of the houses. In some houses they put in heated floors, because the houses had been damp and caused sickness. This has had the effect of greatly reducing transience in the past 18 months. This is a good example of how social issues were connected with crime. When children were moved around a lot they were less likely to be settled in school and more likely to play truant and drift into crime.

After one year of the Housing Renewal Project Housing New Zealand had replaced many wooden fences with open pool style ones, improved street lighting, and provided security stays on windows and doors. Comments from tenants indicated that they liked it; they felt more secure, found that the fences were more attractive and felt that they stopped burglars. The programme will be evaluated after two years.

Another security measure completed by Housing New Zealand was the construction of a fence along the back of Roscommon Road and Browns Road, which stops people coming through the bottom end of Roscommon Road onto Housing New Zealand properties.

Housing New Zealand has worked with Police on truancy operations. Tenancy Managers educate new tenants about issues such as security, truancy and Neighbourhood Support. Housing New Zealand has helped generate new Neighbourhood Support groups in Clendon and worked with the Police to shut down 'tinnie' houses as well as a Housing New Zealand house being used to manufacture methamphetamines.

The Housing New Zealand community development initiative has resulted in the formation of the Clendon residents' group, which had initiated a number of projects to enhance their community. Their priorities were:

- rubbish
- crime and safety
- more facilities for the community.

They were producing a newsletter for which the community constable provided a regular article. Housing New Zealand mentioned that a close working relationship with the Police had worked well to increase security in the area and for the Police, it utilised Housing New Zealand tenants as de facto Neighbourhood Support groups feeding information and concerns back through the tenancy managers.

9.8.5 Graffiti clean-up

St Elizabeth's Church set up an employment scheme through WINZ to paint over graffiti from 8.00am to midday every day. A van was donated by Guthrie Bowron (a local firm) and the paint was paid for by Manukau City Council. The Church managed the project. Over 5000 litres of paint were used in one year. The scheme targeted the long-term unemployed, and according to the manager of the project many of those on the scheme had a burglary record. The scheme made people more aware of taking responsibility in the community. People were more inclined to ring up and say where they have seen tagging.

9.9 Other justice sector responses to burglary

The relationship with other justice agencies was generally seen to be average. Youth and Community Services had the strongest relationships with CYF and Corrections. There were some areas which could be addressed, such as more regular liaison, and this was identified by Police and by other agencies. However, all of the government agencies in this Area were under pressure and although they identified advantages of closer liaison, they recognised that this competed with many other demands. The least satisfactory area in Police and justice agency relationships was identified as the lack of information-sharing. This was mentioned by all parties as being unsatisfactory, as a result of the Privacy Act.

The most frustration expressed was between the Police and the courts—with the judiciary being seen to be too lenient on burglars. It was suggested that this was a south Auckland phenomenon due to the generally serious violent nature of many of the cases before the court. Youth advocates and probation officers were seen to plead leniency for young burglars, as their crimes were of a less serious nature than violent assaults, for example.

Police were advocating on behalf of victims and strongly felt that burglary was having a huge impact on people, yet this was not being reflected in sentences.

On the positive side there were joint projects being developed. A recent project was being developed as a joint initiative of the Pacific Island court liaison officer, the Police prosecutor, and CYF staff. This involved developing an education programme on the effects of offending and addressing schools and churches in the Area.

9.9.1 Department of Corrections—Straight Thinking

The Department of Corrections operated several programmes aimed at reducing recidivism of offenders based on an assessment of their criminogenic factors. Straight Thinking was one such programme, run by trained facilitators. It took up to ten people on each programme and ran about four times per year. The participants had been convicted of offences and the aim of the programme was to teach them skills for making different decisions from the ones which led them to offend. Burglars made up a high percentage of the participants on the programmes. Although the effectiveness of the programme had not yet been evaluated, the Department believed that although some graduates of their programme have re-offended, it had been for far less serious offences than originally.

9.9.2 Community Probation Service

Community Probation Service worked with offenders through either supervised Centre placements or agency placements whilst they served their non-custodial sentences. A high percentage of those serving non-custodial sentences were burglars, who were most likely to be placed under supervised work. In supervised work, offenders turn up to be mustered into work groups and then taken to supervised jobs such as parks and reserves maintenance. Comments made by staff indicate that this was not seen as a deterrent for young burglars as they were often mixing with older, experienced criminals and formed new networks. People not turning up for their community work might be arrested for bail breach.

Some first-time offenders who were not regarded as being of great risk were placed within an agency to serve their community hours. Agencies then took responsibility for their supervision. Agencies such as the SPCA and Habitat for Humanity were given as examples which had worked well for young first-time burglars, some of whom went on to take jobs after their sentences were completed. Staff noted that they were concerned that organisations such as Manukau City Council were no longer taking placements due to the requirements of OSH and not being covered by insurance.

They have given the excuse that inducting people into their sites like their swimming pools, or a community centre with gym work inducting them into all the hazards that are around, it would take them an hour or two hours for each client placed there, and they can't afford the time to do that. I have been on the job for two and a half years there has never been an accident recorded anywhere, and yet the public are allowed to go in there and do all these things they don't get inducted for two hours. This means that we may be increasingly losing agencies for placements, which would undermine the whole scheme.

Another problem identified by probation officers was the cost barriers for offenders to reach their placements.

9.9.3 Department for Courts—Pacific community liaison service

A Pacific Youth court officer initiated a project whereby a group of youth advocates, lawyers and community workers would go into schools and talk about burglary and the implications of offending. They would describe the Police and court system. The planned school talks would involve Police, the courts and CYF in a joint approach. Eventually, they would like to go to church groups and community groups as well. One of the barriers anticipated in this approach is resistance from the schools and the community, who don't believe that their children are offending. The Pacific court officer was developing a database with information on offenders, such as what church they belonged to and what school they were from. With this information he hoped to be able to encourage these organisations to face up to the issue of youth offending.

When interviewed again in 2004, the liaison officer noted that the Police were 'drawing a hard line' on young burglars. This meant an increase in custodial sentences and an overload in already inadequate residential facilities for young people. The Pacific Island community had noticed that there were more serious responses coming from the court. They also noticed more bail checks on their young people. The reaction to this was mixed—frustrated at being interrupted, but hopeful that it would deter young people from getting into more trouble. He believed that the Pacific Island parents liked to feel support from the Police, as they were often helpless about how to keep their youth from getting into trouble with the law.

A suggestion by the Pacific youth liaison officer was that the Police needed to work with the Pacific Island churches, as they have a lot of mana in the eyes of this community. By establishing a good relationship there would be a great opportunity to influence the community in crime prevention. He also believed that the churches could act like Neighbourhood Support groups, as people were more comfortable speaking to their own community rather than neighbours.

9.9.4 Child, Youth and Family

CYF was also working on a truancy initiative in conjunction with the schools and Police which involved working with the kids in the school environment before they came to the attention of CYF. Social workers from the department had been attached to a designated school in order to be able to deal with minor issues as they arose. Each social worker devoted about 10 hours per week on proactive initiatives outside the casework model. Manurewa Youth Aid said they had a good professional working relationship with CYF social workers, but acknowledged that they were understaffed. They said that they would prefer to have social workers assigned to young people after a family group conference (FGC), and before the matter deteriorated and ended up in court. The lack of a social worker meant that the families were not supported to ensure the plan was carried out and the Police did not have the time.

9.9.5 Lawyers and youth advocates

Lawyers and youth advocates interviewed for this report commented that bail conditions being imposed on young people seemed severe from the youth point of view. Due to the delay in the court hearing charges, conditions such as the 24-hour curfew were impossible for young people to adhere to for more than a couple of weeks. Often the home environment was one which generated the antisocial behaviour in the first place. They said that the delay by Police in laying charges contributed to the problem. They were critical of the current service provided by CYF in Manurewa and believed that this led to Police often not turning up to Family Group Conferences. However, this meant that valuable information was not being presented by the Police. They also believed that more effort should be made to encourage victims to attend these.

They commented that CYF needed to develop more youth programmes and resource families so that they could abide by conditions set by the courts.

Like others, lawyers were critical of the lack of good programmes for youth offenders in Manurewa. Many young offenders needed programmes with positive male role models. These programmes, said one lawyer, should be available to all young people so they don't have to offend to get into them.

Another comment was that many Police did not have enough of an understanding of the legislation as it affected juveniles. This resulted in inappropriate arrests and inappropriate conditions being applied, which exacerbated the bad behaviour rather than improving it. Police needed to be aware of the time frames which had meaning for young people, rather than the slow time frames of the court and CYF. They were supportive of the Manurewa Youth Aid diversion programmes and Youth Development but felt that the insights from these ought to be taken into the general Police who were dealing with young offenders.

The lawyers also commented that not enough was being done to seek reparation from offenders. In relation to burglaries, Police need to encourage victims to provide 'proof of loss' so that the court could award against it.

10 Crime statistics

10.1 Introduction

Crime data analysis is a component of the three-year evaluation examining the effectiveness of Police practice in relation to dwelling burglary. This is intended to supplement other information sources within each case study Police Area, such as interviews with key respondents, household surveys, victim interviews and offender interviews.

The main focus of the crime data analysis is to examine the incidence and resolution of dwelling burglary to assist the evaluation's assessment of the effectiveness of the dwelling burglary initiatives. Dwelling burglary, however, is not a crime that occurs in isolation. Dwelling burglary offenders are also often convicted for non-dwelling burglaries and other dishonesty or property crimes. The report therefore also examines other offences to provide a general crime profile for the Police Area and establish whether dwelling burglary initiatives may have resulted in a reduction or increase in other crimes in the Area (crime type diffusion or displacement, respectively).¹² The recorded rates of crime in the Police Area are compared to those for New Zealand overall to establish whether any trends or changes within the Police Area were more likely due to Area initiatives or national trends.

This section begins with an examination of the composition of crime, followed by an examination of recorded crime for:

- total crime
- offence categories (the seven main categories of crime)
- dishonesty offences
- burglary
- dwelling burglary.

¹² The crime data analysis was to include an examination of dwelling burglary locations within each Police Area to assess whether location-focused dwelling burglary initiatives may have resulted in a reduction or increase in dwelling burglary in other locations within the Police Area (spatial diffusion or displacement, respectively). The New Zealand Police map-based policing system (MAPS) can produce maps indicating the locations of recorded crime data, reading this data from either the CARD system or the NIA system. Particular scene types (e.g. dwelling) from crime data in CARD currently, however, cannot be indicated by MAPS, whereas scene type with NIA crime data can. Unfortunately, while the Manurewa, Rotorua, Lower Hutt and Sydenham Police Areas entered large proportions of their recorded dwelling burglaries for 2002 into NIA, only small proportions of these had a geographical coordinate assigned to their NIA record. The MAPS system, however, requires the geographical coordinates in order to map the crime incidents to their locations. Furthermore, although MAPS graphically indicates the location of incidents within suburb and even mesh block boundaries, it cannot currently extract the dataset grouped by either suburb or mesh block. Therefore, it was not possible to do this analysis.

The analysis of recorded dwelling burglary offences includes a five-year historical review and an examination of monthly trends from 2000 to 2004.

Offence clearances involve the identification of the alleged offender/s responsible for a particular offence, but do not necessarily mean they are prosecuted or convicted of that offence (for example, they may be warned, cautioned, or referred to Police Youth Aid). Following the examination of recorded crime is an examination of the recorded clearances for:

- total crime
- offence categories (the seven main categories of crime)
- dishonesty offences
- burglary
- dwelling burglary.

This section concludes by examining trends in prosecutions, convictions and sentences for burglary, both nationally and within the court district which is closest to the Police Area. The data for this section was obtained from the Case Monitoring System through the Justice Data Warehouse.

10.1.1 Data from New Zealand Police used in this report

Official Police recorded crime statistics and clearances data in this report was obtained from the justice sector Law Enforcement System via the Incoff Offence Calendar Detail universe of the New Zealand Police Business Objects database.

Official Police recorded crime statistics record the scene type of the location where the offence occurred, enabling the examination of official Police recorded dwelling burglary data. As the non-dwelling scene types include the 'not applicable', 'null scene', 'unknown' and 'other scene' codes, an undercount of dwelling burglaries is possible. For New Zealand overall, the 'not applicable', 'null scene' and 'other' scene codes accounted for 7.3%, 8.2%, and 6.9% of all burglaries in 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively.

Population data was used to calculate the rates of recorded crime in this report. Statistics New Zealand calculated the estimated resident populations for each Police station, based on the Police station boundaries as at the 2001 census. New Zealand Police then derived the estimated resident populations for each Police Area by summing data from the stations within each Police Area. The population data are the estimated population figures as at 30 June (mid-point) each year.¹³

¹³ The estimated resident population for a given area as at 30 June is based on the 1996 census usually resident population counts for the years 1996–2000 and the 2001 census usually resident population counts for the years 2001–2004, updated for:

- residents missed or counted more than once by the census (net census undercount)
- residents temporarily overseas on census night
- births, deaths and net migration between census night and the date of estimate
- reconciliation with demographic estimates for ages 0–9 years.

Visitors from outside the given area are excluded.

10.1.2 Interpreting Police recorded crime data used in this report

The crime data presented in this report is Police recorded data and not actual crime data. An incident that was reported to Police, or became known to Police by detection, and where Police believe an offence occurred is counted as a recorded offence. Changes in Police recorded crime can therefore be due not only to changes in the actual incidence of crime, but also changes in:

- the proportion of offences reported to Police
- Police recording practices
- Police practices in identifying unreported crime.

While the New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims 2001¹⁴ identified household burglary as one of the highest reported crimes to Police, an estimated 32% of New Zealand's household burglaries in 2000 were not reported. Similarly, the surveys of burglary victimisation conducted as part of the current research¹⁵ conducted for this evaluation estimated 30% of household burglaries in Manurewa during 2001 and 2003 were not reported to Police.

It is imperative that crime data and analyses presented in this report are interpreted in terms of volumes of Police work, rather than accurate reflections of the true incidence of crime.

In order to conduct comparisons between the Police Area and New Zealand overall, as well as between the four Police Areas in the final report, all the crime data in the reports is presented as rates per 10,000 population, rather than absolute volumes. As an example, in 2002, New Zealand had a total of 60,404 Police-recorded dwelling burglaries, and an estimated resident population of 3,939,000. This translates to a rate of 153.4 recorded dwelling burglaries per 10,000 population, meaning that on average, for every 10,000 residents in New Zealand, 153.4 burglaries were recorded during 2002. This does not necessarily mean, however, that 153 or 154 people out of every 10,000 residents experienced a dwelling burglary during 2002, as some people experienced repeat burglaries.

Several Police key respondents interviewed in the evaluation reported that dwelling burglary victimises whole households, not just individuals. The New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims 2001 also regards dwelling burglary as a crime against households. To reflect dwelling burglary in terms of households, but also enable comparison of dwelling burglary to other (not household-specific) crimes, recorded dwelling burglary data in the reports is presented both as rates per 10,000 population, and rates per 100 households. Using the earlier example, in 2002, New Zealand had a total of 60,404 Police recorded burglaries, and an estimated 1,359,843 occupied dwellings¹⁶. This translates to a rate of 44.4 recorded dwelling

¹⁴ Morris, A. and Reilly, J., *New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims 2001*, Ministry of Justice, 2003.

¹⁵ Triggs, S., *Surveys of household burglary Part One (2002): Four Police Areas and national data compared*, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Triggs, S., *Surveys of household burglary Part Two: Four Police Areas compared between 2002 and 2004*, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

¹⁶ Statistics New Zealand provided New Zealand Police the number of occupied dwellings in each Police station area as at the 2001 census; however, they were not asked to provide the estimated number of


burglaries per 1,000 households in 2002 for New Zealand, meaning that for every 1,000 households in New Zealand, 44.4 dwelling burglaries were recorded during 2002. Note as previously, this does not necessarily mean that 44 or 45 out of every 1,000 households experienced a burglary during 2002, as some households experienced repeat burglaries.

10.2 Trends in Police recorded crime

10.2.1 Total crime

Figure 10.1 examines the total recorded crime rate per 10,000 population for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand for 2004 and the preceding seven years.

Figure 10.1: Total crime per 10,000 population for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand



From 1997 to 2004, New Zealand had a lower crime rate than Manurewa for the same period. Overall, the total crime rate decreased in Manurewa from 1997 to 2004 by 21.7%, whereas nationally, there was a 20.1% decrease.

occupied dwellings for the years 1996–2002, as they had done for the usually resident population. Therefore rates of recorded dwelling burglaries per 100 households have only been calculated for the years 2000–2004, with the 2001 census night number of estimated occupied dwellings used for each of these years.

Figure 10.2: Dishonesty offences and total crime per 10,000 population for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand





Figure 10.2 shows dishonesty offences and the total crime rates per 10,000 population for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand. Dishonesty offences and crime rates were both higher in Manurewa than in New Zealand during the period 2000 to 2004.

Overall, dishonesty offences decreased in Manurewa from 2000 to 2004 by 18.8%, whereas nationally there was a 14.0% decrease. Total crime in Manurewa decreased by 18.8% from 2000 to 2004, whereas nationally there was a 9.7% decrease.

Table 10.1 provides the recorded crime rates per 10,000 population for the remaining offence categories for Manurewa and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.3 represents the data graphically.

Table 10.1: Offence categories (excluding dishonesty) crime rates per 10,000 population for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand

Offence category	Rate per 10,000 population									
	Manurewa					New Zealand				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Violence	212.9	207.8	202.9	178.2	190.6	107.8	113.4	114.1	113.8	111.4
Sexual	16.4	13.5	13.5	10.0	9.0	8.6	8.0	8.9	8.1	7.6
Drugs and antisocial	166.9	145.3	130.9	140.1	126.8	138.3	141.8	140.6	146.7	134.1
Property damage	112.3	100.3	110.4	133.1	104.5	105.0	105.0	103.7	108.9	101.8
Property abuses	87.7	91.8	81.9	57.7	58.5	54.7	55.0	55.8	52.2	48.4
Administrative	51.2	47.6	63.3	103.2	35.9	32.8	34.1	36.9	37.2	29.6

Figure 10.3: Offence categories (excluding dishonesty) crime rates per 10,000 population for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand

10.2.1.1 Recorded violence offences

The rate of recorded violence offences per 10,000 population for Manurewa decreased by 10.5% from 2000 to 2004, while nationally the rate increased by 3.3% over the same period.

10.2.1.2 Recorded sexual offences

The rate of recorded sexual offences per 10,000 population for Manurewa decreased by 45.1% from 2000 to 2004, while nationally the rate decreased by 11.6% over the same period.

10.2.1.3 Recorded drugs and antisocial offences

The rate of recorded drug and antisocial offences per 10,000 population for Manurewa decreased by 24.0% from 2000 to 2004, while nationally the rate decreased by 3.0% over the same period.

10.2.1.4 Recorded property damage offences

The rate of recorded property damage offences in Manurewa decreased by 6.9% from 2000 to 2004, while nationally the rate decreased by 3.0% over the same period.

10.2.1.5 Recorded property abuse offences

Manurewa's rate of recorded property abuses per 10,000 population decreased by 33.3% from 2000 to 2004, while nationally the rate decreased by 11.5% over the same period.

10.2.1.6 Recorded administrative offences


Manurewa's rate of recorded administrative offences decreased by 30.0% from 2000 to 2004, while nationally the rate decreased by 9.8% over the same period.

10.2.2 Dishonesty offences

Table 10.2 provides the recorded crime rates per 10,000 population for particular dishonesty offences for Manurewa and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.4 represents the data graphically.

Table 10.2: Dishonesty offences per 10,000 population for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand

Selected dishonesty offences	Rate per 10,000 population									
	Manurewa					New Zealand				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Burglary	289.4	244.1	254.1	216.4	197.0	172.4	155.5	153.3	153.7	142.0
Unlawful taking/ conversion m/v's	129.0	104.0	125.7	127.5	119.2	57.0	52.1	56.2	54.2	47.9
Remaining car conversion	28.9	37.9	42.3	51.1	34.9	41.0	40.3	42.4	43.2	34.7
Theft ex car	135.6	153.7	194.7	162.1	146.2	121.8	127.8	136.2	132.8	114.9
Theft ex dwelling (no drugs)	22.6	28.0	29.2	27.4	18.1	20.3	20.6	21.2	18.8	14.4
Remaining theft	252.5	234.5	220.0	199.7	177.4	186.9	187.6	186.6	182.7	167.7
Receiving/possessing stolen goods	11.3	14.2	7.2	6.0	6.8	7.1	6.3	6.0	6.2	5.7
Remaining dishonesty offences	74.2	73.4	100.1	91.7	66.6	53.9	51.4	55.5	44.9	39.6

Figure 10.4: Dishonesty offences per 10,000 population for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand

10.2.2.1 Recorded burglary offences

Burglary accounted, on average, for more than a quarter of Manurewa's recorded total dishonesty offences for each of the years 2000 to 2004 and close to a quarter of New Zealand's total dishonesty offences for the same period. Burglary offence rates per 10,000 population for Manurewa decreased by 31.9% from 2000 to 2004, while the national burglary rates per 10,000 population decreased by 17.6% from 2000 to 2004.

10.2.2.2 Recorded car conversion offences

Unlawful takings/conversion of motor vehicles accounted for 13.6% of Manurewa's total recorded dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004 and 8.5% of the total recorded dishonesty offences in New Zealand for the same period. Unlawful takings/conversion of motor vehicle offence rates per 10,000 population for Manurewa decreased by 7.6% from 2000 to 2004, while the national rates per 10,000 population decreased by 15.9%.

Remaining car conversion¹⁷ offence rates per 10,000 population for Manurewa increased by 20.8% from 2000 to 2004, while the national rates per 10,000 population decreased by 15.3% from 2000 to 2004.

¹⁷ Remaining car conversion offences included: unlawfully get into/interfere with motor vehicle; take/convert/interfere bicycle; and miscellaneous car conversion offences.

10.2.2.3 Recorded theft offences

Theft offences in Manurewa accounted for 44.9% of Manurewa's total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000 to 2004. Nationally, theft offences accounted for 51.9% of New Zealand's total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004.

Theft ex car is the offence term for the stealing of property from a car. Theft ex car accounted for 17.8% of Manurewa's total recorded number of dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004, whereas it accounted for 20% of New Zealand's total recorded number of dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004. Theft ex car offence rates per 10,000 population for Manurewa increased by 7.8% from 2000 to 2004, while the national rates per 10,000 population decreased by 5.7% from 2000 to 2004.

Theft ex dwelling accounted for 2.8% of Manurewa's total recorded dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004 and 3.0% of New Zealand's total recorded dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004. Theft ex dwelling offence rates per 10,000 population for Manurewa decreased by 19.1% from 2000 to 2004, while the national rates per 10,000 population decreased by 29.1%.

Remaining theft accounted for 24.3% of Manurewa's total recorded dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004 and 28.8% of New Zealand's total recorded dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004. Remaining theft offence rates per 10,000 population for Manurewa decreased by 29.6% from 2000 to 2004, while the national rates per 10,000 population decreased by 10.3%.

10.2.2.4 Recorded receiving or possessing stolen goods offences

The total recorded number of receiving or possessing stolen goods offences only accounted for a small percentage of the total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004, for both Manurewa and New Zealand (1% each).

10.2.2.5 Recorded remaining dishonesty offences

Remaining recorded dishonesty offences include receiving drugs, money laundering, financial transaction opportunities and fraud. The total recorded number of remaining dishonesty offences for Manurewa accounted for 9.1% of the total recorded number of dishonesty offences and 7.7% of New Zealand's total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004. Remaining dishonesty offence rates per 10,000 population for Manurewa decreased by 10.2% from 2000 to 2004, while the national rates per 10,000 population decreased by 25.7%.

10.2.3 Burglary offences

Figure 10.5 shows the recorded burglary rates per 10,000 population for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand from 1997 to 2004. For both Manurewa and New Zealand, there was generally a decreasing trend in burglary from 1997 to 2004. National burglary rates were lower than the Manurewa rates. The total burglary rate per 10,000 population decreased in Manurewa from 1997 to 2004 by 44.9%, whereas nationally there was a 33.7% decrease.

Figure 10.5 Recorded burglary per 10,000 population for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand




Figure 10.6: Dwelling and non-dwelling burglary per 10,000 population for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand




Figure 10.6 examines the rates of recorded dwelling and non-dwelling burglary per 10,000 population from 1997 to 2004, for Manurewa and New Zealand. Manurewa's dwelling burglary rates were higher than the national dwelling burglary rates from 1997 to 2004. Non-dwelling burglary rates were also higher in Manurewa than in New Zealand, except for 2002 and 2003.


The dwelling burglary rate per 10,000 population decreased in Manurewa from 1997 to 2004 by 47.2%, whereas nationally there was a 31.1% decrease. The non-dwelling burglary rate per 10,000 population also decreased in Manurewa from 1997 to 2004, by 38.0%, as it did nationally, where there was a 37.8% decrease.

From 2000 to 2004, Manurewa experienced a decrease in the dwelling burglary rate per 10,000 population of 25.8%, whereas nationally there was a 15.4% decrease.

For non-dwelling burglary from 2000 to 2004, there was a 43.8% decrease in Manurewa compared to a national decrease of 21.3%.

Figure 10.7 examines the rate of dwelling burglary per 100 households¹⁸ for Manurewa and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Manurewa's rate of recorded dwelling burglary per 100 households was higher than the national rate from 2000 to 2004.

Figure 10.7: Rates of dwelling burglary per 100 households for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand



¹⁸ The total number of private dwellings as at the 2001 census was used to calculate the rates per 100 households for each of the years 2000 to 2004, as estimates for the 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2004 years were not available.

When Manurewa’s recorded dwelling burglary rate is examined as a rate per 100 households, recorded dwelling burglary rates decreased in Manurewa from 2000 to 2004 by 17.6%, while nationally the rates decreased by 13.3%.

10.2.4 Clearance rates—total crime

Table 10.3 provides a comparison of the rate of recorded offences per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded crimes cleared for each offence category and total crime for Manurewa and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.8 presents the percentage of recorded crimes cleared data graphically.

Figure 10.8: Percentage of recorded crimes cleared by offence category for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand




Table 10.3: Crime rates per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded crimes cleared by offence category for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand

Offence category	Manurewa (New Zealand)									
	Rate per 10,000 population					Percentage cleared				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Violence	212.9 (107.8)	207.8 (113.4)	202.9 (114.1)	178.2 (113.8)	190.6 (111.4)	72.3 (76.6)	73.4 (77.2)	72.4 (77.8)	67.7 (79.9)	70.9 (80.6)
Sexual	16.4 (8.6)	13.5 (8.0)	13.5 (8.9)	10.0 (8.1)	9.0 (7.6)	49.1 (53.8)	44.7 (52.1)	57.7 (57.2)	28.0 (56.0)	42.0 (55.9)
Drugs and antisocial	166.9 (138.3)	145.3 (141.8)	130.9 (140.6)	140.1 (146.7)	126.8 (134.1)	84.1 (89.6)	82.4 (88.3)	81.1 (88.6)	79.8 (90.5)	75.5 (91.6)
Dishonesty	943.5 (660.4)	889.9 (641.6)	973.4 (657.3)	882.0 (636.8)	766.2 (567.8)	22.7 (22.6)	21.0 (22.7)	15.6 (22.5)	17.4 (23.1)	18.1 (23.8)
Property damage	112.3 (105.0)	100.3 (105.0)	110.4 (103.7)	133.1 (108.9)	104.5 (101.8)	44.9 (31.4)	36.1 (31.2)	37.5 (30.3)	47.5 (31.1)	43.0 (31.6)
Property abuses	87.7 (54.7)	91.8 (55.0)	81.9 (55.8)	57.7 (52.2)	58.5 (48.4)	71.4 (68.3)	67.1 (67.3)	62.3 (69.0)	63.7 (72.5)	61.3 (73.2)
Administrative	51.2 (32.8)	47.6 (34.1)	63.3 (36.9)	103.2 (37.2)	35.9 (29.6)	85.1 (85.8)	85.5 (84.3)	94.1 (86.3)	95.1 (88.6)	91.2 (91.4)
Total crime	1590.9 (1107.6)	1496.1 (1099.0)	1576.4 (1117.4)	1504.3 (1103.7)	1291.5 (1000.5)	42.3 (41.4)	40.3 (42.0)	35.8 (41.9)	39.0 (43.5)	37.7 (44.6)

10.2.4.1 Recorded clearances for violence offences

Recorded clearance rates for violence offences were lower in Manurewa compared to New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Recorded clearance rates for violent offences in Manurewa decreased by 1.9% from 2000 to 2004, while nationally clearance rates increased by 5.2% over the same period.

10.2.4.2 Recorded clearances for sexual offences

Recorded clearance rates were lower in Manurewa than in New Zealand, except during 2002 when the proportion of sexual offences cleared in Manurewa was higher than the proportion for New Zealand. Recorded clearance rates for sexual offences in Manurewa decreased by 14.5% from 2000 to 2004, while nationally clearance rates increased by 3.9% over the same period.

10.2.4.3 Recorded clearances for drugs and antisocial offences

Recorded clearance rates for drugs and antisocial offences were lower in Manurewa than in New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Recorded clearance rates for drugs and antisocial offences in Manurewa decreased by 10.9% from 2000 to 2004, while nationally clearance rates increased by 2.2% over the same period.

10.2.4.4 Recorded clearances for dishonesty offences

Recorded clearance rates for dishonesty offences were lower in Manurewa than in New Zealand from 2001 to 2004. Recorded clearance rates for dishonesty offences in Manurewa decreased by 20.2% from 2000 to 2004, while nationally clearance rates increased by 5.3% over the same period.

10.2.4.5 Recorded clearances for property damage offences

Recorded clearance rates for property damage offences were higher in Manurewa than in New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Recorded clearance rates for property damage offences in Manurewa decreased by 4.2% from 2000 to 2004, while nationally clearance rates increased by 1.0% over the same period.

10.2.4.6 Recorded clearances for property abuse offences

Recorded clearance rates for property abuse offences were lower in Manurewa than in New Zealand except during 2000, when clearance rates in Manurewa were higher. Recorded clearance rates for property abuse offences in Manurewa decreased by 14.1% from 2000 to 2004, while nationally clearance rates increased by 7.2% over the same period.

10.2.4.7 Recorded clearances for administrative offences


Recorded clearance rates for administrative offences were higher in Manurewa than in New Zealand except during 2000 and 2004, where national clearance rates were marginally higher (0.8% in 2000 and 0.2% in 2004). Recorded clearance rates for administrative offences in

Manurewa increased by 7.2% from 2000 to 2004, while nationally clearance rates increased by 6.5% over the same period.

10.2.5 Clearance rates—dishonesty offences

Table 10.4 provides a comparison of the rate of recorded offences per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded crimes cleared for particular dishonesty offences for Manurewa and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.9 presents the percentage of recorded crimes cleared data graphically.

Figure 10.9: Percentage of recorded dishonesty crimes cleared for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand



Clearance rates in Manurewa for burglary, unlawful takings/conversion of motor vehicles, theft ex car, theft ex dwelling and remaining dishonesty offences were lower than the national rates from 2000 to 2004, whereas remaining theft and remaining car conversion clearance rates were higher (except during 2002 for remaining car conversion, where the clearance rates were the same for both Manurewa and New Zealand).

Table 10.4: Dishonesty offences crime rates per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded crimes cleared for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand

Selected dishonesty offences	Manurewa (New Zealand)									
	Rate per 10,000 population					Percentage cleared				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Burglary	289.4 (172.4)	244.1 (155.5)	254.1 (153.3)	216.4 (153.7)	197.0 (142.0)	9.6 (15.8)	11.1 (16.0)	8.9 (15.9)	7.2 (16.5)	8.8 (17.3)
Unlawful takings/conversion of motor vehicles	129.0 (57.0)	104.0 (52.1)	125.7 (56.2)	127.5 (54.2)	119.2 (47.9)	13.6 (16.9)	12.0 (18.8)	12.1 (19.4)	13.7 (20.3)	11.3 (20.1)
Remaining car conversion	28.9 (41.0)	37.9 (40.3)	42.3 (42.4)	51.1 (43.2)	34.9 (34.7)	29.4 (22.3)	29.9 (22.6)	25.0 (25.0)	35.8 (25.9)	30.3 (25.5)
Theft ex car	135.6 (121.8)	153.7 (127.8)	194.7 (136.2)	162.1 (132.8)	146.2 (114.9)	3.1 (6.4)	2.0 (6.6)	2.8 (7.3)	3.1 (8.0)	3.5 (7.5)
Theft ex dwelling	22.6 (20.3)	28.0 (20.6)	29.2 (21.2)	27.4 (18.8)	18.1 (14.4)	7.8 (13.8)	9.2 (13.3)	8.1 (13.0)	2.0 (13.7)	5.1 (13.4)
Remaining theft	252.5 (186.9)	234.5 (187.6)	220.0 (186.6)	199.7 (182.7)	177.4 (167.7)	47.0 (33.1)	39.0 (32.8)	33.3 (32.0)	36.0 (32.4)	40.5 (34.4)
Remaining dishonesty offences	85.5 (61.0)	87.6 (57.7)	107.4 (61.5)	97.6 (51.1)	72.1 (45.3)	41.7 (50.9)	43.9 (50.4)	21.0 (48.6)	24.9 (53.3)	25.2 (52.1)

10.2.5.1 Recorded clearances for burglary offences

Manurewa's rate of recorded clearances for burglary offences was lower than the national rates from 2000 to 2004 and there was an 8.3% decrease in clearances from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 9.5% increase in national rates.

10.2.5.2 Recorded clearances for car conversion offences

Manurewa's rate of recorded clearances for unlawful takings/conversion of motor vehicles offences was lower than the national rates from 2000 to 2004 and there was a 16.9% decrease in clearances from 2000 to 2004, compared to an 18.9% increase in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

Manurewa's rate of recorded clearances for remaining car conversion offences was higher than the national rates from 2000 to 2004, except in 2002, where the rates were the same. There was a 3.1% increase in clearances from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 14.3% increase in national rates.

10.2.5.3 Recorded clearances for theft offences

Manurewa's rate of recorded clearances for theft ex car offences was lower than the national rates from 2000 to 2004 and there was a 12.9% increase in clearances from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 17.1% increase in national rates.

Manurewa's rate of recorded clearances for theft ex dwelling offences was lower than the national rates from 2000 to 2004 and there was a 34.6% decrease in clearances from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 2.9% decrease in national rates.

Manurewa's rate of recorded clearances for remaining theft offences was higher than the national rate from 2000 to 2004. There was a 13.8% decrease in clearances from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 3.9% increase in national rates.

10.2.5.4 Recorded clearances for remaining dishonesty offences


Manurewa's rate of recorded clearances for remaining dishonesty offences was lower than the national rate from 2000 to 2004 and there was a 39.5% decrease in clearances from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 2.3% increase in national rates.

10.2.6 Clearance rates—burglaries

Table 10.5 compares the rates of recorded dwelling and non-dwelling burglary per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded dwelling and non-dwelling burglary offences cleared for Manurewa and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.10 presents the data for the percentage of cleared dwelling and non-dwelling burglaries graphically.

Table 10.5: Dwelling and non-dwelling burglary rates per 10,000 population and percentage of dwelling and non-dwelling burglary offences cleared for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand

Burglary	Manurewa (New Zealand)									
	Rate per 10,000 population					Percentage cleared				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Dwelling burglary	191.5 (10.3)	168.8 (93.4)	194.9 (93.2)	164.9 (97.3)	142 (89.9)	8.8 (15.3)	9.9 (15.7)	8.9 (15.2)	7.1 (16.0)	8.3 (16.3)
Non-dwelling burglary	97.9 (66.2)	75.3 (62.1)	59.2 (60.1)	47.0 (56.4)	55.0 (52.1)	11.1 (16.7)	13.9 (16.6)	8.9 (17.0)	7.4 (17.4)	10.0 (18.9)

Figure 10.10: Percentage of recorded dwelling and non-dwelling burglary offences cleared for the Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand


Manurewa's recorded clearance rates for both dwelling and non-dwelling burglary were lower than the national rates from 2000 to 2004.

Manurewa's recorded clearance rate for dwelling burglary decreased by 5.7% from 2000 to 2004, whilst the non-dwelling burglary clearance rate decreased by 9.9%. The national recorded clearance rate for dwelling burglary increased by 6.5% from 2000 to 2004, whilst the non-dwelling burglary rate increased by 13.1%.

10.3 Trends in prosecutions, convictions and sentences for burglary

Figure 10.11 shows the outcomes of burglary prosecutions in New Zealand from 1997 to 2004, as a percentage of burglary charges. Prosecutions resulting in convictions decreased from 77.0% to 69.8% of burglary charges from 1997 to 2004. Prosecutions that were not proved increased from 22.4% to 28.7% of burglary charges from 1997 to 2004. Prosecutions that were discharged without conviction and other prosecutions from 1997 to 2004 were a relatively minor proportion of charges prosecuted.


Figure 10.11: Outcomes of burglary prosecutions in New Zealand from 1997 to 2004^{1, 2}



- 1 The outcomes of burglary prosecutions labelled 'Not proved' were comprised of 'Dismissed', 'Discharged', 'Withdrawn', 'Acquitted' and 'Other not proved'.
- 2 This data was obtained from the Case Monitoring Subsystem of LES. This subsystem records the court processing of charges. A database has been established consisting of depersonalised information that has been extracted from the Case Monitoring Subsystem. Every offence for which an offender is apprehended can result in a 'charge' (or prosecution) being laid. For example, if a person is apprehended for having committed two burglaries and one assault, this may result in three separate charges being laid against the person. The analysis was based on individual charges using the Final Court Hearing Date to ensure that every charge laid was finalised. For example, a charge might be laid in 2004 but not finalised in court until 2005.

Figure 10.12 shows the outcomes of burglary prosecutions in the Manukau District Court from 2000 to 2004 as a percentage of charges laid. The proportion of prosecutions resulting in convictions increased from 69.7% to 74.6% from 2000 to 2004. Prosecutions that were not proved decreased from 29.8% to 24.2% from 2000 to 2004. Prosecutions that were discharged without conviction and other prosecutions were a relatively minor proportion of all charges prosecuted from 1997 to 2004.

Figure 10.12: The outcomes of burglary prosecutions in the Manukau District Court from 1997 to 2004^{1, 2, 3}



- 1 The outcomes of burglary prosecutions labelled 'Not proved' were comprised of 'Dismissed', 'Discharged', 'Withdrawn', 'Acquitted' and 'Other not proved' prosecution outcomes.
- 2 Prosecutions in the Manukau District Court include burglary offences prosecuted from the Manurewa Police Area but the Manukau District Court covers a substantially larger area than the Manurewa Police Area.
- 3 This data was obtained from the Case Monitoring Subsystem of the Law Enforcement System. This subsystem records the court processing of charges. A database has been established consisting of depersonalised information that has been extracted from the Case Monitoring Subsystem. Every offence for which an offender is apprehended can result in a 'charge' (or prosecution) being laid. For example, if a person is apprehended for having committed two burglaries and one assault, this may result in three separate charges being laid against the person. The analysis was based on individual charges using the Final Court Hearing Date to ensure that every charge laid was finalised. For example, a charge might be laid in 2004 but not finalised in court until 2005.

Figure 10.13 shows the number of convictions for burglary in the Manukau District Court and in New Zealand District and High Courts from 2000 to 2004. Overall, there was a 1.6% increase in national burglary convictions from 2000 to 2004. Burglary convictions in the Manukau District Court decreased by 2.2% from 2000 to 2004.

Figure 10.13: Number of burglary convictions in the Manukau District Court and in the New Zealand District and High Courts from 2000 to 2004





Figure 10.14: Types of sentence imposed for burglary offences in the Manukau District Court from 2000 to 2004, as a percentage of cases^{1, 2}



1 The types of sentences imposed were as follows: custodial (life imprisonment, preventive detention, imprisonment or corrective training); community (community work, periodic detention, community service, community programme or supervision); monetary (fines or reparation); and other sentences (e.g. a conviction and discharge, or an order to come up for sentence if called upon).

2 In general terms, a 'case' in this report is defined as all charges being dealt with against an offender at the same point in time. For example, in a case that involves more than one charge, the charge taken to represent the case is one that resulted in the most serious penalty.

Figure 10.14 shows types of sentences imposed for burglary offences in the Manukau District Court from 2000 to 2004 as a percentage of cases involving burglary. Community sentences decreased from 2000 to 2002 and then remained relatively stable from 2002 to 2004. Custodial sentences increased from 2000 to 2002 and then decreased in 2003 and in 2004. Monetary sentence trends decreased from 2000 to 2003 and then increased in 2004. Other types of sentence trends were relatively stable between 2000 and 2004.

10.4 Summary and discussion

In the Manurewa Police Area, the rate of recorded dwelling burglary decreased by 10% more than the decrease in the national rate from 2000 to 2004. This suggests that at least some of the reduction in recorded dwelling burglary may be attributed to the specific burglary reduction initiatives put in place in Manurewa over the period.

Over the same period in Manurewa, the rates of violent offences, theft ex car, remaining theft, property abuses and non-dwelling burglary decreased by more than the decrease in the national rates. The trends in other offence types, such as drug and antisocial offences, theft ex dwelling and property damage, were similar in Manurewa to national trends. These findings suggest there was little displacement from dwelling burglary to other offence types in the Manurewa Police Area during the period.

The proportion of clearances for dwelling burglary and for most other offence types decreased in Manurewa for the period 2000–2004, while the clearance rates for dwelling burglary and most other offence types increased nationally.

Convictions as a proportion of charges prosecuted showed an increasing trend in the Manukau District Court, while there was a decreasing trend nationally.

The percentage of cases involving burglary that resulted in a custodial sentence increased to 2002 and then gradually declined to 2004 in the Manukau District Court.

11 Perceived effectiveness of overall burglary reduction effort

11.1 Introduction

In the first years of the case study Manurewa was hindered in its burglary reduction strategy by the lack of staff and the lack of direct control over significant resources. Initiatives which had proved to be successful were disbanded due to workload pressures. Under the new structure, launched at the start of 2004, the Area Commander was able to utilise these increased resources directly and build a more effective approach through increased Intel capability and tactical coordination but utilising the same kinds of strategies which had proven effective in the past.

The crime statistics and household surveys reinforce Manurewa's increased effectiveness. In 2002 the dwelling burglary figures increased dramatically, by 15.5%, coinciding with staff shortages and the absence of proactive units. Dwelling burglary figures decreased in 2003 by 13% and in 2004 by 16.2%. The rate increased in the first part of 2003, but in the second half of the year the Police numbers were up to the full level and the acting Area Controller brought in a series of high-profile targeting measures and increased bail checks.


The dwelling burglary rate per 10,000 population decreased by 47.2% between 1997 and 2004, and by 25.8% from 2000 to 2004.

The rate for recorded clearances was lower than for New Zealand during the period 2000 to 2004. There was an 8.3% *decrease* in clearances compared to a 9.5% *increase* in burglary clearances for New Zealand as a whole for this period.

According to the Household Survey, there are several measures which are indicators of increased Police effectiveness.

- There was a significant decrease in Manurewa of people who considered crime to be a problem in the Area.
- There was a slight decrease in the number of people worried about being a victim of crime.
- There was a statistically significant drop in the attempted burglary rate between 2002 and 2004.
- The percentage of people reporting burglary increased from 72% in 2002 to 78% in 2004.
- The proportion of those who were satisfied with the service received from the Police increased slightly between 2002 and 2004, but there was an increase in the proportion of those who were dissatisfied who named the attitude of the Police as the reason for their dissatisfaction (from 24% to 70%).

Figure 11.1: Monthly rates and moving averages of recorded dwelling burglary per 10,000 population for Manurewa Police Area and New Zealand



Monthly rates and moving averages (2000–2004)

Figure 11.1 depicts some of the Police burglary initiatives together with changes in recorded dwelling burglary rates for the period 2000–2004. While a wide range of factors impact on burglary rates, it gives a picture of what happened to dwelling burglary rates as changes occurred in the Police Area. It illustrates monthly and moving averages of recorded dwelling burglary rates per 10,000 population for the Manurewa Police Area and for New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Dwelling burglary rates for Manurewa (for both monthly and moving averages) were higher than the national rates. Compared to Manurewa, the national recorded monthly and moving average dwelling burglary rate per 10,000 population fluctuated less markedly from 2000 to 2004.

11.2 Barriers to effectiveness

The key barriers to Police effectiveness in relation to burglary reduction were:

- staff shortages
- lack of direct control by the Area Controller over key sections of staff
- lack of Intel capacity
- the high rates of crime generally in Manurewa in relation to other Areas in New Zealand.

11.2.1 Staff shortages

In 2002 Manurewa was eight staff short of their entitlement for most of the year. This meant that the proactive squad (Street Crime Unit) was disbanded and that other proactive activities, such as bail checks and special targeting operations, were discontinued. In 2003 the first half of the year saw the new station being built and the Manurewa staff located at Papakura. In July the new station was opened and new staff recruits from the Police Academy and from the United Kingdom filled the vacancies. In January 2004, the new structure was implemented following restructuring and several units formerly based at the District were transferred back to Manurewa. These included ER, LET and Intel. This resulted in the doubling of Area Police numbers and unfortunately some overcrowding in the newly opened station.

11.2.2 District control of Police units

Before restructuring, the Manurewa Area Commander was unable to apply significant resources to burglary reduction as the ER cars (I-cars) were directed by Comms from the Papakura station. They were required to respond to urgent calls all over Counties-Manukau District. Manurewa Q-cars often called on to respond to priority jobs locally and this lessened their ability to undertake proactive duties such as bail checks and targeting offenders.

11.2.3 Intel

During 2002 and 2003 the Intel resources at the Manurewa Area level were inadequate. The position of one Intel officer was filled only part of the time and those who were placed in the role worked mainly in isolation and were insufficiently trained. There were long gaps without an Intel officer and the station was reliant on District providing weekly crime maps and

targets. The consequence of this was that the Area was unable to develop more sophisticated analyses of their crime patterns and respond accordingly. After the restructuring the Intel capacity was greatly enhanced and new applications were developed to drive the tactical responses to crime.

11.2.4 Crime rate in Manurewa

From 1997 to 2004, Manurewa had a higher crime rate than New Zealand for the same period. From 1997 to 2001, there was a steady decrease in the national crime rate, whereas in Manurewa, the crime rate fluctuated from 1997 to 2004. Police respondents often stated that despite the success of various operations and initiatives, they were aware that Manurewa had a high crime rate and the conditions which gave rise to this—such as unemployment, several generations of criminal families, poor education and poor parenting—were unlikely to change. The acting Area Controller in 2003 thought that it was important to address the belief that the crime rate could be brought under control and to send that message through the media.

11.3 Strengths of Police initiatives

11.3.1 Staff

Manurewa Police leaders commented from the beginning that their strength lay in the attitude and quality of staff. Even when they were severely understaffed, they were enthusiastic about addressing crime and willing to undertake bail checks, target offenders and work on special operations. When they were given the opportunity they were proactive in initiating special operations to address burglary and were forthcoming with new ideas. After the restructuring there was a period of adjustment as people came to terms with new roles and expectations, but Police reported that within three months they were a cohesive team.

11.3.2 Bail checks

Bail checks were reported to be an effective mechanism for reducing burglary offences during the whole period of the research. Manurewa staff had been convinced of their effectiveness since the District burglary strategy was released. Although there were problems from time to time in having accurate information, or time to conduct them whilst being short staffed, there had not been the resistance faced by some other Areas.

11.3.3 Proactive squads

Police were very positive about the effectiveness of proactive squads. From 2002 they spoke of how effective the Street Crime Unit had been when it had a full complement of staff. Various forms of proactive squads were formed subsequently and they were said to be the most effective when they were able to undertake proactive duties and not become burdened by routine file work, and when they were protected from general duties.

11.3.4 Targeting offenders

Manurewa Police had utilised Intel to nominate the top ten offenders for the Area. Their names were provided to each patrol and changed or updated weekly. This was said by those interviewed to be effective as it kept all frontline staff familiar with active burglars. With the new structure Intel had improved the quality of those targeted. The Card exercise late in 2003 was also thought to have been effective as it was combined with a high media profile and also helped to consolidate the new team.

11.3.5 Intel

After the restructuring, Intel was greatly improved and became a key part of the new tactical approach. A strength of the new arrangement was that the Intel staff were based in the same building as patrol staff and tactical coordinators. The co-location and informal exchanges of information were as important as the high quality systems being implemented.

11.3.6 Media

During late 2003 the acting Area Commander undertook a campaign to convince the public, the media and even his own staff that it was possible to see a future without the high crime rates that people in South Auckland were led to expect. He spoke of reducing crime by half by breaking each crime problem down into manageable parts. The media responded well to this, and it was helped by giving his operations catchy names such as Card and Monopoly. He was interviewed on national television on the Holmes show, and by local papers. The impact of the positive message seems to have been reflected in the Household Survey, which was carried out a year later. The number of people who felt that crime was a problem dropped significantly and the number of people who thought the Police were actively patrolling and targeting had increased from the previous survey.

11.4 Conclusions

The Crime rate per 10,000 persons decreased in Manurewa from 2003 to 2004 at a greater rate (14.1%) than for New Zealand as a whole (9.3%). Household Survey indicators suggest that the Police have been effective in reducing crime (reported rates had also reduced) and have improved the sense of security in the Area. Police effectiveness in relation to burglary reduction will always be curtailed to some extent by the prevalence of more serious crime in the Area. By the end of 2004 it appeared that the right elements were in place and, if applied consistently and with strict monitoring of the effectiveness of each initiative, would continue to reduce burglary.