Research on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary Report 7

Case Study of the Sydenham Police Area

Dr Sue Carswell and Karen Johns

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Research on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary

Report 1: *Surveys of Household Burglary part one (2002): Four Police Areas and national data compared*, Dr Sue Triggs, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 2: *Surveys of Household Burglary part two: Four Police Areas compared between 2002 and 2004*, Dr Sue Triggs, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 3: *Literature review: Police practice in reducing residential burglary*, Dr Sally Harvey, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 4: *Case study of the Manurewa Police Area*, Karen Johns, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 5: *Case study of the Rotorua Police Area*, Tanya Segessenmann and Karen Johns, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 6: *Case study of the Lower Hutt Police Area*, Alison Chetwin and Helena Barwick, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 7: *Case study of the Sydenham Police Area*, Dr Sue Carswell and Karen Johns, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 8: *Victims of burglary*, Garth Baker and Alison Gray, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 9: *Burglary offenders*, Garth Baker and Alison Gray, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Report 10: *Overview: Research on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary*, Alison Chetwin, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

Foreword

Burglary is a problem that considerably affects many New Zealand households. From victimisation surveys we know that it can have a profound effect on victims and that householders are concerned about it. Burglary is also costly both to government and to the New Zealand public. Reducing burglary is a key priority in government's Crime Reduction Strategy and an important outcome for the justice sector.

Although recorded burglary rates show a declining trend since the late 1990s, there is considerable room to achieve further reductions. The extensive research published here helps us understand what strategies might be effective in which contexts, as well as the reasons why they are effective. The research has revealed a wealth of practical and workable strategies and initiatives that can be shared from one Police Area to another.

The research project is the result of a highly productive collaboration between the Ministry of Justice and New Zealand Police. We are grateful for the substantial funding support for the project provided by the Cross Departmental Research Pool (CDRP) administered by the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology. In the spirit of the CDRP, it has been an excellent example of cross-departmental research on a subject of high priority to government.

The real commitment of the New Zealand Police to reducing crime is evident throughout the ten reports of the Burglary Reduction Research Programme. This substantial series of reports is published to be used in part or in its entirety by front-line Police, as well as managers, advisers and policy makers, all of whom play a variety of roles in the wider justice sector in the effort to reduce burglary.

Belinda Clark
Secretary for Justice

Acknowledgements

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Abbreviations

AFIS   Automated Fingerprint Identification System
CARD   Computer Assisted Resource Deployment
CIB   Criminal Investigations Branch
CIU   Combined Investigation Unit (Sydenham)
Comms   Southern Communications Centre
CYF   Child, Youth and Family
DPR   directed patrolling report
ESR   Hamilton Institute of Environmental Science and Research
FGC   Family Group Conference
FPO   Fingerprint Officer
Intel   Intelligence Section
KRA   Key Result Area
LRS   Local Recording System
MO   modus operandi
NIA   National Intelligence Application
OC   Officer in Charge
OR   offence report
SOCO   Scene of Crime Officer
STU   Strategic Traffic Unit
VS   Victim Support
YCU   Youth Crime Unit
YES   Youth Education Service

Executive summary

The Ministry of Justice, in partnership with the New Zealand Police, has conducted research over three years (2002–2004) on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary. This case study report is the final report examining burglary initiatives undertaken in the Sydenham Police Area. Three other Police Areas in New Zealand are also part of the project—Manurewa, Rotorua and Lower Hutt.

The evaluation involved an in-depth case study approach conducted in the four Police Areas from 2002 to 2004 in an attempt to discover which Police practices work in which contexts and through what mechanisms. The case studies involved:

- a community profile
- interviews with key respondents from the Police, the criminal justice sector and community organisations who had a knowledge of burglary
- Household Burglary Surveys in 2002 and 2004
- interviews with burglars and victims of burglary
- analysis of quantitative data from New Zealand Police and the Ministry of Justice.

Community profile

The Sydenham Police Area, with a population of 61,179 in the 2001 census, is part of the Canterbury Police District. In 2002 the District was divided into six Police Areas, but it had been restructured in 2004. Sydenham then became part of Southern Canterbury Police Area, which was an amalgamation of the old Hornby, Selby and Sydenham Police Areas. The population has a high percentage of people of European descent (91%) and has a slightly older population than the national average. A slightly higher percentage of people had incomes under $20,000 than the New Zealand average.

Police strategies

The Canterbury District had centralised a number of Police services to operate on a District-wide basis to address the mobility of burglary offenders between the five Christchurch City Police Areas. The main district-led strategies were:

- the District Break Squad (Law Enforcement Team)
- the First Fifteen initiative, which targeted Christchurch's top 15 recidivist burglars.
- The Youth Crime Unit (YCU), another specialised squad, which targeted the top 30 recidivist youth offenders, many of whom committed burglary offences.

After the restructuring of the District in 2003, the Intel resources were reduced at District level and enhanced in the Police Areas, but the Break Squad and YCU remained with a

District-wide focus. The main strategies adopted by Sydenham were directed patrolling, targeting and bail checks. After the restructuring the Southern Area:

- established the Volume of Crime Squad, which dealt with burglary, car theft and theft ex cars
- improved locally-driven targeting through enhanced Intel
- developed, at the end of 2004, a burglary desk to handle all historic burglaries by telephone.

Effectiveness of Sydenham's strategies

Offender-focused initiatives

Five offender-focused initiatives and practices were deployed in Sydenham:

- bail checks
- First Fifteen initiative
- YCU
- the collection of DNA samples and fingerprints
- scene of crime investigation.

Bail checks were carried out by the District Break Squad and YCU at District level, as well as by frontline patrols in the Sydenham Area. They had been a consistent part of the strategy since 2001, and were believed to be effective, but were hindered at the area level by not having sufficient staff to conduct them consistently. After the restructuring the frontline staff conducted bail checks regularly and the Volume Crime Squad followed up on breaches.

The First Fifteen initiative began in October 2001 and was a response to the burglary situation in the Christchurch metropolitan area. The purpose of the initiative was to target and apprehend the top 15 burglars. Police actively targeted those on the list both overtly and covertly until they were apprehended. Regular coordination meetings were held with key people from the district and areas attending. The exchange of information at these meetings was a critical part of the initiative. After the restructuring, more emphasis was put on targeting local offenders in each area, and the First Fifteen as a District initiative was reviewed.

The YCU targeted their top 30 youth offenders. They conducted bail and curfew checks but often sought to develop a more general rapport with the young person, rather than take a simple punitive approach. There needed to be sufficient staff in order to have a realistic and workable ratio of officers to youth files.

In 2003, the District instigated Operation Profile, which resulted in 1082 DNA samples being collected. In 2004, SOCO reported an increase in the number of 'hits'.

Victim-focused initiatives

Sydenham Police sent letters to victims acknowledging their burglary complaint. The letters also contained security advice. Community constables followed up repeat victims with a visit and helped them to develop strategies to avoid further victimisation. Work was also being done by Intel to improve the time taken to identify repeat victims.

Sydenham (Southern Canterbury) Police were also exploring ways to work with communities which were experiencing high victimisation, such as students, and the Asian community in Christchurch. Some strategies were intended to inform people in local, student and ethnic media about crime issues and protection. Neighbourhood Support and Victim Support were both highly valued by Sydenham Police. However, only 15% of respondents in the 2002 household survey were members of Neighbourhood Support and this dropped to 12% in 2004.

Victim Support worked closely with Police and attended all burglaries in which an offender had been disturbed at the scene or in which a victim lived alone. They were planning to recruit bilingual volunteers and produce pamphlets in a wider range of languages.

Location-focused initiatives

Location-focused initiatives are those which aim to reduce the incidence of burglary by applying Police resources to 'hot' spots where burglary is known to be prevalent. One of the main location-focused initiatives was directed patrolling, which included patrolling 'hot' spots and looking for suspected offenders and their vehicles. Directed patrolling was carried out in the Sydenham Police Area by frontline staff and the volunteer group Christchurch South Community Watch. Sydenham Intel identified locations that had been 'hot' spots of crime or victimisation. They developed weekly directed patrol directives for each shift. The staff was required to patrol these areas during their shift and report back on any suspicious activity. Sometimes the Police operated a range of mechanisms in one location, such as:

- having the Strategic Traffic Unit (STU) look for traffic infringements
- parking the 'booze bus' in that area
- having officers present in cars, on bikes and on foot.

Barriers to location-focused initiatives were said to be the lack of capacity when there was only one patrol car available at night. They didn't have time to patrol "hot spots' whilst responding to Comms call outs. The patrol car also had to attend traffic accidents in the area and this took time away from proactive patrolling..

Property-focused initiatives

When the Sydenham Break Squad was operating they visited businesses in their Area as regularly as possible and ideally tried to go weekly. They found this a worthwhile exercise and had started to build a good relationship with local dealers. The District Break Squad regularly conducted visits, sometimes two to three times a week to prominent businesses. They encouraged victims to circulate inventories to all the second-hand shops and thought it was

important to encourage victims to do that, as Police did not have time. This was reported to have yielded good results. A dealer who was interviewed said they usually received five calls a day from victims looking for property. Police noted that it would be helpful if second-hand dealers would keep serial numbers of items sold.

Cross-focused initiatives

This section of the report describes the initiatives which cross all those areas. This includes:

- Break Squad
- Volume Crime Squad
- Intelligence

The District Break Squad has operated since 1991 across the Christchurch metropolitan area. Their central approach allowed them to maintain an overview of burglary trends and coordinate Police practices. They conducted a fair proportion of the District's burglary investigation work and perceived that the combined efforts of their squad and the Police Areas were increasingly effective at reducing burglary.

Sydenham Police addressed burglary rates by establishing specialised burglary squads to focus on a range of proactive strategies. After the restructuring the Southern Area created the Volume Crime Squad, which focused on a range of crime, including burglary.

Intel was based at District level and coordinated all information to support the break squads as well as the Area targets. After the 2003 restructuring, Intel was enhanced at the Area level and diminished at the district level.

General crime reduction initiatives

Canterbury Police had a wide range of partnerships to achieve crime reduction. Several youth groups were running successful programmes and worked closely with Youth Aid, community constables and Youth Education. The District also had several liaison positions for iwi, Pacific peoples and the Asian community. All were active in developing projects to address specific crime issues, particularly with youth.

Conclusions

Sydenham had a lower recorded crime rate per 10,000 population than New Zealand. Overall, the total crime rate decreased in Sydenham by 28.7% from 1997 to 2004, whereas the national total crime rate decreased by 20.1% for the same period.

Sydenham's dwelling burglary rates were higher than the national dwelling burglary rates from 1998 to 2001 and from 2003 to 2004. There was a 14.0% decrease in dwelling burglary in Sydenham from 1997 to 2004, whereas nationally there was a 31.1% decrease in dwelling burglary over the same period.

When a comparison is made between 2000 and 2004, recorded dwelling burglary rates in Sydenham decreased by 20.6%, whereas nationally, they decreased by 15.4%.

Canterbury Police District and Sydenham Area (Canterbury Southern) were faced with difficult resourcing decisions due to the nature of Christchurch City. The decision to locate strategies at the District or Area level resulted in a reduction in responsiveness at the other level. A unit such as the District Break Squad provided strategies across the whole city, but left areas unable to target their own offenders effectively.

When resources were enhanced at the Area level, more coordination and information sharing was required as offenders operated city-wide. Area resources were able to be deployed more effectively to address victims, locations, property and offenders locally.

1 Introduction

1.1 The objectives of the research

The Ministry of Justice, in partnership with the New Zealand Police, has conducted research over three years (2002–2004) on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary. This case study report is the final report examining burglary initiatives undertaken in the Sydenham Police Area. Three other Police Areas in New Zealand are also part of the project—Manurewa, Lower Hutt and Rotorua.

The objectives of the research are to:

1. examine Police best practice, including Police initiatives in partnership with communities, in relation to residential burglary reduction; to understand which practices are effective in which contexts and why

2. gain an understanding of some wider contextual factors that influence the effectiveness of burglary initiatives

3. examine effectiveness in relation to the incidence of burglary, the resolution of burglary, public satisfaction and perceptions of safety

4. examine any unintended effects of burglary initiatives, such as displacement.

1.2 The report

This report starts in Section 2 with a community profile to provide information about the Sydenham Area, as it was recognised that contextual factors are important to take into consideration when examining what works and how it works in a particular environment. The community profile gives an overview of demographic and geographical information and general crime in the area. This is followed by a description of at-risk groups of offenders, victims, locations and property identified by key respondents interviewed for the evaluation.

Section 3 looks at the Police's National, Canterbury District and Sydenham Area strategies for burglary reduction. The rest of the report discusses burglary initiatives according to their focus on offenders, victims, location or property. In section 9 general crime prevention initiatives indirectly related to burglary, such as youth programmes and drug rehabilitation schemes, are discussed to provide contextual information on what is being done in the community. The Police structures relating more specifically to crime reduction, such as the work of Youth Aid and community constables, are then briefly described.

Results from the Household Burglary Survey (2002 and 2004) undertaken with 500 households in each of the four Police Areas are incorporated into the report. The full results for Sydenham Area and information on methodology for the survey are available in Report 2

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of this series, *Survey of Household Burglary part two: Four Police Areas compared between 2002 and 2004.*[1]

1.3   Evaluation methodology

This section gives an overview of the methodology used for the evaluation.

1.3.1   Study design

This evaluation aims to find out about effective burglary reduction initiatives in order to communicate best practice to Police and community partners. It was recognised that different environmental factors—demographics, geography, crime rates, community involvement, and local Police organisational structures—could impact on the development, implementation and effectiveness of burglary initiatives. The design therefore involved an in-depth case study approach to be conducted in four Police Areas over a period of three years (2002–2004).

This type of design is known as realistic evaluation, and was developed by researchers working on various crime prevention evaluations sponsored by the British Home Office in the 1990's.[2]

1.3.2   Police Area selection

The four Police Areas were selected based on a scoping study conducted in 2001 that took into consideration:

- the above environmental factors
- what could be learned from each Police Area
- the Police Area's willingness to take part in the study.

Police Areas with middle to high burglary rates and a range of different environmental factors representative of the majority of New Zealand were chosen so that lessons learned from these study sites would be informative for other Police Areas.

1.3.3   Conceptual framework for burglary reduction initiatives

In any community, a range of initiatives are likely to be in place for the purpose of addressing and preventing burglary. Initiatives range from specific Police interventions, such as targeting offenders, to interventions delivered to victims, such as security advice, through to more generally focused interventions, such as programmes for at-risk young people.   The

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[1]   Triggs, S., 2005. Wellington: Ministry of Justice. Household Burglary Survey results marked with a [+] are significantly greater than the average of the other three study areas, whereas [-] indicates a result significantly lower than the average. Other results are not significantly different from the average of the other three study areas.

[2]   Pawson, R. and Tilley, N.1997. *Realistic Evaluation.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

conceptual framework for the evaluation organised particular initiatives under the following categories:

- *'hot' offenders*—initiatives which targeted known burglars
- *'hot' victims*—initiatives which aimed to increase the security of victims
- *'hot' locations*—initiatives which involved targeted patrolling of locations with high burglary concentrations
- *'hot' property*—initiatives which aimed to reduce the market for burgled goods and identify stolen property.

1.3.4 Information collection methods

The study design included a range of information collection methods to examine the burglary initiatives in each Police Area and identify the mechanisms that led to burglary reduction. For example, enforcing bail conditions for known burglars might be expected to lead to a reduction in repeat offending through the mechanism of deterrence or incapacitation. Using a range of methods allowed for verification of the results because if diverse kinds of data lead to the same conclusions, then more confidence can be placed in the validity and reliability of those conclusions.

The information collection methods for the current report included:

- *community profile*—Researchers:
  - gathered demographic and socio-economic data on each Police Area
  - gathered general information on crime in the Police Area
  - identified contextual factors, including risk and protective factors, that impacted on the incidence of burglary.
- *interviews*—Researchers conducted semi-structured face-to-face interviews with key respondents having knowledge of burglary from the Police, criminal justice sector and community organisations. Key people were interviewed regularly throughout the research period.
- *Household Burglary Survey 2002 and 2004*—A survey of 500 households was conducted in each of the Police Areas to find out:
  - fear of crime
  - burglary victimization
  - security measures people use
  - satisfaction with Police practice.

  The surveys were conducted face-to-face with one householder aged 16 years and over.
- *quantitative data from New Zealand Police and the Ministry of Justice*—Data was analysed to assess the effectiveness of burglary initiatives by examining burglary rates in regards to incidents and resolution of burglary. Unintended effects of burglary initiatives, such as displacement to other Police Areas or types of offences, were examined.

1.3.5   Ethics and project management

The evaluation proposal was submitted to the Justice Sector Research Group for ethical advice. The ethical standards of the Australasian Evaluation Society and the Association of Social Science Researchers have been followed. An advisory group consisting of representatives of key stakeholder agencies provided advice on the design, conduct and management of the project and review draft reports.

2 Profile of the Sydenham Police Area

The Sydenham Police Area, with a population of 61,179 in the 2001 census, is part of the Canterbury Police District. In 2002 the District was divided into six Police Areas, of which five contain part of Christchurch City. The Sydenham Police Area was aligned to the Spreydon and Heathcote Council wards and the Banks Peninsula district. The main station was based in the suburb of Sydenham, with outlying stations at Lyttleton and Akaroa.

In 2004, the Police District was restructured into three urban Police Areas (Northern, Southern and Hagley/Ferrymead) and one rural Police Area (Canterbury South). Sydenham became part of Southern Canterbury Police Area, which was an amalgamation of the old Hornby, Selby and Sydenham Police Areas. This Area covers from Arthur's Pass in the Southern Alps across the Canterbury Plains over to and including Banks Peninsula and the Port of Lyttelton. It also includes the southern suburbs of Christchurch around to Sumner. The Universities of Canterbury and Lincoln are both in this Police Area. Riccarton became part of the Police Area and this is one of the highest density areas of Christchurch, with many student flats and a lot of rental accommodation, attracting high burglary rates. Southern Canterbury after restructuring had 125 sworn and 7.8 non-sworn staff for the Area.

In this report, information about the first two years describes the Sydenham Police Area as well as District teams whose focus was burglary. The report then describes the burglary initiatives of the Southern Area and District. Crime statistics therefore are not comparable between 2002 and 2004.

The boundaries between Police Areas in Christchurch City area are mainly artificial due to the predominantly flat topography of Christchurch. The geography, combined with inexpensive public transport, meant offenders could easily be mobile within and between Police Areas. Therefore good communication between Police Areas and with the District head office was regarded as very important.

2.1   Census and other data

This section makes comparisons between the population of Sydenham Police Area (as at the 2001 Census) and the total population of New Zealand. It looks at ethnicity, age, employment, education, income, household composition, family composition and quality of life.

2.1.1   Ethnicity

Christchurch has a much higher percentage of European people (91%) in Sydenham and a lower percentage of peoples of all other ethnic groups compared with New Zealand's total population.

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2.1.2   Age

Sydenham had a lower proportion of younger people (30% under age 25 compared with 35% nationally) and a slightly larger proportion of older people (19% over age 60 compared with 16% nationally) than New Zealand's total population.

2.1.3   Employment and education

The employment status of people living in Sydenham is similar to that of New Zealand as a whole, with slightly fewer unemployed (3.9% compared with 4.8% nationally). A slightly higher percentage of the population have qualifications than the national population.

2.1.4   Income

A slightly higher percentage (48.3%) of people aged 15 years and over had incomes under $20,000 than people in the whole of New Zealand (46.9%). In Sydenham, 24% of the population had incomes of $40,000 and over, compared with 27% of the population as a whole.

Whilst the proportion of people receiving government benefits was similar to the proportion in New Zealand generally, there was a higher proportion of those in receipt of Government Superannuation or Veterans Pension (17.2%) compared to the rest of New Zealand (14.5%).

2.1.5   Household composition

There was a slightly lower proportion of families with at least one dependent child than the New Zealand population. This could also be a reflection of the higher proportion of older people that live in Sydenham compared to the New Zealand population.

2.1.6   Quality of life

Sydenham Police Area is geographically and socio-economically diverse. Geographically it covers both rural and urban areas that encompass some of the wealthiest and poorest suburbs in Christchurch. Respondents identified the hill suburbs, particularly Cashmere, as having a high socio-economic status. At the other end of the scale, suburbs such as Waltham, Addington, Hoonhay and Sydenham were considerably poorer. Other areas in the Sydenham Police Area were described as 'nice middle of the road'.

The socio-economic diversity of the Police Area was further reflected in the range of school decile ratings, from decile 1 in Waltham to decile 9 or 10 in St Martins[3]. Respondents thought that there were more rental properties in the poorer suburbs of the Sydenham area and consequently a more transient population.

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[3]   Every state school in New Zealand is given a decile rating from 1–10 by the Ministry of Education. A school's decile rating indicates the extent to which the school draws its students from low socio-economic communities. For example, decile 1 schools are the 10% of schools with the highest proportion of students from low socio-economic communities. These are called low decile schools. Decile 10 schools are the 10% of schools with the lowest proportion of these students. These are called high decile schools.

2.2   Perceptions of crime

When asked about crime generally in the Sydenham Police Area, a number of respondents in the 2002 Household Survey identified burglary, family violence offences, car theft and theft from cars as being the most predominant offence types.

Particularly in the lower socio-economic areas of Sydenham there were more problems with youth offending such as tagging. 'Boy racers' were also identified as a problem, particularly on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights—they used one of the main thoroughfares, Colombo Street, which ran through the Sydenham Police Area to the central city, as part of their circuit. The wealthier hill suburbs tended to have limited off-street parking, which resulted in more cars being targeted for vehicle thefts or theft from cars.

Burglaries were a substantial proportion of the offences Police dealt with in Sydenham. Respondents thought that geographic and socio-economic factors influenced the distribution of burglaries throughout the Police Area. Police who were interviewed did not think there were so many burglaries in the wealthier hill suburbs because:

- they were not so easily accessible by foot or bicycle as the houses on the flat
- wealthier householders were more aware of security and made more use of burglar alarms
- more established communities facilitated a higher use of Neighbourhood Support groups and informal networks of neighbours keeping watch on each other's houses
- more occupants at home during the day.

Household Survey (2002 and 2004)—worry about victimisation

In both 2002 and 2004 the proportion of survey participants who were very worried about being the victim of various crimes was significantly lower than the average of the other areas surveyed. Around half of the respondents were either very or fairly worried about being the victim of various types of crime, including burglary. More Sydenham respondents were very worried about being assaulted or being attacked and robbed than they were about being burgled.

The relatively lower level of concern about burglary in Sydenham reflects the actual level of risk, as the burglary victimisation rate was significantly lower in both Sydenham and Lower Hutt than in either Manurewa or Rotorua.

The following sections identify respondents' perceptions of at-risk categories within the framework utilised for the evaluation—that is, offenders, victims, location and property.

2.2.1   Key respondent identification of main at-risk groups of offenders

When respondents were asked to identify at-risk groups of offenders, several very strong themes emerged in regards to demographics and social factors. The two main groups identified were drug addicts and youth offenders. The two groups were not mutually exclusive; however, offenders who were dependent on opioids[4] tended to be older. The

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[4]   Includes heroin, morphine and methadone.

majority of respondents identified a link between burglary and drugs (including alcohol), where the offence was committed in order to obtain drugs. The offender could also be committing the offence under the influence of drugs.

Respondents identified the following factors, which were often interrelated, that could contribute towards offending behaviour:

- family environment—factors such as family violence, other members of the family committing offences, dysfunctional family relationships
- peer group—association with other offenders
- truancy
- low socio-economic status and stealing because of need or desire for things they could not obtain
- gambling addiction (noted by a few respondents).

Along with more youth committing burglaries, a disturbing trend among some young burglars was the increasing use of violence. A respondent commented on trends they had observed, including the different impact government initiatives have had on adult and youth offenders.

Clearly the issue of burglary is predominantly recidivist offenders. I think I would say that in my judgement that there is a greater percentage of young people committing burglaries compared with adults…I think it is more noticeable now among the young people than it has been previously. I think that there has been a tendency for older people to stop short of committing as many burglaries as they have in the past, because the Government issued a sort of an ultimatum to Police to respond to burglary complaints within a specified number of hours, and because they are handing down heavier sentences. I think both of those have impacted on the adult world but it hasn't impacted upon the youth world.

2.2.2 Key respondent identification of main at-risk groups of victims

Respondents noted that anyone can be a burglary victim and often burglars were opportunistic and employed tactics such as walking up the street or knocking on doors to see if anyone was at home. Another factor with opportunistic burglaries was people who did not utilise security properly.

Some respondents did identify groups that were more vulnerable to burglaries, such as:

- the elderly
- members of the Asian community who had been targeted
- people who had associates that burgled them (e.g. previous flatmates, boyfriends, husbands, their children's friends)—this was also noted as a possible factor in repeat victimization.

Household Survey (2002 and 2004)—Sydenham burglaries in 2001 and 2003

The percentage of households surveyed in Sydenham which experienced one or more burglaries was 6.5% in 2001 and 5.3% in 2003. The proportion of households which were repeat victims of burglary was 1.4% in 2001 and 0.8% in 2003. These differences were not statistically significant. More households experienced a successful burglary than an attempted burglary.

A substantial minority of entries were made through unlocked doors or open windows. Burglary victims were less likely to have had almost all types of security measures at the time of their most recent burglary, compared to all respondents at the time of the interview.

2.2.3   Key respondent identification of main at-risk groups of locations

As stated, the flatter areas of Sydenham were reportedly more prone to burglaries. These areas tended to encompass both lower and middle socio-economic type households. However, a respondent did note a recent trend of burglars from other Police Areas targeting some of the more affluent areas of Sydenham such as lower Cashmere, because they knew there would be better goods to steal.

Other location factors respondents said burglars considered were visibility and escape routes. Flatter terrain, long driveways, high fences, private courtyards, and bushes obscuring the house provided good cover for offenders, particularly considering many burglaries were conducted during the day. Alleyways, parks and schools that adjoined housing could provide burglars with escape routes.

2.2.4   Key respondent identification of main at-risk property

The most popular items to steal were small portable goods, especially electronic goods like DVDs and PlayStations and items such as CDs and jewellery. These items could be easily carried in a day-pack. The total clearing out of households was relatively uncommon. In the past there had been some stealing to order of whiteware from new housing developments, but this was not a major problem in the Sydenham Area. Offenders also stole things like alcohol, food and clothes. Often what they stole would be an indication of the age of the offender.

3 Overall Police structures and strategies

3.1 Structure in 2002 and 2003

The Area Controller was based at Sydenham station along with the Combined Investigation Unit (CIU), patrol staff, Youth Aid and Youth Education Services (YES) officers, community constables, an intelligence (Intel) officer and non-sworn support staff. The patrol staff and Youth Aid were based in a separate patrol base down the road from Sydenham Station, which was not an ideal situation for communication between sections. Plans for a new, larger station had been proposed for quite some time. Sydenham Police comprised 45 sworn and 2.8 non-sworn staff in addition to the Area Controller. Another 15 were based at Lyttleton. Sydenham operated only one I-car (emergency response car) each shift and this car responded to prioritised call outs from the Southern Communications Centre (Comms).

District Police was the base for several units which included burglary as their focus.

- District Break Squad
- Youth Crime Unit (YCU)
- Intel
- Scene of Crime officers (SOCO)
- fingerprint section.

3.2 Structure in 2004

After the restructuring in 2004, the previously Sydenham functions were then split between Hornby and Sydenham stations, which are 20 minutes apart by car. The Area Commander was based at the Hornby station along with CIU, community Police, youth aid, and watch house. The patrol group of 40 staff members was based at Sydenham along with Intel, Volume of Crime Squad and the Tactical Manager (a new position). The District Break Squad and YCU (YCU) continued to be based in District HQ. Intel was greatly reduced at the District level and its capacity increased within the Police Areas.

3.3 Burglary reduction strategies

This section provides an overview of the National, District and Area strategies for burglary reduction.

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3.3.1   National strategies

One of the goals of the government's Crime Reduction Strategy was to focus on burglary, which it identified as a high-volume crime that has a serious impact on victims and communities. In June 2000, the Justice and Police Ministers announced a new major burglary strategy. Over $13 million in additional funding was awarded to the Police to be spent during 2000–2003 to reduce burglary, particularly repeat burglary.   Government priorities were translated into Police objectives in the annual *New Zealand Police Departmental Forecast Report* and the *New Zealand Police Strategic Plan to 2006.*   The *Strategic Plan to 2006* identified two strategic goals of community safety and crime reduction, and included a stated commitment to achieving national targets for violence, youth safety, organised crime, burglary and road safety.

The Police National Dwelling Burglary Reduction Strategy, developed during 2002, provided Police Districts and Areas a framework to work within in order to reduce residential burglary rates. The strategy:

- encouraged Police to establish lead roles with communities to prevent burglaries

- advocated intelligence-led policing to identify burglary problems and develop appropriate responses, with an increased emphasis on the use of informers and extended interviewing of burglary offenders

- stressed the need for Police to evaluate their burglary related strategies and share good practice.

The strategy also encouraged each Police Area's burglary strategy to focus on repeat offenders, victims and locations, and disrupting stolen property distribution networks, with initiatives within each of these focuses directed towards the prevention of burglary, identification and resolution of burglary problems, and enforcement.   The strategy also outlined how Police intended to achieve a national target of reducing residential burglary for the 2002–2003 financial year by 3% and increasing resolutions to 18%.

The national priorities were communicated to the District Commanders within these documents and during the Police Executive Conference; however, District Commanders had considerable flexibility and discretion in developing local strategies.   District Commanders were held accountable by means of an annual District appraisal based on specific performance measures. In the case of residential burglary, these measures were in the form of population-based recorded residential burglary rates and resolution rates.

3.3.1.1   *Policing Development Unit*

District Commanders have a great deal of autonomy in what strategies they employ and in how they allocate their resources to support these strategies. The national headquarters Policing Development Unit provides an internal consultancy role to support District and Area Commanders.   They provide support and disseminate information through seminars, workshops, conferences and newsletters.

The Police have been promoting the problem-solving approach to reducing crime, which involves more analysis of the conditions which encourage crime and victimisation. For example, when a lot of crime is happening in one area, instead of just increasing the patrolling in that area Police are being asked to think about what factors in that area might be encouraging crime.

A review of intelligence in the three Police Districts in Auckland in 2003–2004 by Australian criminologist Gerry Ratcliffe[5] produced a series of recommendations involving the use of crime mapping, greater use of intelligence and the adoption of the '3I' model, which shows the interrelationship between interpretation of the criminal environment, analysis, and then impacting on that environment through decision makers deploying resources in the right way.

Figure 3.1:   3 'I' Model

In order to successfully operate this model, Police have had to greatly increase their Intel capacity and change traditional policing methods. The key means of disseminating the new approach has been Intel training at the Police College. In over two years 460 analysts have attended basic and advanced courses.

Problem analysis involves building in the problem analysis components—people, products and processes—with the result that people are more professionalized. The tactical tasks involve meetings once a week, establishing priorities, making decisions, allocating clearly assigned tasks and bringing in key partners.

The new approach has been taken up by enthusiastic District and Area Commanders. The adoption of the model has not been made a requirement, but Commanders are required to report back their crime reduction strategies and the evidence being provided by the problem solving model has convinced many others to adopt it.

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5   For a description of this model see Ratcliffe, J. 2002. Intelligence-led policing and the problems of turning rhetoric into reality. *Policing and Society* 12 (1): 53–66.

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3.3.2   Canterbury District Strategy

The *Canterbury Police District Business Plan 2002–2003* set the target for 2002–2003 as fewer than 300 burglary crimes per month and a resolution rate that should exceed the 2001–2002 rate. To achieve these goals the business plan identified the following objectives:

- increased targeting activity by the District Criminal Investigations Branch (CIB)
- implementation of the District Burglary Strategy
- a reduction in repeat victimisation
- a 25% increase in Neighbourhood Support groups in areas with less than 100 groups
- Intel-focused Police resource deployment, including risk-targeted patrol plans and returns.

The Canterbury District had centralised a number of Police services to operate on a district-wide basis in order to optimise resources and create specialised units, and to overcome any issues with boundary policing. In regards to burglary, a district-wide approach was identified as important to address the mobility of burglary offenders between the five Christchurch City Police Areas. The District Break Squad was a Law Enforcement Team that focused on burglaries and conducted both proactive and investigative work. They took the lead role in coordinating the First Fifteen initiative, which targeted Christchurch's top 15 recidivist burglars. The YCU, another specialised squad, targeted the top 30 recidivist youth offenders, many of whom committed burglary offences. The Intel and Crime Prints sections provided a district-wide service in their specialist areas.

After the restructuring of the District in 2003, the Intel resources were reduced at District level and enhanced in the Police Areas, but the Break Squad and YCU remained with a district-wide focus.

3.3.3   Sydenham Area Strategies

This section outlines the development of a burglary strategy utilised by Sydenham Area until the end of 2003, and then identifies strategies developed by the Southern Canterbury Area after restructuring. The rest of the report examines how these were implemented and the strengths and barriers to effective implementation.

The Sydenham Area Controller developed an Area burglary strategy in 2000.[6] The strategy recognised the importance of general crime prevention strategies and community partnerships as part of a global approach to addressing burglary. However, he stated in his report that the strategy would only be a success if it were well supported by the District Police units, and the approach on an Area basis was not ad hoc.

The main strategies adopted by Sydenham were directed patrolling, targeting and bail checks. These mechanisms were identified early on as being the most effective way to reduce burglary. The main issue was how to arrange the resources in order to effectively undertake

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[6]   *A Strategic Plan to Reduce the Incidence and Effects of Residential Burglaries in South Christchurch* (2000). Internal document. The development of this strategy also fulfilled part of an MBA degree the Area Controller was undertaking during 2000.

these proactive mechanisms whilst responding to urgent jobs. Another issue was the problem of addressing city-wide burglary at both Area and District levels.

The strategies could only be implemented when Sydenham operated a burglary squad which was protected from other duties. This could not be maintained consistently throughout 2002 and 2003. Targeting was primarily a district-wide strategy delivered through the First Fifteen initiative. District Break Squad focused on implementing the strategies, assisted at the Area level by the burglary squads when they were operating.

After the 2003 restructuring staff resources were increased at the Area level. The same strategies were adopted but could be better driven locally. Key changes were:

- the establishment of the Volume of Crime Squad, which dealt with burglary, car theft and theft ex cars
- locally-driven targeting through enhanced Intel
- the development at the end of 2004 of a burglary desk to handle all historic burglaries.

The burglary desk would comprise six staff formerly allocated to Comms, and operate in the Christchurch metro area. They would receive all historic burglary incidents (channelled via Comms) and take offence reports (ORs) by phone. Patrol cars were not sent to the house, but an appointment was immediately made with SOCO staff, who would do the scene examination. The expectation was that this would free frontline staff up for more proactive patrolling, bail checking and following up bail breaches.

4 Offender-focused initiatives

This section sets out initiatives used by Sydenham Police Area that focused on the offender. The main purpose of these initiatives was to prevent further offending by either incarcerating offenders or deterring them from further offending. This was achieved through identification, apprehension and conviction of offenders, and monitoring strategies. Five offender-focused initiatives and practices will be discussed:

- bail checks
- targeting offenders (specifically through the First Fifteen initiative)
- YCU
- the collection of DNA samples and fingerprints
- scene of crime investigation.

4.1 Bail checks

The monitoring of bail conditions, particularly the enforcement of curfew checks, was seen as an important way of trying to prevent further offending while a defendant was on bail. The officer in charge of the case might seek to oppose bail and remand the defendant in custody. Those burglary defendants who were placed on bail could have a combination of the following types of conditions:

- non-association orders with co-offenders
- residing at a specified address
- curfew placed on the defendant to remain at a specified address between certain times—for example, 7.00pm to 7.00am.; defendants had to present themselves at the door when the Police call around to check if they were home
- reporting to Police station—to make sure they were still in the area and remind them of their next court appearance
- keeping away from the victim and the address where the offence occurred.

Bail checks were carried out by the patrol staff based on photo IDs of the top 10 offenders in the Police Area. At the times when Sydenham operated its own burglary squad, the members carried out bail checks as part of their strategy. Community constables would follow up with curfew checks on people in their area. Bail checks were also conducted by the District Break Squad and YCU for their targets.

When offenders were not at home or not complying with their conditions, the file was passed on to the next morning shift, which was responsible for following up with an arrest.

4.1.1 Strengths of bail checks

Respondents thought bail checks were an effective deterrent to further offending if they were conducted regularly. As the Police concentrated more efforts on bail checks as a key strategy in the targeting of top offenders, its effectiveness became more apparent.

Curfew checks enabled the Police to know whether a defendant was at home or not, and if they were not at home then the defendant was open to being a suspect for any new offences. Having an address they must reside at also gave the Police a starting point if they were looking for a suspect.

In regards to youth offending, a lot of their offending was done at night when under the influence of alcohol or other drugs and when they were in a group situation. Many committed burglaries during the day to reportedly subsidise their drinking and other substance abuse at night. Therefore curfew checks could be an effective way of preventing some of their further offending, as most youth offenders did not like being arrested and held in custody until their court appearance the next morning. Only a 24-hour curfew could address their daytime burglary activities.

4.1.2 Barriers to successful implementation

The main barrier identified for the enforcement of bail conditions was enough frontline staff to monitor them. Sydenham Police were only able to have one or two cars out on patrol during the day and only one I-car at night (as this required two staff members). They were often not able to carry out the bail checks required to make a difference to burglary rates.

Another respondent commented that there ought to be better communication with Corrections about people who had breached their probation or other community sentence. Sometimes when Police contacted Probation, they were informed that the person had breached weeks ago, and yet the Police hadn't been told.

When the Sydenham Police were short staffed, they did not have enough resources to follow up on bail breaches. When the new structure was operating in 2004, the Volume of Crime Squad carried out the follow-up and arrests for breaches of bail conditions.

4.2 Targeting offenders

4.2.1 First Fifteen initiative

The First Fifteen initiative is a district-wide strategy developed under the supervision of the Crime Services Manager. The initiative started in October 2001 and was a response to the burglary situation in the Christchurch metropolitan area. The purpose of the initiative was to target and apprehend the top 15 burglars. The concept used the rugby theme of the First Fifteen to maintain focus on the initiative and help disseminate information, for example by distributing eye-catching red and black posters to Police.

Monthly meetings were held with representatives from each Police Area, the District Break Squad, Intel, YCU and the Crime Prints detective, to nominate new targets and discuss strategies. First Fifteen targets must be known as active burglars and could be targeted for months at a time depending on how long it took to apprehend them.

Each of the five Police Areas was responsible for at least one target and the District Break Squad monitored around eight. YCU often had a few of their targeted youth offenders on the First Fifteen. The responsibility for a target was assigned to one person, who then coordinated targeting strategies and was the known contact person throughout the District if their target's activities came to the notice of Police. All the files on offences where the targeted offender was wanted for an interview were given to the coordinator, who then interviewed the target. This enabled the coordinator to have as much knowledge as possible about the target when they went into an interview.

Targeting could either be conducted overtly or covertly. Overt targeting would mean the person targeted would be aware that the Police were monitoring their activities, and included strategies such as curfew checks and search warrants. Overt targeting could potentially act as a deterrent to further offending. Covert targeting included a number of strategies that the target would hopefully not be aware of. The aim of any targeting was to apprehend the burglar, ultimately, 'on the job' as this provided irrefutable evidence.

Liaison meetings provided an opportunity for Crime Prints to receive up-to-date information on possible offenders. They checked First Fifteen targets on a monthly basis and reported back about the number of targets whose prints had come up at crime scenes. A respondent estimated that generally there were two or three a month, which indicated the Intel was right and the Police were looking for the right people.

In the new structure, Southern Canterbury Area began to develop its own top offender targets based on those seen to be active in their Area. Whilst they still supported the First Fifteen, respondents were beginning to comment in 2004 that the District Break Squad were doing a great job at the top fifteen, but that there were more active burglars that they could apprehend locally. This shift meant that communication was crucial between the break squad and local Intel, so that they were not tripping over each other.

The First Fifteen initiative was reviewed late in 2004. Indications at that stage were that the emphasis was moving back to Areas having their own targets, and that the meetings would continue for liaison purposes, but that the First Fifteen would be disbanded.

4.2.1.1   Strengths of First Fifteen initiative

The First Fifteen initiative was a way of getting all the Christchurch Police Areas, specialised sections and district squads working together to apprehend burglars. Burglars could be very mobile, particularly as Christchurch was predominately flat and many burglars walked or biked. This initiative sought to overcome a piecemeal approach to the offenders' apprehension, where each Police Area was only concerned with what was happening in their Area and did not realise their suspect had been active in other Areas. The coordinated approach aimed to increase the chances of offenders being apprehended.

The strategy performed two important functions. Firstly, it created awareness of who the top burglars were and alerted frontline Police about who to look for. Frontline Police played an important role in the targeting strategies and in gathering Intel about suspected offenders' movements. The rugby theme utilising the Crusaders' colours of black and red was seen as an important communication tool, as this information had to compete with the masses of paper Police were inundated with. The organisers of the First Fifteen initiative reported that there had been positive feedback from the uniform branch and that they did take some note of who the targets were.

Secondly, the system of assigning targets to specific Police personnel created a sense of ownership and responsibility for coordinating the monitoring of the target. The main advantage of having one Police person responsible for the targeting was that they became the central point for information about the alleged offender. They could organise their arrest with all the charges that had accumulated, rather than the different Police Areas charging an offender separately on just one or two charges. A respondent stated that another advantage was that it looked better in court to have a burglar with ten charges rather than a few.

Respondents reported that the strategy had created better liaison between the District Break Squad and the suburban stations because of the monthly meetings. The District Break Squad disseminated information more readily to the Police Areas and 'it is a two-way stream now.'

4.2.1.2   Barriers to implementing the First Fifteen initiative

The main barriers to successful implementation of the initiative that were identified were:

- limited targeting strategies—some Police had a narrow concept of what targeting an offender was and were not utilising a fuller range of strategies that would make the targeting more effective
- meeting attendance—there had been incidents of poor communication regarding the time of liaison meetings and consequently some of the Police Area representatives had not attended; to facilitate attendance the meetings were held at alternate Police Areas
- there had not been adequate recording of actions taken in relation to the First Fifteen targets—Police were not consistently reporting back on what they had done and what information they had got on the target
- there had been only one person district-wide to input all the notings into the National Intelligence Application (NIA), and as a consequence there was a large backlog; after the restructuring Police officers were being told to send their data by email in order to overcome this
- in the new structure, there was some confusion as to who should receive notings and how the information on targets was to be shared and analysed between District and Areas
- people were assuming that targeting was the responsibility of the coordinator for the target, whereas in fact the idea was that all staff would be targeting and notifying the coordinator.

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4.2.2　Effects of targeting offenders

Some possible effects of the practice of targeting offenders were studied. First, the trends from 2000–2004 in the average annual burglary conviction rates of a sample of 59 offenders[7] targeted in 2002 and a sample of 50 offenders targeted in 2003 in the Canterbury Police District were examined.

Figure 4.1:　Average annual burglary conviction rates: offenders targeted in Canterbury Police District during 2002 (N = 59) and 2003 (N = 50)[1]

[1]　The rate represents the average number of burglary charges for which convictions were obtained per offender per year.

Figure 4.1 shows that for each sample, the average conviction rate for burglary was higher in the years of targeting (2002 and 2003) and lower in the year following targeting (2003 and 2004) than in the years prior to targeting (2000–2001 and 2000–2002). Over the years 2000–2004, the total number of burglary convictions in the Christchurch District Court showed an increasing trend (see Section 10). These patterns suggest that the Police targeting activity may have led to an increase in the likelihood of apprehension and conviction for the targeted offenders in the year of targeting and an incapacitation effect from the sentence being served in the year following targeting.

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[7]　All offenders selected for the sample were aged 17 or over in 2000, so that their convictions could be obtained from the criminal history data in the Justice Data Warehouse.

Secondly, in order to assess whether there was a displacement effect from the Police practice of targeting offenders, the court locations of convictions for offenders targeted in the Canterbury Police District in 2002 and 2003 were examined from 2000–2004.

Figure 4.2 shows that the sample of offenders targeted in 2002 had burglary convictions both in the Christchurch District Court[8] and elsewhere in each of the years 2000–2004. There is no evidence of an increase in burglary convictions in other District Courts in the year of targeting (2002) or in the years following targeting (2003 and 2004). This would suggest that the Police practice of targeting offenders in the Canterbury Police District in 2002 did not result in a displacement effect.

Figure 4.2: **Court location of burglary convictions for offenders targeted in the Canterbury Police District during 2002 (N = 59)[1]**

[1]   The number of convictions is the number of charges for which convictions were obtained. This is an indication of the number of burglary incidents for which convictions were obtained in each court location.

Figure 4.3 shows that the sample of offenders targeted in 2003 had burglary convictions both in the Christchurch District Court[9] and elsewhere in each of the years 2000–2004. While there is an increase in burglary convictions in other District Courts (Wellington) in the year of targeting (2003) and in the year following targeting (2004) (in Blenheim, Invercargill, and North Shore), it is also clear that this group of offenders received convictions elsewhere (Auckland, Waitakere, Manukau, Timaru, and Napier) in earlier years. This would suggest that the Police practice of targeting offenders in the Canterbury Police District in 2003 may

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[8]   The location of the district court in which convictions were obtained has been used as a proxy for the location of the offences for which convictions were obtained.
[9]   The location of the district court in which convictions were obtained has been used as a proxy for the location of the offences for which convictions were obtained.

have resulted in a small displacement effect, but that some of these offenders are generally quite mobile within the country.

Figure 4.3: **Court location of burglary convictions for offenders targeted in the Canterbury Police District during 2003 (N = 50)**

4.3   Youth Crime Unit

The YCU was set up in August 1998 to address the problem of a small number of recidivist youth offenders. The problem had been identified by Youth Aid officers, who wanted a more coordinated approach towards dealing with offenders. A respondent stated that because these offenders were committing offences all over the Christchurch Metropolitan it was hard to coordinate files between the different Police Areas and hard to apportion responsibility for those targeted.

The YCU was originally set up as a pilot with the view to targeting the top 30 youth offenders. Ideally each Police officer in the YCU should be responsible for around four to five targeted youth offenders. At full capacity the unit consisted of six members—the officer in charge (OC) of Youth Crime, who was a CIB sergeant, and five constables, two of whom were detective constables. The YCU performed both investigative work and targeting on the nominated youth offenders.

The youth offenders were identified as suitable targets by the amount of recidivist offending they had committed that was appearing before the Youth Court. Burglary offences featured prominently as an offence type.

The targeting of youth offenders aimed to both apprehend offenders and 'slow them down by putting pressure on them'. One of the main strategies the YCU used to apply pressure on

youth offenders was curfew checks. Another strategy they used was the monitoring of a young person's attendance at their courses and programmes. Officers had contact with the course tutors and if the young people were consistently not attending then they would be taken there.

4.3.1 Trends and changes

The unit's composition had fluctuated over the years, as it was not ring-fenced and officers were called to other duties that had higher priority, such as homicides. This meant either the ratio of youth offenders to officers had risen to 1:7, or they needed to reduce the number of total offenders targeted.

Mid-2002 the YCU decided to change their targets on an eight-weekly basis. One of the advantages of doing this was that it gave Police the ability to change targets when a youth offender was sentenced to a custodial sentence under the Children, Young Persons and their Families Act 1989, s311, which was for a period of eight weeks. After the youth offender was released the YCU were able to resume targeting that young person. There was no cap on the length of time a young person could be targeted, as some stayed targets for years.

4.3.2 Strengths of the Youth Crime Unit

Many respondents regarded targeting offenders as one of the most effective practices Police could do to reduce residential burglary. As with the First Fifteen strategy, targeting could be overt or covert. The overt targeting was seen to act as a deterrent to further offending by letting the offender know that the Police were monitoring their movements and that they were at risk of being apprehended. The curfew checks were one of the main ways the YCU achieved this. It was also noted that some young people became tired of constant Police attention, court appearances and sentences and decided to stop offending, particularly as the YCU took a strict zero-tolerance approach to offending and the breaching of bail conditions.

However, the constant contact YCU officers had with their targets was not only for punitive purposes and provided an opportunity for a supportive relationship to develop. One YCU officer commented:

> *In actual fact when we are doing the curfew checks we might have been the only person who has asked how was his day or did he go to his course, so it looks like we are the only person interested, so it is amazing the relationship it forms. Consistency in their lives is important too that we are constant in their lives for nine months or a year and for them to see us as a support person.*

The YCU also saw that this supportive relationship could also extend to the parents or caregivers of a youth offender.

> *Sometimes it is a family that is trying to deal with the problem, we don't normally say your kid is a target, we don't take that approach, it is more subtle and just that we will be around to keep an eye on what he is doing and things like that. Sometimes the parents are glad that finally somebody is there to help deal with it and to help with areas of health and education and social welfare. It is like an ally, the parents really come on board.*

As a district-wide strategy the YCU provided a focal point for dealing with the most recidivist youth offenders in terms of:

- communication
- coordination
- responsibility
- consistency of approach.

4.3.2.1   Communication

The YCU officers talked to the Youth Aid officers responsible for their targets to find out about issues such as forthcoming family group conferences (FGCs) and what plans were being put in place. Youth Aid, YCU and Child, Youth and Family (CYF) Youth Justice social workers met about every six weeks to discuss the progress of targeted offenders and potential targets. Respondents from Police and CYF commented on the good working relationship they had with each other in regards to the frequent exchange of information. They also worked together with search warrants that were conducted under the Children, Young Persons and their Families Act 1989.

As stated, YCU representatives attended the First Fifteen meetings, as the two targeting initiatives shared some of the same targets. In 2004, they began attending the weekly tactical meetings with other senior sergeants. YCU also made a point of sharing their notings electronically via the Internet.

4.3.2.2   Coordination

The YCU provided a central point for the coordination of files between Police Areas. In theory everyone in the district should know who was responsible for the targets. Therefore, if any offences came to notice, YCU would do the enquiry work, investigation and interviewing of the suspect. They would lay the charge(s) and work on the court files. When the case was referred to FGC, Youth Aid would step in and attend the FGC and might be involved in follow-up action with the young person and their family.

4.3.2.3   Responsibility

The assignment of specific offenders to one officer created a sense of ownership and responsibility that overcame the issue of who coordinated a response when an offender was committing burglaries in more than one Police Area.

4.3.2.4   Consistency

As stated, respondents reported that a supportive relationship could form between the young person and the officer responsible for targeting them. The consistency of approach and the zero-tolerance philosophy of the unit were seen as an advantage in terms of providing boundaries for these young people. This consistency was regarded as important for both the deterrent and supportive aspects of the YCU approach.

Respondents from Youth Justice and many Police interviewed perceived the YCU to be very effective. However, it was acknowledged that there was a hard-core element of offenders who were not deterred by targeting, as evidenced by some of the youth offenders being targeted over several years.

4.3.3   Barriers to Youth Crime Unit

The main issue was the frequent understaffing of the unit, as it was not ring-fenced from other duties. After the new structure was implemented, YCU respondents felt that they were working harder to provide liaison with the three metro areas.

YCU officers were unable to carry out effective targeting if they had too many young persons. There could be some tension between balancing the investigative and targeting sides of the job, with the emphasis being placed too heavily on one aspect or the other. A respondent stated that depending on what was occurring, the YCU might focus on an investigation for days or weeks and likewise, might focus solely on targeting for a week or two. They said the key was being able to have the resources to be flexible.

Some Police respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the sentences that youth offenders received and felt that custodial sentences under section 311 (Children, Young Persons, and their Families Act 1989), which were usually of eight weeks duration, were not a sufficient deterrent. It was also noted that this length of time was not long enough for any rehabilitation to occur or for any of the professionals involved to effect a change in the young person's behaviour. Following on from this were insufficient residential facilities for juvenile offenders and low-quality courses and programmes.

In the new structure the District Intel was greatly reduced, which impacted on the quality of the information provided to YCU. This was beginning to be addressed at the end of the period.

One respondent felt that a barrier was to the restriction on collecting DNA from youth offenders.

4.3.4   Suggested improvements

To retain the function of a targeting squad it was noted that it was important to maintain the appropriate ratio of officers to targeted youth offenders, which is a maximum of one officer to five targets.

4.4   Collection of DNA and fingerprints

The matching of DNA samples and fingerprints was an important means of linking suspects to offences or eliminating suspects from enquiries. The effectiveness of these methods of resolving burglaries and other offences depended on the existence of large national databases of individual DNA samples (the DNA Databank) and fingerprints (Automated Fingerprint Identification System [AFIS]). These were used to seek matches with samples found at crime scenes.

However, national databases held many unidentified crime scene DNA profiles and prints. Therefore Canterbury District set targets for voluntary fingerprinting and for the collection of DNA samples from suspects and convicted offenders. For example, the District Break Squad was assigned two sets of voluntary fingerprints a month and the Police Areas might be assigned one.

When a match was obtained and an arrest made, local Police could not automatically progress the case towards prosecution without first obtaining a fresh fingerprint or voluntary DNA sample from the apprehended person. During 2002, legislation on DNA meant that Police could not use the crime scene match with the databank sample. DNA samples could be obtained voluntarily from any adult suspect or apprehended person, and compulsorily only from those convicted of burglary or certain other serious offences. New legislation brought in in 2003 allowed for compulsory samples to be taken from burglary suspects. Where a voluntary sample was declined, the Police could apply for a forensic search warrant, which involved collecting items that had DNA material on them, such as toothbrushes and razors.

Voluntary DNA samples could not be taken from juveniles even with parental permission. However, section 283 of the Children, Young Persons and their Families Act 1989 allowed a judge to authorise the obtaining of a sample where:

- the charge was proved
- there was a conviction
- the young person was a serious and repeat offender.

Youth Aid in Sydenham said they obtained a lot of compulsory DNA samples.

In 2003, the District was given a target of collecting 624 voluntary DNA samples. They instigated Operation Profile, which resulted in 1082 samples being collected—150 from prison inmates. In 2004, SOCO reported an increase in the number of 'hits'. For example, in 2001–2002, the District had 33 DNA hits. In 2002–2003 they had 76 hits, and in 2003–2004 they had 118.

Arrested offenders can be fingerprinted. Youth Aid tried to obtain voluntary fingerprints from youth offenders who had not been arrested. Both the young person and their caregiver or parents had to give their consent for printing.

The SOCO trainer identified the need to upgrade the prints being taken from prisoners in the watch house and so had initiated courses with frontline staff.

4.5   Scene of crime investigation

The Crime Prints Section[10] at Canterbury District is responsible for crime scene investigation for the whole South Island. At the beginning of 2002 Crime Prints had 16 staff including the

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[10]   The Crime Prints Section is commonly referred to as SOCO.

OC: seven SOCOs, six Fingerprint Officers (FPOs), a detective, and a receptionist/administrator. The Sydenham Police Area utilised the services of this centralised unit.

The structure of the South Island Crime Prints Section is unique in several ways.

- SOCOs and FPOs work together in the same section.
- One of the SOCOs had a training role and was responsible for a variety of training initiatives with Police and Comms primarily in the South Island, but has also conducted training with North Island Police.
- The section had been assigned a detective who analysed and coordinated information about cases between Crime Prints and officers in charge of cases. To facilitate the exchange of information, the detective actively liaised with other sections and attended relevant forums such as the First Fifteen meetings.

The role of a SOCO was described by a respondent as a 'hunter and gatherer' of evidence. In the case of burglaries this primarily meant the collection of fingerprints and, increasingly, DNA evidence. Two SOCO cars were on the road seven days a week all year round. They attended an average of six appointments a day. The role of the FPO is to identify fingerprints by comparing lifted prints from the crime scene with prints held on AFIS or in the local manual collections.

A significant proportion of Crime Prints work was the examination and identification of burglary scenes. A specific process had to be followed for Crime Prints to achieve this.

- *Attending officer to determine the need for SOCO*—when a frontline officer attended a burglary they made a decision as to whether a SOCO should attend. SOCO had instituted one-on-one training with frontline officers to improve their ability to take good fingerprints and other scene evidence. This training was also supposed to make the officer more aware of when they should call on the expertise of a SOCO. Late in 2004, the Southern Area was about to bring in a new system of taking burglary ORs over the phone, and having SOCO attend every burglary. This would require an extra staff person, but enable SOCO to develop a much better idea of modus operandis (MOs) and other patterns of offending.
- *SOCO appointment*—if the officer decided a SOCO should attend, they called Comms to make an appointment. Comms kept an appointment book for SOCO and was able to give an appointment time immediately.
- *Collection of evidence*—when a SOCO attended a burglary scene they first focused on the movements of the burglar and determined the most likely places prints or other evidence might be obtained. Other evidence included DNA, tool mark impressions and footprints. Either fingerprints were uplifted at the scene or items might need further treatment to lift the prints. This was done in the laboratory at Christchurch District Headquarters. DNA samples were sent to Hamilton Institute of Environmental Science and Research (ESR) to be analysed and checked with the national DNA Databank.
- *Handling of DNA burglary exhibits*—the District Break Squad had instituted a process that centralised and standardised procedures for handling burglary DNA exhibits. Previously, SOCO or other Police personnel were either putting the exhibits in the exhibit store or sending them through to the District Break Squad via internal mail. This was changed so

all exhibits for a burglary crime scene with DNA were put into the exhibit store and only the documentation went to one of the District Break Squad Detective Sergeants, who made a decision as to whether it went to ESR for analysis. While testing was expensive at $400 per sample, the Detective Sergeant said 98% of the time he did support the testing of items, and this produced good results in terms of identifying the offender.

- *Identification of fingerprints*—the FPO received prints from the SOCO or from general Police staff and determined if the print was of high enough quality for an AFIS search. In Christchurch they also had the capacity to do manual searches through their own identification collection of offenders they had positively identified in the past. Youth offenders who had given voluntary fingerprints were kept in a separate collection, as were fraud offenders.

When a suspect was positively identified, the FPO made up a Fingerprint Identification Memo with details of the complainant, who preserved the prints, what the fingerprints were identified on, and the alleged offender. This memo was used at pre-trial conferences. However, if the defendant still pleaded not guilty, Crime Prints had to prepare a more substantial submission for the not-guilty hearing. This could take them anywhere from six to eight hours to produce.

A record of jobs done by Crime Prints was logged into a Local Recording System (LRS[11]), which allowed Crime Prints to do sector searches. LRS contained information such as location, time and MO of offender. The Crime Prints detective analysed this data and sent any relevant information back to the investigating officer.

- *Security advice*—the SOCOs gave victims advice on security in order to help them prevent further burglaries. Crime Prints used to hand out information packs before 2002; however, it became resource-intensive to make up the packs and some of the information needed updating.

4.5.1 Barriers to crime scene investigation

The following factors were identified as possible barriers to effective implementation.

- There were some cases of scene contamination and poor practices with the handling and storage of evidence. The defence counsel might query the chain of evidence and even suggest Police had planted evidence. Crime Prints therefore had to be very careful in their collection, handling, storing and recording of evidence. Crime Prints undertook training of Comms, frontline officers and detectives to prevent scene contamination and poor practices with the handling and storage of evidence occurring.

- The increased public awareness of forensics meant offenders had become more aware of Police practices and took precautions such as wearing gloves.

- High workload could put a lot of pressure on staff.

- A very serious crime such as a homicide meant attendance at burglary scenes had to be reprioritised further down the list.

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[11] Each job is allocated a LRS number.

4.5.2   Strengths of crime scene investigation

The following points were identified as strengths in the way Crime Prints undertook their work in relation to burglary.

- Respondents reported that the structure of Crime Prints encouraged good communication between SOCOs and FPOs, who worked effectively as a team.

- Having a detective assigned to the section allowed for better coordination of identification of suspects between Crime Prints and the officer in charge of the case. The detective's location sitting with SOCOs was reported to be an advantage in obtaining knowledge on the latest suspects.

- The appointment book kept by Comms allowed frontline officers to notify complainants immediately what time their SOCO appointment was. This was identified as good customer service because people did not have to wait around for the Police to show up. Appointment times were generally within 24 hours.

- The training initiatives undertaken by SOCO were seen as extremely beneficial to the work Crime Prints did. During 2002 Sydenham had a couple of their staff undertake the more comprehensive week-long SOCO training courses on forensics.

- Crime Prints had instituted a system of recognition and reward for fingerprint hits among frontline staff. A memo was sent to the OC of a Police officer who:
    - obtained a voluntary fingerprint which subsequently resulted in a positive identification of fingerprints preserved at a crime scene
    - carried out a quality scene examination resulting in positive fingerprint identification.

    Crime Prints asked the OC to convey their appreciation to the Police officer for a job well done. Crime Prints also sent officers a symbolic reward, such as a lollipop which had a sticker on it saying 'lick crime', which according to SOCO respondents has become a displayed marker of success among some frontline officers.[12] Crime Prints had received some very positive feedback from frontline staff about this system of recognition.

- Crime Prints aimed to maintain a high profile among the Police and encouraged open communication with other sections and groups such as Victim Support. For example, trainee detectives spent a week with SOCO going out to scenes.

- Perhaps the greatest strength of Crime Prints was the enthusiasm and dedication of this section. This was further evidenced by the low staff turnover.

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[12]   Crime Prints has also used other items to reward successful collection of fingerprints such as key rings, mugs and fridge magnets. An AFIS badge was given to an officer after three hits.

5 **Victim-focused initiatives**

This section examines the initiatives that were employed by Police and community organisations to prevent burglary and to address the needs of those who had been burgled. These initiatives therefore aim to reduce burglary by deterring burglars through enhanced security and/or making them aware that they have increased chances of being apprehended. For victims who have been burgled the initiatives aim to:

- provide support and reassurance
- inform them of progress
- give them security advice that will reduce chances of repeat victimisation and enhance recovery of property.

Three initiatives are discussed below:

- victim initiatives utilised by Sydenham Police Area
- Victim Support
- Neighbourhood Support.

5.1 Victim initiatives utilised by Sydenham Police Area

Sydenham Police sent out a letter to victims acknowledging the receipt of their burglary complaint. This letter also contained information regarding the recording of property and security advice. When the Break Squad was in operation the second detective assigned to the squad instigated a system of file allocation to individual Police on the squad. This provided one point of contact for victims and for other Police sections they liaised with.

> **Household Survey (2002 and 2004)**
> The percentage of households surveyed in Sydenham which experienced one or more burglaries was 6.5% in 2001 and 5.3% in 2003. The proportion of households which were repeat victims of burglary was 1.4% in 2001 and 0.8% in 2003. These differences were not statistically significant. More households experienced a successful burglary than an attempted burglary.

The Sydenham Break Squad identified repeat victims and forwarded their details to the community constables, whose role it was to chat with them and assess why they were repeat victims. The community constables were responsible for helping victims put strategies in place to prevent further burglaries, such as developing a Neighbourhood Support group or joining an existing one. They would also give them basic crime prevention advice. The Sydenham Break Squad found that there were not many repeat victims, and those that had

had repeat burglaries were often targeted by the same offender. Some respondents mentioned that repeat victims were not being identified quickly enough and that people need to be given target hardening advice on the second burglary. The gap was seen to be in the report taking—asking if people had been burgled before.

Intel was concerned that repeat victims were not being identified as the data entry people had to specifically link people by birth date and name to all offences. Often the data entry would solely be by address at the time of the incident.

The new Southern Area planned to look at the specific issues which contributed to victimisation of the Asian and student communities. This included promoting crime prevention through ethnic and student papers.

5.2   Neighbourhood Support

Neighbourhood Support in Christchurch is coordinated by Canterbury Neighbourhood Support Incorporated, which is an incorporated society funded by the City Council, Community Trusts and the Police. The focus of Neighbourhood Support was community safety, including crime, fires, and civil disaster. Neighbourhood Support used to primarily target burglaries, thefts of cars, and thefts from cars, but in conjunction with the move away from Police control the role had expanded. The Police previously coordinated Neighbourhood Support with operations situated in their Crime Prevention Section. The main linkages with the Police were through some material support, sharing of Intel and the work of community constables with Neighbourhood Support groups. In 2004 there were 1650 groups operating in Christchurch. State Insurance had become a funding partner and provided two cars and other support to the Christchurch group.

The Canterbury Neighbourhood Support was operated by a full-time coordinator who was responsible for the administration of the organisation. The coordination role involved tasks such as:

- helping people set up and maintain groups
- keeping a database of all the District Neighbourhood Support groups
- producing the quarterly magazine *Eye on Crime* (later changed to *Eye on Community)* and collating and disseminating Neighbourhood Support information
- talking to community groups and fundraising.

The community constables interviewed did not perceive that their role had changed much with the shift of the Neighbourhood Support coordination role out of Police. They liaised with the coordinator about setting up and talking to groups and exchanged Intel with him. They contributed articles to the magazine as well as writing articles for local community newspapers. The community constables passed on Intel to Neighbourhood Support group contacts about activity in their area, such as recent burglaries, to pass on to members. They were also available for the group contacts to ring about any Intel or concerns they had.

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To set up a group the public could:

- get in touch with Neighbourhood Support directly
- be transferred through the Police operators
- approach their local community constable.

Respondents commented that many people were motivated to start a group after a burglary. A patrol member interviewed said he always asked burglary victims if they were members of a Neighbourhood Support group as part of the security advice he gave them. If they were not, he gave them contact information.

5.2.1 What does Neighbourhood Support achieve?

Respondents interviewed identified the following reasons they perceived Neighbourhood Support works and what it could achieve.

- *Empowerment*—Neighbourhood Support encouraged people to empower themselves and take charge of and ownership in their neighbourhoods.
- *Safety*—Neighbourhood Support encouraged people to feel safer.
- *Community care*—the Neighbourhood Support process facilitated people getting to know their neighbours and encouraged them to watch out for each other, for example when someone was away on holiday or ill.
- *Awareness*—Neighbourhood Support encouraged people to be more aware and alert of suspicious behaviour[13] and gave them an avenue to report this, when otherwise they might think it not worth contacting the Police. The District coordinator commented:

  I go to meetings and people are meeting their neighbours for the first time, often having lived virtually next door for years. So it breaks down those barriers, gets them communicating, gets their eyes and ears working, and it works.

- *Deterrence*—the Neighbourhood Support group sign in the street provided by the Council and the stickers on letterboxes could send a message that this area might be risky as neighbours were watching out for each other. This could have a deterrent effect.
- *Prevention*— Neighbourhood Support information provided security advice that could also act as a deterrent and make it more difficult for burglars to enter a property.

5.2.2 Barriers to implementation

Respondents thought that it was more difficult to set up and maintain groups in low socio-economic areas in Sydenham where people tended to live in rental properties and were more transient. The maintenance of groups was largely dependent on motivated contact people and area coordinators. People who were homeowners and had lived in the neighbourhood for a while were more likely to be interested in participating in a Neighbourhood Support group. Several respondents noted that not as many burglaries occurred in areas where there

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[13] A member is encouraged to ring the Neighbourhood Support group contact person if it is not an emergency, to discuss whether they should report to the Police.

was Neighbourhood Support, but this could be in part due to people being able to pay for security.

5.2.3   Strength of implementation

The strength of Neighbourhood Support was that it was a community-based initiative where people were taking responsibility not only for themselves, but also for their neighbours, to make their communities safer. Key personnel stood out as strengths, such as the Canterbury Neighbourhood Support coordinator, who had previously done this job with Police, so had the knowledge and the contacts within Police. This facilitated the liaison between the relatively new organisation and Police. He was able to dedicate himself full-time to Neighbourhood Support rather than the 15–20% of his time that was possible while working for Police.

5.3   Victim Support

5.3.1   Description

Christchurch Victim Support Group Inc. was located within the Central Police Station. They serviced the Christchurch and Banks Peninsula Areas, thus encompassing the Sydenham Police Area. They provided a 24-hour service seven days a week, and guaranteed to be on the scene within a maximum of 45 minutes of notification. In Christchurch the response was reported to usually be within 10–15 minutes. In 2004 Victim Support had two paid staff and 24 active volunteers. They provided their volunteers with 35 hours of training. Victim Support was restructured in 2004 and the selection, training and ongoing supervision of volunteers was being standardised and made more professional.

In regards to attending victims of burglary scenes, Police staff are under instruction from National Headquarters to call Victim Support in the following circumstances: *burglary of a domestic dwelling where the offender is disturbed on the scene or in other circumstances where the occupant or witness is distressed by the event.* Victim Support respondents interviewed also stated it was mandatory for the Police to notify them if the person lived alone.

Victim Support was called out by Comms, who either made the decision based on talking to the victim or were notified by Police attending the scene. Victim Support always rang the victim before they visited to verify that they wanted to see a Victim Support volunteer.

At the scene, Victim Support volunteers provided support for victims in whatever way they deemed appropriate, including practical suggestions on security and help with contacting insurance agencies. In regards to follow-up, the volunteer would ask the victim if they would like a phone call in a few days to see how they are doing.

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Household Survey (2002 and 2004)—Neighbourhood Support

The following highlights some of the Household Survey results in regards to Neighbourhood Support.

- When asked 'What Police or community activities, which aim to reduce burglary, in your neighbourhood are you aware of?', 36% (in 2002 and 2004) of Sydenham participants mentioned (unprompted) Neighbourhood Watch/Support.
- The main ways in which respondents were aware of Neighbourhood Support were
  - by word of mouth
  - Neighbourhood Support
  - leaflets in their letterbox
  - community newspapers
  - signs in the neighbourhood
  - television.
- Significantly fewer respondents in Sydenham (15%) were members of Neighbourhood Support in 2002 compared to the average of the other areas. This had dropped to 12% in the 2004 survey. Of the Sydenham respondents who were members of Neighbourhood Support or Rural Support, 82% said they thought it was very or somewhat helpful in 2002 (88% in 2004), compared to 4% (5%) who thought it unhelpful.
- Too few respondents thought Neighbourhood Support unhelpful to comment on the reasons it was considered unhelpful. For the Sydenham respondents who believed Neighbourhood Support was helpful, the reasons mentioned were:
  - strengthens communities/get to know neighbours (77% in 2002 and 80% in 2004)
  - feel safer (52% in 2002 and 61% in 2004)
  - signs/stickers deter burglars (10% in 2002 and 6% in 2004)
  - get to meet Police (8% in 2002 and 4% in 2004)
  - good/frequent/well-run meetings (8% in 2002 and 6% in 2004)
  - gives security advice (7% in 2002 and 11% in 2004)
  - tells us about local burglaries (3% in 2002 and 11% in 2004)
- Of the 426 Sydenham respondents who were not members of Neighbourhood Support, the reasons mentioned for not being a member were:
  - household not approached to join (60% in 2002 and 57% in 2004)
  - never heard of it (14% in 2002 and 9% in 2004)
  - don't hear about it anymore (12% in 2002 and 4% in 2004)
  - no particular reason (10% in 2002 and 4% in 2004)
  - heard of it, but we have not asked further (9% in 2002 and 18% in 2004)
  - have informal networks with neighbours (7% in 2002 and 18% in 2004)
  - recently moved to the neighbourhood (6% in 2002 and 7% in 2004)
  - was a member but we quit/group stopped (5% in 2002 and 5% in 2004)
  - don't think it's helpful/worthwhile (3% in 2002 and 2% in 2004)
  - too busy/not enough time (1% in 2002 and 6% in 2004)
  - do not want neighbours to know our business (1% in 2002 and 1% in 2004)
  - neighbours often changing (1% in 2002 and 6% in 2004)
  - don't like neighbours (<1% in 2002 and 0% in 2004)
  - never thought about it (1% in 2002 and 0% in 2004)

The following initiatives were implemented by Christchurch Victim Support.

- Victim Support distributed *Remember Victim Support Channel 2, Comms* stickers to Comms to put on their computers and to Police to put on their dashboards and notebooks. This idea was initiated by Christchurch Victim Support to encourage Comms and Police to notify Victim Support. The initiative started in early 2001 and the stickers are now distributed nationwide.
- Victim Support encouraged Comms to suggest Victim Support to victims with a positive statement such as *Victim Support will contact you shortly*, which can then be refused. They found this more successful than saying *Would you like Victim Support?,* because it was the Kiwi attitude for people to say *no* (*she'll be right).* It should be noted that Comms might make the decision to notify Victim Support anyway, because they assess the person is distraught.
- Victim Support sent all burglary victims a letter with contact details and an information sheet that outlined:
  - common emotions in response to burglary
  - advice on how to cope
  - security suggestions.

  Victim Support collected the information on who had been burgled from Comms every 24 hours.
- The manager of Christchurch Victim Support initiated *Harry and the burglar*, a book for child victims of burglary. It has gone nationwide. This book is supposed to be sent out to all burglaries where children are traumatised. The manager of Christchurch Victim Support stated the reason for producing the book:

  Parents will often ask what to say to the children at nighttime if the children get upset. They lose a bit of sleep. That was a book designed so the parents can read to them as a bed-time story. We just provided them with reassurance.

- Christchurch Victim Support produced a website which provides information on non-profit victim organisations in the Christchurch area. This includes articles such as *Surviving Burglary*. Victims are given a card with the website address.

5.3.2   Barriers to implementation

It was noted that there had been a few occasions where Police response could have been better as victims were left waiting, particularly those in a distressed state. This was said to be due to the Police being busy with priority incidents.

Communication and understanding of the roles was also seen as requiring improvement and it was hoped that since the Victim Support restructuring and the fact that staff were in the office full time, and with the 0800 victim phone line, this would improve.

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5.3.3   Suggested improvements

Victim Support staff interviewed suggested their volunteers could be trained to attend burglary scenes to assist victims before the Police, on the occasions they are busy with other incidents. This would also involve training from SOCO in regards to what specific areas they could or could not touch and so on. The proposed advantages were that the victims would not be left in a distressed state and the enhanced partnership between Police and Victim Support would provide better customer service. It was noted on occasion that Victim Support did arrive before Police.

Victim Support was planning to widen the range of volunteers and recruit younger people and perhaps social work students who already have some training. They were also planning to look at ways to recruit more bilingual volunteers, particularly those with Japanese, Mandarin, Samoan and Maori languages.

Another possibility was to have a specialised burglary team of volunteers, as well as a team for suicides and homicides. This would allow people to develop expertise in this area.

6 Property-focused initiatives

Property-focused initiatives are those which aim to reduce the incidence of burglary by reducing the market for burgled goods. Property recovery and using property to aid in identifying burglary offenders are also important issues in regards to property. Liaison with second-hand dealers and pawnbrokers and centralised property recording are two property-focused initiatives which will be discussed below.

6.1 Liaison with second-hand dealers and pawnbrokers

6.1.1 Description

Second-hand dealers were required to work within the Secondhand Dealers and Pawnbrokers Act 2004, which required dealers to:

- be licensed
- maintain a register of the source of all items bought
- retain certain items for 14 days before on-selling.

Before this legislation came in, they came under the Secondhand Dealers Act 1963. This Act had required them to hold certain property for a month. The list of items which the Act covered was very out of date.

Police were entitled to:

- visit all dealers and pawnbrokers to check that they were licensed
- check their registers
- check that they knew the requirements of the Act and that they were adhering to them.

This was primarily because burglars used second-hand dealers and pawnbrokers as a way of disposing of their goods and getting ready cash.

When the Sydenham Break Squad was operating they visited businesses in their Area as regularly as possible and ideally tried to go weekly. They found this a worthwhile exercise and had started to build a good relationship with the local dealers. The District Break Squad regularly conducted visits, sometimes two to three times a week to prominent businesses. They encouraged victims to circulate inventories to all the second-hand shops and thought it was important to encourage victims to do that, as Police did not have time. This was reported to have yielded good results. A dealer who was interviewed said they usually received five calls a day from victims looking for property.

The dealer interviewed saw his role as both 'preventative' and 'passive'. It was preventative in that pawnbrokers gave people a way to access cash by selling their goods, whereas otherwise some of them might have been desperate enough to steal. It was passive in the sense that they checked for serial numbers (the Police would give them a list of stolen goods) and looked out for suspicious people and would ring the Police if they had any concerns. The Police liked them to delay the person until they could come, but this operator was concerned for his staff's safety so instructed them to tell the suspect that 'the Police are on their way, but you are on video and they will catch up with you eventually'. He stated it was not worth the risk of getting too involved; they did not 'hold' people. This respondent noted the difference between Police and themselves in regards to visibility and accessibility for the offender, as they were vulnerable to intimidation working at the shop every day.

6.1.2 What does visiting second-hand dealers and pawnbrokers achieve?

Respondents interviewed identified the following benefits from liaison work.

- There were benefits to dealers from a good relationship with Police: they were able to check out suspicious goods or sellers and identify some stolen goods before buying them, as dealers did not want to buy stolen property.

  We have good relationships with most of the second-hand dealers. We quite often get phone calls to say 'I have received a fax from a victim and we believe we have got the property here now' or 'the person has brought the property in and they are coming back in half an hour'.

- Stolen property could be identified and recovered.
- Some burglars were apprehended through stolen property being identified.
- Police could check registers to find out who had been selling property.

6.1.3 Barriers to implementation

Several barriers to implementation were identified.

The liaison process was time consuming and the Police in the Sydenham Area were often under pressure to attend other priority incidents. The regular liaison was the key factor, but Sydenham was unable to keep the proactive squad operating, and no one was able to keep the liaison going in 2003. Under the Southern structure the Volume of Crime Squad was also struggling to carry out as much of the proactive work as it wanted.

Household Survey (2002 and 2004)
Results indicated that only a minority of people in the Sydenham area record and identify their property.
- 25% made security markings on property in 2002 (29% in 2004)
- 25% noted down serial numbers of electrical property in 2002 (26% in 2004)
- 18% photographed small property items in 2002 (26% in 2004).

Both the Police and the dealer interviewed thought a major barrier was the difficulty in trying to identify property because many people did not record serial numbers of electronic goods or mark their items in some way. Another issue was the delay in stolen property being

entered into the system, which meant that the operator might call up to check a serial number before it had been entered.

There was an issue of invasion of privacy for the public who were pawning goods but did not necessarily want others to know about it. Some operators were not as cooperative as they could be. Some operators had not been very discerning about who they bought goods from and the Police encouraged them to take more responsibility by looking at the value of goods and the age of the person bringing it in. A Police respondent stated:

> *Also with having the working relationship that we have with the second-hand dealers, they are looking out for stuff too. They are becoming more observant. Especially with values and the age of the person. We try and encourage them to look at the person who is selling it. Look at the property that is being sold. Just work out does it look right? Does it feel right? A 17-year-old comes in with a five-diamond ring. Things like that.*

6.1.4   Strength of implementation

The strength of this initiative was having dedicated people who could build up good relationships with second-hand dealers and pawnbrokers, thus encouraging them to be more observant and to contact Police. The consistency of personnel and the institutional knowledge they had about offenders combined with the analysis of recent burglary files allowed for linking of property and suspects when checking registers.

The District Break Squad set up an operation called Operation Steptoe in 2004. They were utilising their legal powers to warn second-hand dealers from buying from known criminals. Police were also suggesting that frontline staff search second-hand shops for distinctive property they recorded when taking the OR.

6.2   Property recording initiative

6.2.1   Description

The District Break Squad started an initiative encouraging burglary victims to record their property. When an acknowledgement letter was sent to the complainant, it included a form that was a schedule of property. The complainant could use the schedule to record serial numbers of their property and any new goods they acquired to replace the stolen items. The Police advised them to send a copy of this to their insurance company in case of any future incidents. Jewellery was the main problem, as a description of common items like engagement and wedding rings was not enough for the Police to identify them. Photographs of jewellery would be very helpful but very few people were doing this.

Sydenham officers in charge of burglary cases also sent out a letter of acknowledgement and a request for a complete list of property stolen and serial numbers if they had not already been provided. The letter also gave security advice, saying it would be very helpful in the future if they kept a complete list of serial numbers in a safe place and that they should mark items such as CDs.

6.2.2　Recovery of property

When Police served a search warrant or caught an offender in possession of a stolen item they searched NIA for complainants who had had those items stolen.

> *We identify huge amounts of property from that system.　It is brilliant.　It is labour-intensive to enter the property on the NIA system but it is vital to identify property.*

6.2.3　Barriers to implementation

The main barrier to the identification of property was the public not recording or identifying their property adequately.

The delayed collection of information on stolen property could be a hindrance to property recovery as property from a burglary in the morning could be down to second-hand dealers by that afternoon.　The District Break Squad encouraged attending officers to get as much information as possible on the property as quickly as possible.　It was noted that often the Burglary Offence Report property list had 'to be advised or to be faxed in by complainant'. However, many respondents commented that victims often did not know all the items that had been stolen straight away.

6.2.4　Suggested improvements

Police interviewed said it would be helpful if retailers kept records of the serial numbers of items they sold in their sales records.　At present they do not keep this information.

7 Location-focused initiatives

Location-focused initiatives are those which aim to reduce the incidence of burglary by applying Police resources to 'hot' spots where burglary is known to be prevalent. One of the main location-focused initiatives was directed patrolling, which included patrolling 'hot' spots and looking for suspected offenders and their vehicles. Directed patrolling in the Sydenham Police Area and the volunteer group Christchurch South Community Watch will be discussed below.

7.1 Directed patrolling

7.1.1 Description

Intel identified locations that had been 'hot' spots of crime or victimisation. They developed weekly directed patrol directives for each shift. The staff was required to patrol these areas during the shift and report back on any suspicious activity. Sometimes the Police operated a range of mechanisms in one location, such as:

- having the Strategic Traffic Unit (STU) look for traffic infringements
- parking the 'booze bus' in that area
- having officers present in cars, on bikes and on foot.

Directed patrolling was one of the key result areas (KRAs) for patrols' performance appraisals.

In Sydenham the Intel officer and the patrol supervisors (NCOs) made the suggestions for directed patrolling and produced directed patrolling reports (DPRs) that were then disseminated to staff. Directives for directed patrolling could also come from the District level. Intel used the MAPS programme to identify 'hot' spots for burglaries. During the second half of 2002 Sydenham was without an Intel officer, and District Intel directly provided information during this period. The frequency of DPRs varied depending on what was happening in the Area. The DPR was handed out in paper form, which patrol staff signed to say they had sighted it, making them accountable for trying to achieve those directives. One respondent said that staff was using the DPR as a suggestion, but the sergeants weren't enforcing it, so they weren't really being effective.

To monitor performance, patrol staff was required to record the number of times they had patrolled an area. Patrol staff would also get information electronically through the Police intranet on a directed patrolling target or area. From 2004, staff was required to log on through Comms to say they were conducting a DPR, and this saved them time completing

manual logs. In 2004, Intel developed a DPR which they encouraged the staff to scribble any notings on, with Intel taking responsibility for entering it as notings.

7.1.2   Thursday patrols

In 2004 the Area began a series of regular patrols in Riccarton, which had been experiencing high burglary levels. The idea was to saturate the area with Police—mainly on Thursday, but occasionally they would change to Friday or Saturday. Usually they would have about ten staff in the location, but sometimes they could only get three or four. Intel could see that the initiative was very effective as almost no burglaries were occurring at the times of the patrols.

> **Household Survey (2002 and 2004)—Police patrols**
> The results showed that 10% of respondents in 2002 were aware of Police patrols in their neighbourhood (8% in 2004).
>
> Of the 44% of respondents who answered 'yes' when asked 'Is there anything that you would like the Police to do to make you feel safer from burglary?', 60% would have liked more visibility/patrolling in 2002, with no significant difference in 2004.

7.1.3   Strengths of directed patrolling

Police who were interviewed identified the following benefits of directed patrolling for burglary.

- For offenders, directed patrolling could act as a deterrent because of Police visibility in an area.
- There was the possibility that Police might apprehend a burglar going to or from a 'job'.
- Intel could be gathered on known offenders' movements.
- For the public, directed patrolling provided reassurance that the Police were nearby and patrolling the area.
- Intel could see that the initiative was very effective as almost no burglaries were occurring at the times of the patrols.

7.1.4   Barriers to implementation

Police interviewed identified the following barriers to implementation.

- The reality for patrols was they were largely driven by Comms, and patrols had to attend priority incidents, which allowed little time for directed patrolling.
- In Sydenham four patrol staff members were transferred to the traffic section at the beginning of 2002, leaving the Area short staffed. Furthermore, two unfilled positions that had been allocated to Sydenham staffing numbers were also removed at the beginning of 2002. The lack of resources was the main barrier to effective implementation. In Sydenham there was only one I-car patrolling in a large geographical area at night.

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- Patrols were required to conduct two hours of traffic duty a day. If there was a traffic accident Sydenham patrol was required to attend, which was very time consuming. A few respondents noted that the traffic section did not attend accidents.

- Police in 2004 were still trying to develop systems to get feedback from the patrols. As officers didn't have time for manual data entry, it was felt by some that the verbal reports were effective at the briefing, which Intel attended.

7.2   Christchurch South Community Watch

Christchurch South Community Watch was a volunteer patrol group and a subbranch of the Community Watchers of Canterbury. They were partly funded by the Police and met once a month at the Sydenham Police, where they liaised with the community constables. The Police provided targets and patrol areas to the community volunteers, who patrolled 'hot' spots and looked out for suspicious behaviour, stolen vehicles and suspects. They acted as an extra pair of eyes for the Police and provided information on activities in the area, which they reported to Comms. They did not become involved in incidents.

8 Cross-focused initiatives

This section examines services that can be regarded as focusing on a combination of offender, victim, property and location initiatives.

8.1 Specialised burglary squads

Sydenham Police addressed burglary rates by establishing specialised burglary squads to focus on a range of proactive strategies. Before the Area was restructured Sydenham had two squads operate: from September 2000 to mid-2002, and from August 2001 to February 2002. They also brought in a temporary squad for six weeks in mid-2002. After the restructuring the Southern Area created the Volume Crime Squad, which focused on a range of crime, including burglary. The first burglary squad is included in this report as it was mentioned by respondents to have been an effective strategy which they could not sustain due to staff reduction and other demands.

8.1.1 District Break Squad

The District Break Squad has operated since 1991 across the Christchurch metropolitan area. Their central approach allowed them to maintain an overview of burglary trends and coordinate Police practices. This was in response to Christchurch's geography and the mobility of many burglars. A member of the squad explained:

> *What happens is we recognise that offenders are very mobile throughout the District. They are not just confined to Sydenham, Papanui or whatever, although juvenile offenders sometimes are. All the files were getting filed locally at Papanui, Sydenham or New Brighton. A very piecemeal approach and no one had a global view of what was going on. It was very hard to spot trends.*

The District Break Squad carried out investigative and proactive strategies to apprehend burglars and receivers, and recover property. For example, squad members acted as coordinators for First Fifteen[14] targets and they regularly monitored second-hand dealers and pawnbrokers for stolen goods.

The Canterbury District's burglary files either went directly to the District Break Squad for investigation or were sent to them when the files were closed, for auditing purposes. The District Break Squad liaised with other District Police sections that provided expertise and assistance with their work, including Crime Prints, YCU, Intel and the Drug Squad.

The District Break Squad consisted of two detective sergeants and an authorised strength of eight investigators who might be a mix of constables, detective constables and detectives. The squad had a part-time clerk who worked 20 hours a week.

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[14] See Section 4.2, Targeting offenders.

However, the District Break Squad was not always fully staffed and they were two investigators short when spoken to in August 2002. They had been trying all year to increase the clerk's hours to full-time as her work was vital to coping with the paperwork that was increasingly taking up more of the detective sergeants' time.

A respondent thought that the squad was becoming more proactive in:

- identifying and targeting the prolific offenders
- targeting property outlets
- policing areas that had been identified as 'hot' spots.

The cultivation of informants had become a key component in the detective's role.

8.1.1.1 What did the District Break Squad achieve?

The District Break Squad maintained an overview of the district burglary offences, which was identified as vital for being able to identify and target burglars and receivers. To conduct a district-wide overview of burglary, they sighted all the burglary files for trend analysis and also took this opportunity to audit them to maintain quality control. They played a coordination role, collecting and disseminating information among the Police Areas. The First Fifteen initiative was one of the major ways they coordinated District activities. The District Break Squad had also become more active in disseminating Intel to the frontline uniform staff by giving them information on targets, their vehicles, the locations of burglaries and outlets for the sale of property. This centralisation of information and the ability to conduct trend analysis district-wide was important to combat the mobility of offenders between Police Areas.

They conducted a fair proportion of the District's burglary investigation work and perceived that the combined efforts of their squad and the Police Areas were increasingly effective at reducing burglary. A respondent commented:

> Things are working here and the stats show it in Canterbury. It is really starting to work. It is like anything, you do a little bit here and a little bit there, the youth crime bit there and it really starts to make an impact so it is good.

Respondents identified offender targeting as one of their primary strategies and believed this approach was working well. The effect of apprehension and conviction of offenders was seen as contributing towards a reduction in burglary because it took recidivist burglars 'out of circulation' for a while at least, and might act as a deterrent to some.

8.1.1.2 Barriers to implementation

The main barrier identified to effective implementation was again resources, particularly in regards to adequate staffing. Effective communication between the squad and the Police Areas had also been an issue. However, respondents from the squad and Sydenham felt that communication had improved, particularly since the implementation of the First Fifteen initiative. Monthly meetings gave everyone an opportunity to get together and discuss issues

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in relation to burglary and exchange information. There was also more information flowing from the District Break Squad to the Police Areas, so it was a two-way street.

8.1.1.3   Strengths of implementation

Many respondents commented on the benefits of having a dedicated squad in terms of their ability to reduce an offence type. The dedication and knowledge of some of the members of the District Break Squad was also frequently commented on, which highlights the importance of appropriate personnel for the job and the benefits of institutional knowledge.

The District targeting initiatives coordinated the Police approach and gave squad members and Area Police a sense of ownership while addressing the mobility of offenders around the Christchurch metropolitan area. This raises the issue of how to balance centralised control with Area control. It was seen as important that the District Break Squad work with the Police Areas, and good communication was identified as key to this in terms of exchanging Intel and assistance, and breaking down any 'them and us' type barriers. It was noted that there was still plenty of room to improve communication within the Police generally.

8.1.2   Sydenham Break Squad 2000–June 2002

The Sydenham Break Squad was initiated in response to burglary becoming one of the Labour Coalition's priorities. The squad started operation in September 2000 and initially consisted of one detective and three constables.

They were responsible for both investigative and proactive Police work in regards to residential burglaries committed in Sydenham. The CIU OC directed files that had a line of inquiry to the Sydenham Break Squad. They followed up any leads and analysed files to identify suspects and offences they were responsible for. This included investigative work on receivers of stolen property. As stated above, the files that did not have any line of inquiry were forwarded to the District Break Squad for collation and recording purposes.

When offenders were apprehended, members of the Sydenham Break Squad carried out interviews to investigate current charges and ascertain if there had been any further offending. They also conducted prison interviews to obtain custody clearances. The squad requested compulsory DNA samples for convicted offenders from the Court and asked for voluntary samples from burglary suspects.

Offender targeting initiatives included bail checks, surveillance, directed patrolling and tip outs[15]. The break squad regarded the monitoring of second-hand dealers and pawnbrokers as an important strategy that complemented the work the District Break Squad was doing.

8.1.2.1   Liaison with other Police sections

The Sydenham Break Squad acted as a focal point for burglary operations, both locally and district-wide. They encouraged Sydenham patrol staff to maximise Intel by ensuring they communicated any information they had obtained about offenders, and emphasised the

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[15]   The Police code for this is '3T'—3 meaning proactive and T meaning turnover. 'Tip outs' refers to stopping vecicles to check warrants and making note of any known offenders and their associates.

importance of doing a good job with their ORs. They asked the patrol staff to hold offenders in custody so that a Break Squad officer could interview them, which they found offered good results in regards to clearances.

It was identified as important to have a close relationship with Intel, and the Area Intel officer was actually shifted into the same office space to facilitate communication with the Sydenham Break Squad. The relationship worked well and members of the squad held the Intel officer in high regard. The Break Squad filled in a Burglary Offender Report when an offender was apprehended and this information was forwarded to District Intel. The type of information they collected included the offender's details, MO, associates, and motive for offending and clearance information.

The squad liaised with District sections that provided expertise and assistance with their work, such as Crime Prints on proposed suspects, fingerprint and DNA hits. The District Break Squad provided Intel on offenders and provided assistance with search warrants and interviews. Assistance with search warrants was mainly due to staff shortages where the Area staff required more people to help them undertake this. A member of the squad acted as the coordinator for Sydenham's First Fifteen targets. The squad also liaised with Sydenham Youth Aid and the YCU regarding youth offenders.

Sydenham's resource capacity had been severely hampered due to a series of serious crimes in the Area and a relocation of staff to the traffic division. In mid-2001 the squad numbers dropped down to two constables, who worked on their own for six months. In November 2001 another detective was assigned to run the squad; however, the pressure of other work left the squad little time for proactive policing of burglary offenders. According to one respondent the Sydenham Break Squad had effectively finished in June 2001, despite it continuing at a minimum level until mid-2002.

The Sydenham Area tried to keep two people concentrating on burglaries even just for collation purpose and for identification of offenders. However, the spree of serious crime has meant they were not able to achieve that. Respondents noted that while burglaries were being followed up, recidivist burglars were not being actively targeted like they had been when there was a dedicated squad.

8.1.2.2   Strengths of Sydenham Break Squad

A respondent thought that the Sydenham Break Squad had a deterrent effect—they estimated that within six to eight weeks of the squad going into operation, offenders knew that there was a team operating and there was a consequent drop in offences in the Area. This meant that there possibly could have been a displacement effect where offenders committed burglaries in other Police Areas.

When fully staffed, the Sydenham Break Squad had time to do more proactive policing, which increased their apprehension and conviction of burglary offenders and clearance rates for burglaries.

A respondent said that it was likely that the initial success of the Break Squad was due to the local knowledge Sydenham Police had about who their local offenders were. They were

therefore able to identify and target those offenders and receivers with proactive policing strategies.

They had some good clearances and the reason they had good clearances is because they knew where the burglaries were happening. They knew what sort of property was being taken. They were doing a lot of proactive work. They were checking the pawn shops and were following up on property and were getting hits with offenders and obviously fingerprints, giving good suspects to Crime Prints and they could check those suspects in the computer when they were checking fingerprints.

The Sydenham staff interviewed felt they were achieving good results with the Break Squad. A combination of local knowledge and local ownership were positive factors in the implementation of the squad. There was liaison between District sections and initiatives such as the First Fifteen strategy were regarded as important considering the mobility of offenders in the Christchurch metropolitan area. Various respondents reported different views on the liaison relationship with the District Break Squad, from good to not so good. Overall this relationship was said to be positive by the end of 2001. As stated, this was facilitated by the First Fifteen coordination meetings.

Many respondents from Sydenham commented on how disappointed they were when staffing levels and resources were cut. They understood the necessity of prioritising their workload, and several respondents acknowledged that ultimately serious crime was always going to take the detectives away. However, they were frustrated that burglary was not being as well resourced as traffic initiatives.

8.1.2.3   Barriers to Sydenham Break Squad

The main issue identified by Police respondents was a lack of resourcing, particularly in regards to staff. This was compounded by the amount of serious crime occurring in the Sydenham Area during much of 2002. Staff identified four specific barriers.

- Staffing levels—Sydenham Area lost five constables to the traffic section at the beginning of 2002[16]. The Area Controller stated that the staff shortage had had a big impact on their ability to 'get out and about', for example to conduct bail checks.
- Sydenham lost a CIU vehicle to STU in early 2002.
- Burglary was prioritised down following a serious crime spree from October 2001 to approximately mid-2002.
- Leave days owing—it was the Area Controller's responsibility to ensure leave was kept at a manageable level. However, demands on staff increased the number of leave days owing. Making sure staff took their leave days had become a difficult balancing act as this left the station short-staffed at times.

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[16]   Four members of the Sydenham metropolitan patrol and one member from Lyttelton station. There were also a further two unfilled positions that were allocated to Sydenham and removed at the beginning of 2002.

8.1.2.4   Suggested improvements

A respondent commented that the ring-fencing of squads so staffing levels would not be depleted would be ideal. They noted that it took time to develop good working knowledge of offenders and their MO; therefore Police should have a decent amount of time on the squads to build this specialist knowledge.

8.1.3   Proactive Squad: August–December 2002

The Sydenham Proactive Squad was established in August 2002. The squad consisted of two detectives and two constables. Their objective was to conduct proactive and investigative work on specific areas of crime as identified by District directives and their own analysis of trends in the Area. The focus was on:

- organised crime
- burglaries
- unlawful takings
- methamphetamine-based drugs.

The Proactive Squad mainly targeted offenders for unlawful takings and burglaries, while major drug investigations were handled by the District Drug Squad.

The functioning of the squad was dependent on other workload, such as homicide investigations, and staff relieving in other Districts.

The squad's initial focus was to target selected offenders. They employed a number of proactive strategies similar to those used by the previous Break Squad.

- An increase in bail checks, especially curfew checks, was driven from a district-wide initiative. The squad members conducted these together and respondents reported that this strategy was giving them some really good results.
- They took responsibility for coordinating targeting of Sydenham's First Fifteen offender(s).
- They took part in Friday afternoon operations to collect Intel (Operation Fox)—Police available went out on patrol for a few hours to see who was around in the Sydenham Area. This could involve tip outs where suspected offenders' vehicles were stopped and people were asked about their activities.

  I do think that is effective . . . part of our job is intelligence, knowing who people are, where people are. Sydenham is a very transient area and a lot of people that come and go. So it is good to know who is coming into the area for that reason. With the use of the Intel section in town we generally at least work out where things happen.

- They proposed to monitor second-hand dealers and pawnbrokers when time permitted.
- They identified and targeted receivers.
- They did directed patrolling for 'hot' spots and targeted offenders.

As with the Sydenham Break Squad, the Proactive Squad was establishing liaison relationships with other Police sections, locally and at District level. For example, they would notify District Break if they had arrested a person or charged them and would send the information through so they knew about the person.

8.1.3.1 Strengths of the Proactive Squad

The formation of a squad that was responsive to trends in offence types allowed for flexibility and the ability to be proactive about the most pressing crimes. There was also an underlying assumption that offenders could be responsible for a range of offences and that there is a strong link between drugs and different types of dishonesty offences. Targeting a range of offence types an offender may be involved in increases the chances of their apprehension.

The Proactive Squad started targeting burglary suspects and putting pressure on with curfew checks. In a short time frame they saw the average rate of burglaries steadily drop from 17 per week to about eight or nine.

A Police respondent commented on the mechanisms behind this approach.

I guess every time you interview someone and do arrest them on a burglary, you are at least stemming the flow to some degree. Whether it is because they are in custody, on bail conditions, or just the fact that they become a little bit paranoid.

8.1.3.2 Barriers to the Proactive Squad

Resourcing was again the major issue identified by respondents. A recent homicide investigation took precedence over the proactive burglary work. It was noted that this would always be the case as they were not a ring-fenced squad.

The Detective Senior in charge of CIU said he had difficulties in allocating work to staff as he did not wish to burn them out. Proactive policing left less staff available to carry out reactive policing. Consequently some of the minor files might not be investigated.

Members of the squad were essentially half of Sydenham's CIU and were not extra staff, which necessitated them being available for weekend shifts. This was not an ideal situation, as in one month there would be two weekends when two of the squad were working. Squad members had to work out how to approach things around those hours.

There was a sense of frustration over the lack of resourcing, especially in regards to staff. The Detective Senior noted that a focus on organised crime, gangs and methamphetamines was included in all the national, District and Area plans but 'really they are hardly worth the paper they are written on if we don't actually throw staff and resources at it.'

8.1.4 Volume of Crime Squad: 2004

The new structure retained the Central Break Squad and established Volume of Crime Squads in each of the Canterbury metropolitan areas. The squad in Southern comprised a sergeant plus four constables on a six-month rotation. However, the sergeant position was not filled

until mid-2004. The focus of the Volume of Crime Squad was to be proactive on burglary, theft ex car, and car theft.

Proactive work included:

- mounting surveillance for active targets
- following up identifications
- conducting search warrants
- directing patrols to targeted locations.

The Volume of Crime Squad did not cover commercial burglaries.

By the end of 2004, the Volume of Crime Squad was said to be getting burdened by the number of investigation files they had and their proactive work was diminishing. In response the Area Commander directed them to be more strategic and if there were no leads on a file, to leave it and move on to the more active leads. This was reducing the backlog and freeing them for the proactive initiatives.

8.1.4.1   Strengths of Volume of Crime Squad

The Area respondents were convinced that the squad was utilising effective strategies to reduce dwelling burglaries. The information they were receiving from local Intel was of high quality and they were confident that they were targeting the right people at the right times and the right locations. They were working well with the patrol group to brief them on current targets and problem areas and also were able to draw on them for special operations.

The squad attended a weekly meeting at Hornby to share information with Intel and patrol staff.

8.1.4.2   Barriers to Volume of Crime Squad

The primary barriers to the effectiveness of the squad were low staff numbers and the problem of being caught up with the investigation files. The squad was often reduced to one or two due to leave, illness, court work and other demands. They were convinced that they had the correct strategy by targeting the right offenders and locations, but they did not have enough staff to implement the strategies they had. The OC was responding by closing files which hadn't been active for a month or two, to free the squad members for proactive work.

Some district respondents had the opinion that having small squads in each Area was an ineffective use of resources as they would always be too small. There needed to be at least ten in a squad to cover for leave and other special duties, and to be able to bring together enough staff to carry out search warrants and arrests. Their preference would be for a larger metropolitan squad.

Another barrier was the effort required to keep up effective communication with District Break Squad, and other Area staff based in the Sydenham station (down the road) and Hornby station, which was a twenty minute drive away.

In order to keep staff at all locations informed about their burglaries and targeting, Sydenham staff developed a daily occurrence sheet on a spreadsheet. However, because the two stations were on separate computer servers, the staff at Hornby had to go through the help desk to get access to the other server, so the effectiveness was diminished, and they only accessed it a couple of times per week.

Some staff also resented the fact they had to provide two staff members to a metropolitan Volume of Crime Squad, but felt that those two had become absorbed into HQ demands and were not serving any purpose for the Police Areas.

8.2   Intel

Before restructuring in 2003, Intel operations at Canterbury District were primarily centralised, with the main Intel unit situated at District Headquarters and each of the five suburban Police Areas assigned one Intel officer. The District Intel section also had a group of analysts, one of whom was appointed specifically to burglary.

The responsibilities of the Sydenham Intel officer involved collecting, analysing and disseminating information to Area staff. Sydenham was without an Intel officer from August 2002 until Easter 2003, and the replacement had not received Intel training and was unsupervised until the new Intel structure was established in 2004. In the new structure Intel was greatly enhanced at the Area level and reduced at District level. Southern Canterbury was provided with a Sergeant plus three analysts, supervised by the new Tactics Group Coordinator.

8.2.1   Services provided by Intel

The following types of information were disseminated to Police:

- *Profiles of suspected offenders*—collated information including personal details, suspect's vehicle, area they were last seen in, associates, MO, and photograph. This was sent to staff with a request for them to provide any up-to-date information that they had and to acquire notings on this person where possible.
- *Briefings*—prepared daily briefings in the morning and a weekly briefing to the night shift summarising what had happened over the week, and suspects for them to look for and their bail conditions, particularly curfew conditions to check over the next week.
- *Bulli-board*—posted items of interest, for example on targeted offenders.
- *Email*—group emails to Sydenham staff including copies of the weekly briefing reports.
- *Photo board*—kept up-to-date with photographs and information on suspected offenders, including First Fifteen targets.
- *Media releases*—compiled information on trends and security advice for local media.
- *Information to community constables*—provided things such as maps for Neighbourhood Support talks and community newspaper articles.
- *DPR*—compiled reports in liaison with sergeants.

Intel worked closely with the Sydenham Break Squad when it was in operation and subsequently with the Volume of Crime Squad. The Intel officer liaised with Intel officers from the other Areas through monthly meetings and had contact with central Intel on a regular basis.

8.2.2   District Intel

In the former structure District Intel maintained an overview of the District, which was important to identifying mobile burglars and overcoming issues to do with boundary policing. They worked closely with the District Break Squad preparing spreadsheets of stolen property so the squad could do NIA searches on the one computer in their section that had the necessary software. Maps were produced weekly which examined the previous seven-day period broken down into the five Police Areas; these were posted on the bulli-board. After the restructuring, these District functions were taken over by Area Intel, and the District was left with an OC, three constables and four non-sworn staff.

8.2.3   Barriers to centralised Intel

The following barriers to centralised Intel were identified.

- Under the centralised structure the Areas were unable to analyse their own crime patterns, and were reliant on District Intel and District Break Squad being able to direct any proactive activity. Their Intel officers were not well supported with Intel training and supervision. There were long periods without any Intel officers and no one to stand in for illness or leave.

- Intel would have liked more notings from Police officers about suspects to provide a greater intelligence base for their work. However, it was acknowledged that there was a lack of general staff to do more proactive work. Collecting notings was part of a patrol officer's KRAs, but the notings were entered into NIA at the District level and there were often delays.

- Intel respondents were very mindful of the problem of frontline staff being inundated with information. They wanted to give them a constant product—for example where are the burglaries happening, who is active in the Area, who has shifted into the Area—which informed proactive Police work. To help filter all this information the Sydenham Intel officer prioritised the information which was focused on several targets at a time.

- Police who were interviewed found NIA slow and frustrating and this probably prohibited frontline officers from utilising the system more.

- Intel found that NIA was not as efficient as locally developed databases to record burglary information.

  We found the NIA system for us frustrating and the fact that we had originally Excel and then Access [database], which we used very efficiently, whether it was people searching for property, doing MO trends and things like that. It was ours. We had developed it and we knew how to use it. We got a lot of use out of the data we kept. Even though it is quite labour-intensive entering the data, our benefit from it was pretty good.

- Because entering data into NIA was slower, staff constraints forced Intel to prioritise what data was entered because of staffing constraints. Burglary was considered a priority

and a data entry operator worked nearly full-time doing this. However, they had to stop entering property taken from theft ex cars due to time constraints.

- Respondents were critical of the lack of training regarding the new systems such as NIA, Business Objects and MAPS.

8.2.4 Strengths of centralised Intel

Due to the characteristics of Christchurch it made some sense to have a district-wide if not metropolitan Intel base. With the District Break Squad and District YCU it was important to have an Intel unit with a high capacity to serve these units.

8.2.5 Area Intel

In the new structure, strengthened Area Intel was greatly appreciated by respondents in the Area. It meant that the Area Commander and the Tactical Coordinator could bring together the information on local crime patterns and direct staff accordingly. Southern Area Intel ran weekly tactical meetings which were attended by the District Break Squad, Volume of Crime Squad and Tactical Coordinator. They shared information on targets for offenders and locations and looked at the current crime trends.

8.3 Burglary clearances

8.3.1 Description

Police developed National, District and Area targets for the 'clearance' of reported burglaries. A clearance involved identifying the offender responsible for a particular offence, but did not necessarily mean that the offender was prosecuted or convicted of that offence. This was translated into a resolution rate.

There are two main points at which clearances can be conducted.

1. *Initial interview*—during the interview with the suspect the Police may question them on other burglaries they have committed. This can also include taking them for a drive so that they can point out other houses that they have burgled. An important skill is being able to engage suspects so they will talk about their offending.

2. *Custody clearance*—while an offender was serving their prison term the Police might interview them about other burglary offences they had committed. Police gave the offender an opportunity to come out of prison with a clean slate, as they would not be charged with the additional offences. The advantage was that Police then knew conclusively who committed the burglary and could close that file. The victim was notified that the person who did their burglary had been identified.

8.3.2   What did clearances achieve?

Sydenham Break Squad achieved some impressive results through clearances both at the initial interview stage and at prison visits. When the squad was operating, they had time to analyse files and ascertain if it was likely that the same person committed the offences. This gave them valuable information with which to conduct their interviews.

> *It is hugely important while you are interviewing an offender to make out, and to not tell him anything until you want to throw something in to create a reaction within him. Once he starts tripping over himself several times and has to back down, you eventually get him there…*

With custody clearances victims would be notified that their burglary had been resolved and that the offender was serving a prison term for other offences. Police interviewed had various perspectives on victim satisfaction with this process. One respondent maintained that the majority of victims were not worried that the offender would not be charged for their offence; they were happy that the burglary had been solved and the person was in jail.

However, another perspective was that this was not providing complainants with very good 'customer satisfaction' as the offender would not be serving any extra time for their offence. One respondent spoke of the injustice of having a clearance for a burglary with $10,000 worth of property stolen. The question was asked whether offenders were getting an appropriate length of sentence for the offences they had committed. This view prompted a respondent to comment on their preference for more skilled interviewing when the person was apprehended.

> *I would rather the Police actually got back to basics and sit down and interview people at the outset, and try to establish as much offending as possible. That is something that we have gone away from, is interviewing itself as a strategy that could be adopted quite easily for targeting offenders.*

Another factor that was noted was that because these cases were historic, it was less likely that any property would be returned.

8.4   The Southern Communications Centre

8.4.1   Description

Comms serviced the whole of the South Island. It was therefore a major interface between the public and the frontline staff in Sydenham. The overall aim driving Comms was ensuring incidents were attended in as timely a manner as possible. The role of Comms was crucial to the burglary strategy in terms of:

- the timeliness of responding to reports from the public of burglars on the premises
- the timeliness of responding to reports of suspicious activity
- the timeliness of responding to reports of historical burglaries
- the quality of initial information taken and advice given to the public until the Police arrived.

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Comms operated 24 hours a day and was at all times managed by a shift manager, who essentially had the command control of any incident until this was assumed by staff in the local area. Most calls relating to burglary came in on general calls for service and were historic. Emergency 111 calls were usually only received when a burglar was on the premises or had been disturbed. The call taker logged in to the initial call, established the address and location, and established the priority of the call. For burglary, the call taker established:

- where and when (if possible)
- mode of entry
- what was taken[17]
- damage done
- mode of exit
- when Police could attend.

Details were typed in to the Computer Assisted Resource Deployment (CARD) database and identified with an event number.

The dispatcher read the details of the incident live on screen via CARD and usually went with the prioritisation that the call taker had given the event; however, they might ask the call taker questions (verbally or electronically) to ask the caller to further establish priority.   The dispatcher was looking for anything that they had to deal with urgently, such as:

- injury
- offenders decamping
- violence
- vehicle seen
- any suspicious behaviour that would indicate the offender was on or near the scene.

If the call was priority one or burglars on, meaning it required immediate response because the burglar was still on the premises or had just left, the call taker sent data to the dispatcher for that Area while keeping the caller on the line to collect more details. The call taker gathered enough information to prepare the patrol unit for responding to the incident. Dispatchers were required to dispatch units to priority one calls within two minutes of the incident being entered and receiving it on their screen. They had a national target of dispatching 80% of priority one calls within one minute and 100% within two minutes.

In a priority one incident, the dispatcher oversaw the establishing of a cordon around the area and called a Police dog handler and a search was conducted. Units were required to respond to a priority one within 10 minutes. There were no Police Area boundaries observed when it came to priority one events.

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[17]   This was particularly in regards to firearms, which could potentially change the priority of the call. A respondent stated that decision-making was not based on the value of goods but on the potential impact to society in regards to future offending.

The more common historic burglaries were given priority two. For historic burglaries the call taker gave information to the caller in regards to protecting the scene, making a list of property stolen, and the time Police would attend. Comms aimed to attend priority two burglaries as soon as possible and usually within one to five hours at the maximum. If the Police were unable to attend during that shift, for instance on a Friday or Saturday night, they advised complainants to secure the property and go to bed, and Police would be there in the morning.

The timing for dispatching a priority two was a real balancing act for the dispatcher. Other variables that influenced the dispatcher on how soon they sent units were:

- availability of units
- if firearms had been taken
- whether there was evidence
- the stress of the caller
- whether the property could be secured
- what time of the day or night it was.

A dispatcher stated:

> *My constant workload is between calls for service and matching that to available resources. This is where my stress and pressure is. That is where my strain is, that task. That is the equation I am constantly juggling. It seems to me that Christchurch never has the resources to match the workload. Now Sydenham is certainly not the worst of those [Police Areas]. But if my three Central I-cars are tied up with a stabbing and a domestic comes in then I will get Sydenham to attend. So that means that Sydenham don't attend their burglaries.*

The dispatcher monitored the location of each unit within the Area. Each unit logged on and off with their dispatcher via the radiotelephone and informed the dispatcher of their location. For historic burglaries the dispatcher usually looked for a single-person car, which was normally a Q-car. Sydenham often put a single-person patrol out during the day shift and for the purposes of Comms this was called a Q-car. (See Section 8.5, Burglary attendance). This was identified as better than putting two people in a patrol car during the day as some of the other Areas did, as it allowed for burglaries to be attended more quickly.

The call remained active until the event was dealt with (for burglary, the site had been visited) and subsequently removed from the screen by general duties officers; the dispatcher monitored the response from Police units and would phone an informant to give feedback on the outcome of their call.

A dispatcher also administered the manual SOCO appointment book. SOCO checked this book every morning and checked in with the channel 2[18] operator during the day to see if there were any appointment changes. If appointments had to be changed Comms would ring complainants to let them know. Police who were interviewed found this manual appointment

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[18]   Channel 2 was the query channel operated by Comms.

system efficient and customer-focused, although some circumstances meant that it was difficult to keep to exact times.

Comms provided an important link to Victim Support, which could be notified by pager 24 hours a day. A dispatcher said that the decision to notify Victim Support was primarily made by the frontline officers attending, unless the person had already requested to see a volunteer or they made a judgement to notify them anyway (see Section 5.3, Victim Support).

8.4.2 What does the Communications Centre achieve?

Comms aimed to dispatch Police as quickly as possible, particularly in relation to priority one calls, in order to protect the public and apprehend offenders. They also provided information to the caller regarding attendance, scene protection, and Victim Support.

A respondent reported that the technology and processes had improved, including a larger proportion of dedicated staff (95%) who had made working at Comms their career. They thought there was more of a customer focus in the way Comms staff dealt with callers and kept them informed, such as ringing them back if the Police were delayed. It was noted that there had not been a complaint to Comms regarding burglary for two years.

8.4.3 Barriers to Communications

Respondents identified a number of barriers to Comms effectively handling burglary calls.

- It was noted over the year that the workload of Comms had increased significantly but the staff numbers were down and sick leave had increased. This caused concern as this job was extremely high-pressure and stressful. A respondent was critical of the lack of resources going into adequately staffing Comms.

  We have got this bizarre situation where the Police are spending money on technology that is generating information, but not on people who know how to use the information or know where to get it or know how to access it.

- The shortage of Police units hampered Comms' ability to efficiently dispatch patrols to attend burglaries. Burglaries were low priority compared to many other incidents and might not get attended during a shift because of the lack of patrol units available. This was particularly noticeable at peak times such as Friday and Saturday nights. A further example of the strain on resources was that the Police Courts section did not work on Saturday morning, therefore staff from Central Police Area had to work at Court. This could have a flow-on effect to Sydenham Police, who were called on to do priority work in the other Police Areas.

- A frustrating aspect for Comms was they had to double-handle burglaries that were not attended, and ring back the complainant to notify them when the Police would be able to attend.

- It was noted that when there were delays with Police attendance, people were more likely to contaminate the scene. This had important consequences for the collection of evidence by SOCO. Comms did inform people about protecting the scene but it was pointed out that you could not give someone a lecture on forensics and fingerprinting

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over the phone in 160 seconds. This is the time allotted for each call for a call taker's performance assessment.

- In regards to notifying Victim Support, as stated this was usually on the advice of the attending officer unless the caller was very distressed. If Police were delayed this delayed notification of Victim Support.

- Comms' radio system was reported to be scanned by all sorts of people, including an estimated 95% of the criminals in Christchurch. Consequently Comms had to be careful about the information they conveyed over the radiotelephone.

- Emergency 111 abuse could waste valuable resources and it was suggested there could be some form of public education to minimise this.

- Police were frustrated that Comms staff only took one phone number to contact victims, and this slowed down their ability to contact then to make appointments to attend.

8.4.4   Suggested improvements

The following things Comms could do to improve their handling of burglary calls were suggested.

- A refining of the priority two category was proposed that would involve introducing a P3 category. The priority two code would apply to an instance when Police had to attend immediately but it was not an emergency.
- A respondent recommended regular training related to Comms work, particularly to familiarise staff with systems that were not frequently used.

8.5   Burglary attendance

8.5.1   Description

As stated above most residential burglaries were 'historic' and dispatched as a priority two. The standard response for Sydenham was to ensure that households that had reported historic burglaries were visited as soon as possible within 24 hours.

Sydenham did have a Q-car in 2001 when their Break Squad was fully operational. However, staff reallocation to STU meant they no longer had the capacity to operate a separate Q-car. During 2002 I-car patrols followed up on burglary reports. The early shifts, particularly during the week, spent a considerable amount of their time[19] attending burglaries and completing reports. The following highlights elements of the attending officer's best practice.

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[19]   An NCO estimated this could be 30–35% of the patrol staff's time.

A comprehensive Burglary Offence Report (POL 23) was used to record the initial information required. This included:

- a cover sheet with essential information, such as:
  – details of the household and householders
  – whether there were any injuries
  – referral to Victim Support
  – previous victimisation
  – whether the offender was known
- a Property Taken sheet to record:
  – quantity
  – value
  – serial numbers
  – description
- a checklist, diagram, and description of information about the scene of the burglary
- a checklist and description of the entry
- a checklist and description of the interior and exit
- a form and checklist for suspects and area enquiries.

The officer would give the complainant a Complaint Acknowledgement Form, which could be used as verification for their insurance company. The form also contained information on Police action, court process, crime prevention and support groups including Victim Support and where to obtain a copy of the crime prevention booklet Practical Crime Prevention. The officer would explain each of these items and give some brief security advice.

There was a thorough and consistent process that should be followed in the burglary initial investigation, including:

- beginning with a brief scene examination of what was taken where, entry points, and signs of movement within the property; this obtained information to draw on during the subsequent interview
- interviewing the victim and any other members of the household using the Burglary Offence Report
- conducting a further, more detailed scene examination
- contacting Comms to make a SOCO appointment
- conducting area enquires to ascertain if there were any witnesses or if anyone noted suspicious vehicles or behaviour—this involved visiting neighbours and if they were not home leaving a leaflet in their letter box informing them that their neighbour had been burgled and if they had information to contact the Police or the complainant.

The OR would be given to the officer in charge to check that it was filled in correctly. The OR had three copies: one for Intel, a file copy and a local copy. If any suspects were

nominated or any urgent follow-up was required then the file copy was passed directly on to the Detective Senior for action. One copy of the OR was passed on to Intel for entering into NIA. If there were no immediate lines of inquiry then the file copy would be sent to the District Break Squad for follow-up. It should also be noted that all commercial burglaries went to District Break Squad.

During the whole research period, Police were unhappy with the time it sometimes took to attend burglaries. Often it was within 24 hours, but by the end of 2004 it was said to be getting worse and many respondents were concerned about it. The reasons provided for the delay were:

- in the Sydenham structure, there was often only one I-car on doing the late shift, which was usually when people arrived home and saw they had been burgled; by then Police were busy responding to high-priority calls
- when the early shift arrived the next morning, victims were often away from home and not available for the Police.

Under the new structure community constables were attending burglaries as well as the patrol staff. However, they were still being called away for other duties. The patrol staff was slightly reduced due to staff being taken for Volume of Crime squad.

8.6   Introduction of the burglary desk

Southern Area was designing a new system at the end of 2004, in which the staff formerly provided to Comms would be instead put to manage a burglary desk based on the model from North Shore/Waitakere. Comms would take burglary calls and ascertain whether the incident was high priority (i.e. offenders still on the premises) and whether the victim was upset. For historic burglaries, the Comms staff would put the details through to the burglary desk, where the burglary would be taken up by the staff on first thing in the morning. The Offence report would be taken over the telephone and an appointment made with SOCO, who would then attend every burglary, collect extra evidence and note if there were sightings to follow up. From further conversations Christchurch Southern did implement this structure and attendance rates had improved dramatically. Patrol staff reported that they had an extra two hours per day to carry out more proactive duties.

9 Police structures relating to crime reduction

This section outlines some of the Police services that facilitate crime reduction through crime prevention methods and working with offenders.

9.1 Youth Aid and Youth Education services

Two Youth Aid officers and two Youth Education officers were based at the Sydenham station. They were supervised locally, but the OC Youth Aid Coordinator/Prosecutor and the Youth Education Sergeant based at the District headquarters provided coordination for these services. The District YCU is discussed in Section 4.3, Offender-focused initiatives. After restructuring, the Hornby and Sydenham Youth Aid, Youth Education and community constables were all situated together at Sydenham station.

The Youth Aid officers had a number of responsibilities to do with youth offending, including:

- dealing with non-arrest matters, primarily through diversion (estimated 95% of those who have contact with Youth Aid, do not go on to commit other offences)
- dealing with arrest matters which included representing Police at FGCs; at times they would be involved with monitoring the FGC plan for a young person
- looking at reasons for offending and if necessary referring a young person to Child Youth and Family Care and Protection Service
- targeting local youth offenders
- making referrals to the District YCU, which targeted the top 30 youth offenders
- obtaining voluntary fingerprints from youth offenders
- liaising with schools—for example, taking referrals from principals of young people who were causing problems
- referring young offenders and at-risk young people to programmes
- responding to parents' requests for help with their teenagers
- visiting at-risk families.

The Sydenham Youth Aid officers were on the following community organisations' committees, which they regarded as a proactive strategy to help prevent offending:

- Hoonhay Youth Centre committee
- Truancy committee

- Care and Protection Resource Panel—this panel examined all the care and protection issues and surrounding statutory requirements.

YES officers visited schools and ran various educational programmes based on the service's four main themes:

- crime prevention and social responsibility—this included programmes on stealing and keeping property safe
- drug abuse resistance education
- school road safety education
- violence prevention.

Youth Aid and YES thought that addressing truancy was very important, as was early intervention to prevent offending from escalating.

9.2   Community constables

In 2002, the Sydenham Police Area's two community constables covered an area that, prior to 2002, was policed by three community constables. There had been an ongoing vacancy for the third community constable position which was finally filled in July 2003.

The community constables worked in partnership with various community organisations and took a role in crime prevention through public education. They were also active in working with some of the at-risk youth. The following are some of the activities they were involved in:

- Neighbourhood Support—facilitated the set-up and maintenance of groups
- Christchurch South Community Watch—coordinated the voluntary community watch group, which participated in directed patrolling activities
- community newspapers—wrote articles providing crime prevention advice and informing the public about where the burglaries were occurring
- talked to community groups about crime prevention
- worked with youth—visited lower decile schools, mentored young recidivist offenders and participated in activities with youth organisations.

The community constables liaised with the Christchurch City Council on projects such as the mobile surveillance camera, which the Council funded. The camera had been used by community constables to monitor trouble spots. The Council had a tagging hotline where people could report incidents of tagging so that it could be painted over. The constables often referred people to this service.

The community constables' roles were being reviewed late in 2004, in order to free them to undertake more proactive tasks in their area.

9.3   Liaison officers

The Canterbury District Business Plan stated:

The Canterbury Police acknowledges Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu as the tangata whenua and is committed to developing ongoing relationships with them. Relationships have also been developed with Te Runanga o Nga Maata Waka (a Confederation of Tribes from the North Island who are now domiciled here), the Pacific community and the Asian community.

The Canterbury District employed two Iwi Liaison officers, a Pacific Liaison officer, and an Asian Liaison officer whose roles are discussed below. The Liaison officers reported to the Policing Development Manager, whose job focused on community relations and partnerships.

9.3.1   Iwi Liaison officers

The District had a 'responsiveness to Maori' plan that came out of the Police's national 'responsiveness to Maori' plan. The primary role of the Iwi Liaison officers was to liaise between the Maori community and the Police. The Iwi Liaison officer who was interviewed saw their role as facilitating understanding between Police and Maori through education and development of community networks. An example of how this could be implemented was the development of Maori advisory groups for each of the Area Controllers in the District. In August 2002, a central advisory group had been established and consultation was still in process over the form and function of the Area Maori advisory groups.

Some of the other activities the Iwi Liaison officers were involved in were youth education and the development of a Maori diversion scheme. They liaised with different sections of the Maori community and also met with Maori representatives from different government organisations on a monthly basis.

9.3.2   Pacific Liaison officer

The Pacific Liaison officer position was established in 2002. Part of his role was to support Police in their work with Pacific peoples. To facilitate this he had consulted with different Police sections that worked with Pacific peoples with a view to developing a training package on best practice with working with Pacific peoples.

The Pacific Liaison officer had links with various agencies, including:

- Ministry of Education
- Ministry of Social Development
- University of Canterbury
- the College of Education.

The Liaison officer also facilitated awareness among Police of activities that other agencies involved in the Justice sector, such as Child Youth and Family, Corrections and Department for Courts, were undertaking.

In 2003 the Police developed a partnership with Niu Trust to form the Pan-Pacific Youth Programme. This programme received funding from Council and the Crime Prevention Unit to employ case workers for Pacific Islands young people. The youth workers took on a caseload of between four and six young Pacific offenders each. The main area they were focusing on was violent offending, burglary and property offences. They were employment- and education-focused and also worked with younger siblings of offenders.

The Pacific Liaison officer liaised with various Pacific community groups, including:

- Pacific Trust Canterbury, who were the largest service provider, addressing everything from family violence to health

- Pacific Island Evaluation, who had an alcohol and drug focus

- Pacific Executive Trust, who were responsible for employment and social issues; the Pacific Liaison officer identified the close relationship between unemployment and crime and the importance of getting people motivated and into employment.

9.3.2.1   Pacific Youth initiatives

The following youth initiatives were designed with crime prevention in mind.

- The Canterbury Tongan community had established a Saturday night youth group. The activities involved sport and workshops and were designed to keep youth who might be more susceptible to crime off the streets. The group was funded by the Canterbury Pacific Safer Community Council, which was set up by the Crime Prevention Unit at the Ministry of Justice.

- Youth for Justice was a proactive strategy that involved taking Maori and Pacific senior secondary school youth on a careers day. They started with a visit to the Police station, then went to Courts, Kingslea (a CYF residential facility) and Christchurch Prison.

The Canterbury Pacific Safer Communities Guide was jointly produced by the Canterbury Pacific Safer Community Council and the Police. The guide was translated into Samoan, Tongan and Cook Island Maori, and includes a significant focus on crime prevention initiatives to prevent burglary.

9.3.3 Asian Liaison officer

This position was established by the District in September 2004, in order to establish communication with the newly emerging Asian communities. Christchurch had an older, well-established Asian community, but in the past few years there had been a great increase of language schools, which attract Asian students, and a burgeoning tourist market from Asian countries. The Asian Liaison officer had identified that there were pockets of victimisation amongst students and was attempting to narrow these down in order to better educate Asian students about burglary. He believed that there was a perception that New Zealand was a safe place and people were not protecting their valuables adequately. He had published articles amongst the Asian language papers, spoken to community groups and worked with

Police to target offenders who were preying on Asian students. Another strength identified by Police was the recruitment of Asian volunteers to the community constable's kiosk in the city centre and in Fendalton. It was hoped that others would follow this initiative.

He was also planning to utilise Intel to get more information on any patterns of victimisation amongst Asian communities—for example, to look into the specific ethnicity of the victims and see which schools or classes they were attending in order to uncover patterns of offending. Some work might be needed to encourage attending officers to ask more questions of the victims in order to get sufficient information to see trends.

Another initiative was to work with frontline Police to facilitate their understanding of working within various Asian communities, and increase their awareness of services available, such as the free interpreter's service.

9.4   Community organisations

This section outlines a few organisations that work with at-risk youth, which could be regarded as having an impact on reducing burglary through a crime prevention approach.

9.4.1   Truancy services

Many respondents identified the link between truancy and youth offending, including burglary. The South Christchurch District Truancy Service provided two truancy officers who covered an area[20] that included much of the Sydenham Police Area. They were contracted by schools and funded by the Ministry of Education and local community organisations. In the South Christchurch Area five secondary schools and their contributing primary schools totalled approximately 100 schools. Thirty schools were using the truancy officers' services.

9.4.2   Hoonhay Youth Centre

The Hoonhay Youth Centre is situated in one of the more socially deprived areas of Sydenham and at the time of the research provided several services for young people.

- It had a youth worker who worked with a group of at-risk young males (predominantly Maori). He conducted a number of activities with them 'to keep their interest', including traditional Maori activities like eeling and fishing. He mentored the young men and worked with their families. The youth worker also supported their course attendance through providing transport and monitored their progress by liaising with the tutors, and he supervised those doing correspondence school at the centre.
- It had a leadership programme for older youth to encourage confidence skills.
- It had a youth drop-in centre.
- It had a homework club.

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[20]   The South Christchurch District Truancy Service covered a large area from Linwood North School through to Sumner, Lyttelton Basin, Little River, Southbridge, Dunsandel, Hornby, Riccarton and Central City.

- Representatives from various agencies such as social workers and Inland Revenue staff were available on fixed days to provide advice.

The Hoonhay Youth Centre liaised with the Sydenham Youth Aid officers, who were on the Centre's committee, and the area community constable. These Police officers were reportedly doing a wonderful job in the way they were dealing with the young people. A few respondents reported that this was in contrast to some previous Police experiences young people and their families had had where they felt harassed by the Police.

One of the issues facing the Centre's work with at-risk youth was the stereotyping of Maori and Pacific youth, which led to difficulties in finding placements on courses. Finding funding, particularly for older youths, was reported to also be very difficult.

10   Crime statistics

10.1   Introduction

Crime data analysis is a component of the three-year evaluation examining the effectiveness of Police practice in relation to dwelling burglary. This is intended to supplement other information sources within each case study Police Area, such as interviews with key respondents, household surveys, victim interviews and offender interviews.

The main focus of the crime data analysis is to examine the incidence and resolution of dwelling burglary to assist the evaluation's assessment of the effectiveness of the dwelling burglary initiatives. Dwelling burglary, however, is not a crime that occurs in isolation. Dwelling burglary offenders are also often convicted for non-dwelling burglaries and other dishonesty or property crimes. The report therefore also examines other offences to provide a general crime profile for the Police Area and establish whether dwelling burglary initiatives may have resulted in a reduction or increase in other crimes in the Area (crime type diffusion or displacement, respectively)[21]. The recorded rates of crime in the Police Area are compared to those for New Zealand overall to establish whether any trends or changes within the Police Area were more likely due to Area initiatives or national trends.

This section begins with an examination of the composition of crime, followed by an examination of recorded crime for:

- total crime
- offence categories (the seven main categories of crime)
- dishonesty offences
- burglary
- dwelling burglary.

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[21]   The crime data analysis was to include an examination of dwelling burglary locations within each Police Area to assess whether location-focused dwelling burglary initiatives may have resulted in a reduction or increase in dwelling burglary in other locations within the Police Area (spatial diffusion or displacement, respectively). The New Zealand Police map-based policing system (MAPS) can produce maps indicating the locations of recorded crime data, reading this data from either the CARD system or the NIA system. Particular scene types (e.g, dwelling) from crime data in CARD currently, however, cannot be indicated by MAPS, whereas scene type with NIA crime data can. Unfortunately, while the Manurewa, Rotorua, Lower Hutt and Sydenham Police Areas entered large proportions of their recorded dwelling burglaries for 2002 into NIA, only small proportions of these had a geographical coordinate assigned to their NIA record. The MAPS system, however, requires the geographical coordinates in order to map the crime incidents to their locations. Furthermore, although MAPS graphically indicates the location of incidents within suburb and even mesh block boundaries, it cannot currently extract the dataset grouped by either suburb or mesh block. Therefore, it was not possible to do this analysis.

The analysis of recorded dwelling burglary offences includes a five-year historical review and an examination of monthly trends from 2000 to 2004.

Offence clearances involve the identification of the alleged offender/s responsible for a particular offence, but do not necessarily mean they are prosecuted or convicted of that offence (for example, they may be warned, cautioned, or referred to Police Youth Aid). Following the examination of recorded crime is an examination of the recorded clearances for:

- total crime
- offence categories (the seven main categories of crime)
- dishonesty offences
- burglary
- dwelling burglary.

This section concludes by examining trends in prosecutions, convictions and sentences for burglary, both nationally and within the court district which is closest to the Police Area. The data for this section was obtained from the Case Monitoring System through the Justice Data Warehouse.

10.1.1   Data from New Zealand Police used in this report

Official Police recorded crime statistics and clearances data in this report were obtained from the justice sector Law Enforcement System via the Incoff Offence Calendar Detail universe of the New Zealand Police Business Objects database.

Official Police recorded crime statistics record the scene type of the location where the offence occurred, enabling the examination of official Police recorded dwelling burglary data. As the non-dwelling scene types include the 'not applicable', 'null scene code', 'unknown' and 'other scene' codes, an undercount of dwelling burglaries is possible. For New Zealand overall, the 'not applicable', 'null scene' and 'other' scene codes accounted for 7.3%, 8.2%, and 6.9% of all burglaries in 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively.

Population data was used to calculate the rates of recorded crime in this report. Statistics New Zealand calculated the estimated resident populations for each Police station, based on the Police station boundaries as at the 2001 census. New Zealand Police then derived the estimated resident populations for each Police Area by summing data from the stations within each Police Area. The population data are the estimated population figures as at 30 June (mid-point) each year.[22]

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[22]   The estimated resident population for a given area as at 30 June is based on the 1996 census usually resident population counts for the years 1996–2000 and the 2001 census usually resident population counts for the years 2001–2004, updated for:
- residents missed or counted more than once by the census (net census undercount)
- residents temporarily overseas on census night
- births, deaths and net migration between census night and the date of estimate
- reconciliation with demographic estimates for ages 0–9 years.
Visitors from outside the given area are excluded.

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10.1.2 Interpreting Police recorded crime data used in this report

The crime data presented in this report is Police recorded data and not actual crime data. An incident that was reported to Police, or became known to Police by detection, and where Police believe an offence occurred is counted as a recorded offence. Changes in Police recorded crime can therefore be due not only to changes in the actual incidence of crime, but also changes in:

- the proportion of offences reported to Police
- Police recording practices
- Police practices in identifying unreported crime.

While the New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims 2001[23] identified household burglary as one of the highest reported crimes to Police, an estimated 32% of New Zealand's household burglaries in 2000 were not reported. Similarly, the surveys of burglary victimisation conducted as part of the current research[24] conducted for this evaluation estimated 30% of household burglaries in Manurewa during 2001 and 2003 were not reported to Police.

It is imperative that crime data and analyses presented in this report are interpreted in terms of volumes of Police work, rather than accurate reflections of the true incidence of crime.

In order to conduct comparisons between the Police Area and New Zealand overall, as well as between the four Police Areas in the final report, all the crime data in the reports is presented as rates per 10,000 population, rather than absolute volumes. As an example, in 2002, New Zealand had a total of 60,404 Police-recorded dwelling burglaries, and an estimated resident population of 3,939,000. This translates to a rate of 153.4 recorded dwelling burglaries per 10,000 population, meaning that on average, for every 10,000 residents in New Zealand, 153.4 burglaries were recorded during 2002. This does not necessarily mean, however, that 153 or 154 people out of every 10,000 residents experienced a dwelling burglary during 2002, as some people experienced repeat burglaries.

Several Police key respondents interviewed in the evaluation reported that dwelling burglary victimises whole households, not just individuals. The New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims 2001 also regards dwelling burglary as a crime against households. To reflect dwelling burglary in terms of households, but also enable comparison of dwelling burglary to other (not household-specific) crimes, recorded dwelling burglary data in the reports is presented both as rates per 10,000 population, and rates per 100 households. Using the earlier example, in 2002, New Zealand had a total of 60,404 Police recorded burglaries, and an estimated 1,359,843 occupied dwellings[25]. This translates to a rate of 44.4 recorded dwelling

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[23] Morris, A. and Reilly, J., *New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims 2001*, Ministry of Justice, 2003.

[24] Triggs, S., *Surveys of household burglary Part One (2002): Four Police Areas and national data compared*, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
Triggs, S., *Surveys of household burglary Part Two: Four Police Areas compared between 2002 and 2004*, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

[25] Statistics New Zealand provided New Zealand Police the number of occupied dwellings in each Police station area as at the 2001 census; however, they were not asked to provide the estimated number of occupied dwellings for the years 1996–2002, as they had done for the usually resident population. Therefore

burglaries per 1,000 households in 2002 for New Zealand, meaning that for every 1,000 households in New Zealand, 44.4 dwelling burglaries were recorded during 2002. Note as previously, this does not necessarily mean that 44 or 45 out of every 1,000 households experienced a burglary during 2002, as some households experienced repeat burglaries.

10.2 Trends in Police recorded crime

10.2.1 Total crime

Figure 10.1 shows the total crime per 10,000 population for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand. From 1997 to 2004[26], Sydenham had a lower crime rate than New Zealand for the same period.

Figure 10.1: **Total crime per 10,000 population for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand**

Overall, the total crime rate decreased in Sydenham by 28.7% from 1997 to 2004, whereas the national total crime rate decreased by 20.1% for the same period.

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rates of recorded dwelling burglaries per 100 households have only been calculated for the years 2000–2004, with the 2001 census night number of estimated occupied dwellings used for each of these years.

[26] The Sydenham Police Area was incorporated into the Canterbury Southern Police Area in January 2004. The statistics for 2004 have been obtained for the area which was formerly Sydenham, incorporating the Akaroa, Lyttelton and Sydenham Police stations. Hence, the analysis for the 2004 data does represent the former Sydenham Police Area. The data from 1997 to 2003 represents the Sydenham Police Area before the boundary changes took place. The data was extracted from the Police Data Warehouse and was sourced from the Incident and Offences Subsystem of the Law Enforcement System.

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Figure 10.2 shows dishonesty offences and total crime per 10,000 population for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand. Dishonesty offences and crime rates were both lower in Sydenham than in New Zealand from 2000 to 2004.

Figure 10.2:   Dishonesty offences and total crime per 10,000 population for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand

In Sydenham, there was an overall 3.4% decrease in dishonesty offence rates from 2000 to 2004, compared to an overall decrease of 14.0% in the national dishonesty offence rates from 2000 to 2004. Total crime decreased in Sydenham by 5.1% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 9.7% decrease in the national total crime rate per 10,000 population.

Table 10.1 provides the recorded crime rates per 10,000 population for the remaining offence categories for Sydenham and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.3 represents the data graphically.

10.2.1.1   *Recorded violence offences*

The rate of recorded violence offences for Sydenham was lower than the rate for New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. It increased by 4.2% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national increase of 3.3% for the same period.

Table 10.1:   Offence categories (excluding dishonesty) crime rates per 10,000 population for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand

	Rate per 10,000 population									
	Sydenham					New Zealand				
Offence category	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Violence	70.8	69.3	63.8	54.7	73.8	107.8	113.4	114.1	113.8	111.4
Sexual offences	5.1	6	5.8	5.5	6.7	8.6	8.0	8.9	8.1	7.6
Drugs and antisocial offences	51.6	54.7	57.2	46.9	50.5	138.3	141.8	140.6	146.7	134.1
Property damage	129.5	124.7	115.1	104.0	99.1	105.0	105.0	103.7	108.9	101.8
Property abuses	31	31.6	29.9	31.5	30.0	54.7	55.0	55.8	52.2	48.4
Administrative	7.9	7.6	8.9	6.4	10.8	32.8	34.1	36.9	37.2	29.6

Figure 10.3:   Offence categories (excluding dishonesty) crime rates per 10,000 population for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand

Sydenham   New Zealand

10.2.1.2   Recorded sexual offences

The rate of recorded sexual offences for Sydenham was lower than the rate for New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. It increased by 31.4% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 11.6% from 2000 to 2004.

10.2.1.3   Recorded drugs and antisocial offences

The rate of recorded drug and antisocial offences for Sydenham was lower than the rate for New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. It decreased by 2.1% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 3.0% from 2000 to 2004.

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10.2.1.4 *Recorded property damage offences*

The rate of recorded property damage offences in Sydenham was higher than the rate for New Zealand from 2000 to 2002 and lower from 2003 to 2004. There was a 23.5% decrease in Sydenham's rates from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 3.0% for the same period.

10.2.1.5 *Recorded property abuse offences*

Sydenham's rate of recorded property abuses was lower than the rate for New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. It decreased by 3.2% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 11.5% for the same period.

### *10.2.1.6* *Recorded administrative offences*

Sydenham's rate of recorded administrative offences was lower than the rate for New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. It increased by 36.7% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 9.8% for the same period.

10.2.2 Dishonesty offences

Table 10.2 provides the recorded crime rates per 10,000 population for particular dishonesty offences for Sydenham and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.4 represents the data graphically.

Table 10.2:   Dishonesty offences per 10,000 population for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand

Selected dishonesty offences	Rate per 10,000 population									
	Sydenham					New Zealand				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Burglary	184.3	138.0	127.9	139.4	161.2	172.4	155.5	153.3	153.7	142.0
Unlawful taking/ conversion m/vs	54.3	55.4	53.5	56.9	57.2	57.0	52.1	56.2	54.2	47.9
Remaining car conversion	44.9	35.9	41.3	47.7	36.6	41.0	40.3	42.4	43.2	34.7
Theft ex car	129.5	137.7	148.0	165.0	150.5	121.8	127.8	136.2	132.8	114.9
Theft ex dwelling (no drugs)	15.9	20.6	27.7	16.7	9.9	20.3	20.6	21.2	18.8	14.4
Remaining theft	117.0	115.2	117.3	121.4	111.5	186.9	187.6	186.6	182.7	167.7
Receiving/possessing stolen goods	4.6	3.5	3.0	4.4	3.5	7.1	6.3	6.0	6.2	5.7
Remaining dishonesty offences	15.1	19.2	20.8	23.1	16.1	53.9	51.4	55.5	44.9	39.6

Figure 10.4: **Recorded dishonesty offences per 10,000 population for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand**

10.2.2.1   Recorded burglary offences

Sydenham's rate of recorded burglary offences accounted for 27.3% of Sydenham's total recorded dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004, whereas nationally, burglary accounted for 24.6% of total recorded dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004.

The burglary rate per 10,000 population in Sydenham decreased by 12.5% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 17.6%.

10.2.2.2   Recorded car conversion offences

Unlawful takings/conversion of motor vehicles accounted for 10.1% of Sydenham's total recorded dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004 and 8.5% of the total recorded dishonesty offences in New Zealand for the same period. The recorded unlawful takings/conversion of motor vehicles rate per 10,000 population was higher in Sydenham than in New Zealand in 2001, 2003 and 2004. It increased by 5.3% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 15.9%.

Remaining car conversion offence rates per 10,000 population for Sydenham decreased by 18.5% from 2000 to 2004, while the national rates per 10,000 population decreased by 15.3% from 2000 to 2004.

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10.2.2.3   Recorded theft offences

Theft offences accounted for 51.0% of both Sydenham's and New Zealand's total recorded number of dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004.

Theft ex car is the offence term for the stealing of property from a car. Theft ex car accounted for 26.6% of Sydenham's and 20.0% of New Zealand's total recorded number of dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004. Theft ex car offence rates (per 10,000 population) for Sydenham increased by 16.2% from 2000 to 2004, compared to the national rates per 10,000 population, which decreased by 5.7% from 2000 to 2004.

Theft ex dwelling offences accounted for 3.3% of Sydenham's total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004. Nationally, theft ex dwelling offences accounted for 3.0% of the total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004. Theft ex dwelling offence rates per 10,000 population for Sydenham decreased by 37.7% from 2000 to 2004, compared to the national rates per 10,000 population, which decreased by 29.1% from 2000 to 2004.

Remaining theft offences[27] accounted for 21.2% of Sydenham's total recorded number of dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004. Nationally, remaining theft offences accounted for 28.8% of New Zealand's total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004. Remaining theft offence rates per 10,000 population for Sydenham decreased by 4.9% from 2000 to 2004, compared to the national rates per 10,000 population, which decreased by 10.3% from 2000 to 2004.

10.2.2.4   Recorded receiving or possessing stolen goods offences

The total recorded number of receiving or possessing stolen goods offences only accounted for a small percentage of the total recorded number of dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004 for both Sydenham and New Zealand (0.7% and 1% respectively). Sydenham's rate per 10,000 population of receiving or possessing stolen goods offences decreased by 23.9% from 2000 to 2004. New Zealand's rate per 10,000 population of receiving or possessing stolen goods offences decreased by 19.7% from 2000 to 2004.

10.2.2.5   Recorded remaining dishonesty offences

Remaining recorded dishonesty offences include receiving drugs, money laundering, financial transaction opportunities and fraud. The total recorded number of remaining dishonesty offences for Sydenham accounted for 3.4% of the total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004, and for New Zealand they accounted for 7.7% of total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004.

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[27]   Remaining theft offences included:
- theft ex drugs
- theft ex shops
- theft (pillage)
- theft ex person
- general theft
- theft as servant/misappropriation.

Remaining dishonesty offence rates per 10,000 population for Sydenham increased by 6.6%, from 2000 to 2004, compared to the national rates (per 10,000 population), which decreased by 25.7% from 2000 to 2004.

10.2.3 Burglary offences

Figure 10.5 shows the rates of recorded burglary per 10,000 population for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand from 1997 to 2004. Overall, from 1997 to 2004, the rate of burglary decreased in Sydenham by 19.1% and decreased nationally by 33.7%.

Figure 10.5:   **Recorded burglary per 10,000 population for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand**


Figure 10.6 examines recorded burglary in terms of the rates of recorded dwelling and non-dwelling burglary per 10,000 population from 1997 to 2004, for Sydenham and New Zealand.

Sydenham's dwelling burglary rates were higher than the national dwelling burglary rates from 1998 to 2001 and from 2003 to 2004. There was a 14.0% decrease in dwelling burglary in Sydenham from 1997 to 2004, whereas nationally, there was a 31.1% decrease in dwelling burglary over the same period. When a comparison is made between 2000 and 2004, dwelling burglary rates in Sydenham decreased by 20.6%, whereas nationally, they decreased by 15.4%.

Non-dwelling burglary rates were lower in Sydenham than in New Zealand from 1997 to 2004. There was a 28.3% decrease in non-dwelling burglary rates in Sydenham from 1997 to 2004, whereas nationally, there was a 37.8% decrease from 1997 to 2004. When a comparison is made between 2000 and 2004, non-dwelling burglary rates in Sydenham increased by 13.3%, whereas nationally, there was a decrease of 21.3% from 2000 to 2004.

Figure 10.6: **Dwelling and non-dwelling burglary per 10,000 population for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand**

Figure 10.7 examines the rate of dwelling burglary per 100 households for Sydenham and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. When Sydenham's recorded dwelling burglary rate is examined as a rate per 100 households, a reduction of 28.5% (versus 29.0% when measured per 10,000 population) occurred in 2001, followed by an 8.0% (versus 10.2%) decrease in 2002[28].

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[28] The decrease in Sydenham's recorded dwelling burglary experienced per households being more than per population in 2001 but less in 2002 is due to the same number of private dwellings being used for both years, whereas the population-based rate used resident population figures estimated for each year, and these experienced an increase from 2001 to 2002.

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Figure 10.7:   Rates of dwelling burglary per 100 households for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand[1]

[1]   The total number of private dwellings as at the 2001 census was used to calculate the rates per 100 households for each of the years 2000 to 2004, as estimates for the 2002, 2003 and 2004 years were not available.

10.2.4   Clearance rates—total crime

Table 10.3 compares the rate of recorded offences per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded crimes cleared for each offence category and total crime for Sydenham and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.8 presents the percentage of recorded crimes cleared data graphically.

Table 10.3   Crime rates per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded crimes cleared by offence category for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand

	Sydenham *(New Zealand)*									
	Rate per 10,000 population					Percentage cleared				
Offence category	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Violence	70.8	69.3	63.8	54.7	73.8	71.7	73.9	71.1	73.5	74.0
	(107.8)	*(113.4)*	*(114.1)*	*(113.8)*	*(111.4)*	*(76.6)*	*(77.2)*	*(77.8)*	*(79.9)*	*(80.6)*
Sexual offences		6.0	5.8	5.5	6.7	34.4	28.9	54.1	44.4	54.5
	5.1 *(8.6)*	*(8.0)*	*(8.9)*	*(8.1)*	*(7.6)*	*(53.8)*	*(52.1)*	*(57.2)*	*(56.0)*	*(55.9)*
Drugs and antisocial offences	51.6	54.7	57.2	46.9	50.5	85.5	90.7	78.7	84.7	84.9
	(138.3)	*(141.8)*	*(140.6)*	*(146.7)*	*(134.1)*	*(89.6)*	*(88.3)*	*(88.6)*	*(90.5)*	*(91.6)*
Dishonesty	565.6	525.4	539.4	574.6	546.5	16.6	16.1	16.2	14.6	17.2
	(660.4)	*(641.6)*	*(657.3)*	*(636.8)*	*(567.8)*	*(22.6)*	*(22.7)*	*(22.5)*	*(23.1)*	*(23.8)*
Property damage	129.5	124.7	115.5	104	99.1	22.5	19.8	19.4	19.9	19.5
	(105.0)	*(105.0)*	*(103.7)*	*(108.9)*	*(101.8)*	*(31.4)*	*(31.2)*	*(30.3)*	*(31.1)*	*(31.6)*
Property abuses	31.0	31.6	29.9	31.5	30.0	72.3	69.8	61.8	62.1	70.6
	(54.7)	*(55.0)*	*(55.8)*	*(52.2)*	*(48.4)*	*(68.3)*	*(67.3)*	*(69.0)*	*(72.5)*	*(73.2)*
Administrative	7.9	7.6	8.9	6.4	10.8	92.0	79.2	82.5	88.1	74.6
	(32.8)	*(34.1)*	*(36.9)*	*(37.2)*	*(29.6)*	*(85.8)*	*(84.3)*	*(86.3)*	*(88.6)*	*(91.4)*
Total crime	861.4	819.3	820.1	823.7	817.4	28.9	29.3	27.9	25.7	29.8
	(1107.6)	*(1099.0)*	*(1117.4)*	*(1103.7)*	*(1000.5)*	*(41.4)*	*(42.0)*	*(41.9)*	*(43.5)*	*(44.6)*

Figure 10.8   Percentage of recorded crimes cleared by offence category for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand

Sydenham   New Zealand

Sydenham had lower recorded rates of total crime per 10,000 population than New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Sydenham also had lower total clearance rates than New Zealand from 2000 to 2004.

10.2.4.1   Recorded clearances for violence offences

Recorded clearance rates were lower in Sydenham for violence offences compared to New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. There was a 3.2% increase in recorded clearance rates in Sydenham from 2000 to 2004. The national clearance rates gradually increased from 2000 to 2004.

10.2.4.2   Recorded clearances for sexual offences

Recorded clearance rates for sexual offences in Sydenham were lower than in New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. There was a 58.4% increase in recorded clearance rates in Sydenham from 2000 to 2004. Nationally, clearance rates increased by 3.9% between 2000 and 2004.

10.2.4.3   Recorded clearances for drugs and antisocial offences

Recorded clearance rates for drugs and antisocial offences were lower in Sydenham than in New Zealand in 2000 and from 2002 to 2004 but were higher in 2001. In Sydenham, there was a small decreasing trend in clearance rates from 2000 to 2004 of 0.7%. Nationally, there was little change in the clearance rates between 2000 and 2004.

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10.2.4.4   Recorded clearances for dishonesty offences

Recorded clearance rates for dishonesty offences were lower in Sydenham than in New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. In Sydenham, clearance rates increased slightly from 2000 to 2004, by 3.6%. Nationally, the rate of recorded clearances increased by 5.3% from 2000 to 2004.

10.2.4.5   Recorded clearances for property damage offences

Recorded clearance rates for property damage offences in Sydenham were lower than in New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. In Sydenham, clearance rates decreased from 2000 to 2004 by 13.3%. Nationally, there was very little change in the clearance rates between 2000 and 2004.

10.2.4.6   Recorded clearances for property abuse offences

Recorded clearance rates for property abuse offences in Sydenham were lower than in New Zealand from 2002 to 2004 and were higher from 2000 to 2001. In Sydenham, clearance rates decreased slightly from 2000 to 2004 by 2.3%. National property abuse clearance rates increased from 2000 to 2004.

10.2.4.7   Recorded clearances for administrative offences

Recorded clearance rates for administrative offences were lower in Sydenham than in New Zealand from 2001 to 2004 but were higher in 2000. In Sydenham, clearance rates decreased from 2000 to 2004 by 18.9%. Nationally, clearance rates increased by 6.5% between 2000 and 2004.

10.2.5 Clearance rates—dishonesty offences

Table 10.4 compares the rate of recorded offences per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded crimes cleared for particular dishonesty offences for Sydenham and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.9 presents the percentage of recorded crimes cleared data graphically.

Table 10.4: **Dishonesty offences crime rates per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded crimes cleared for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand**

	Sydenham (New Zealand)									
	Rate per 10,000 population					Percentage cleared				
Selected dishonesty offences	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Burglary	184.3	138.0	127.9	139.4	161.2	11.0	15.7	9.7	8.1	13.3
	(172.4)	(155.5)	(153.3)	(153.7)	(142.0)	(15.8)	(16.0)	(15.9)	(16.5)	(17.3)
Unlawful takings/conversion of motor vehicles	54.3	55.4	53.5	56.9	57.2	18.7	10.0	13.7	10.2	14.4
	(57.0)	(52.1)	(56.2)	(54.2)	(47.9)	(16.9)	(18.8)	(19.4)	(20.3)	(20.1)
Remaining car conversion	44.9	35.9	41.3	47.7	36.6	22.3	15.9	19.3	15.1	25.7
	(41.0)	(40.3)	(42.4)	(43.2)	(34.7)	(22.3)	(22.6)	(25.0)	(25.9)	(25.5)
Theft ex car	129.5	137.7	148.0	165.0	150.5	5.9	4.1	4.4	2.8	7.4
	(121.8)	(127.8)	(136.2)	(132.8)	(114.9)	(6.4)	(6.6)	(7.3)	(8.0)	(7.5)
Theft ex dwelling	15.9	20.6	27.7	16.7	9.9	14.0	15.4	11.3	11.9	18.5
	(20.3)	(20.6)	(21.2)	(18.8)	(14.4)	(13.8)	(13.3)	(13.0)	(13.7)	(13.4)
Remaining theft	117.0	115.2	117.3	121.4	111.2	27.7	26.0	29.3	27.7	28.3
	(186.9)	(187.6)	(186.6)	(182.7)	(167.7)	(33.1)	(32.8)	(32.0)	(32.4)	(34.4)
Remaining dishonesty offences	19.7	22.7	23.8	27.5	19.6	55.6	56.6	65.8	69.4	53.5
	(61.0)	(57.7)	(61.5)	(51.1)	(45.3)	(50.9)	(50.4)	(48.6)	(53.3)	(52.1)

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Figure 10.9:   Percentage of recorded dishonesty crimes cleared for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand

Clearance rates in Sydenham for burglary, theft ex car and remaining theft offences were lower than the national rates from 2000 to 2004. Unlawful takings/conversion of motor vehicles clearance rates were lower than the national rates from 2001 to 2004, whereas remaining car conversion clearances were lower than the national rates from 2001 to 2003, and theft ex dwelling clearances were lower than the national rates from 2002 to 2003.

10.2.5.1   Recorded clearances for burglary offences

There was a 20.9% increase in burglary clearances in Sydenham from 2000 to 2004 compared to a 9.5% increase in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

10.2.5.2   Recorded clearances for car conversion offences

There was a 23.0% decrease in clearances from 2000 to 2004, compared to an 18.9% increase in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

There was an increase in Sydenham's clearance rates for remaining car conversion offences from 2000 to 2004 of 15.2%, compared to a 14.3% increase in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

10.2.5.3   Recorded clearances for theft offences

The clearance rates for theft ex car offences in Sydenham increased by 25.4% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 17.1% increase in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

There was a 32.1% increase in Sydenham's clearance rates for theft ex dwelling from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 2.9% decrease in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

There was a 2.1% increase in Sydenham's clearance rates for remaining theft from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 3.9% increase in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

10.2.5.4   Recorded clearances for remaining dishonesty offences

There was a 3.7% decrease in clearances for remaining dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 2.3% increase in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

10.2.6 Clearance rates—burglary offences

Table 10.5 compares the rates of recorded dwelling and non-dwelling burglary per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded dwelling and non-dwelling burglary offences cleared for Sydenham and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.10 presents the data for the percentage of cleared dwelling and non-dwelling burglaries graphically.

Table 10.5:   Dwelling and non-dwelling burglary rates per 10,000 population and percentage of dwelling and non-dwelling burglary offences cleared for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand

	Sydenham									
	(New Zealand)									
	Rate per 10,000 population					Percentage cleared				
Burglary	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**
Dwelling burglary	138.4	98.2	88.2	106.0	109.9	12.2	17.1	10.6	7.4	10.1
	(106.3)	*(93.4)*	*(93.2)*	*(97.3)*	*(89.9)*	*(15.3)*	*(15.7)*	*(15.2)*	*(16.0)*	*(16.3)*
Non-dwelling burglary	45.9	39.8	39.7	33.6	52.0	7.6	12.4	7.5	10.5	19.9
	(66.2)	*(62.1)*	*(60.1)*	*(56.4)*	*(52.1)*	*(16.7)*	*(16.6)*	*(17.0)*	*(17.4)*	*(18.9)*

Sydenham's recorded clearance rates for dwelling burglary were lower than the national rates in 2000 and from 2002 to 2004, but higher in 2001. Non-dwelling burglary clearance rates in Sydenham were lower than the national rates from 2000 to 2003 but higher in 2004.

Sydenham's recorded clearance rate for dwelling burglary decreased by 17.2% from 2000 to 2004, whilst the non-dwelling burglary clearance rate increased markedly, by 161.6%, from 2000 to 2004. The national recorded clearance rate for dwelling burglary increased by 6.5% from 2000 to 2004, whilst the non-dwelling burglary clearance rate increased by 13.1% from 2000 to 2004.

Figure 10.10: Percentage of recorded dwelling and non-dwelling burglary offences cleared for the Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand

## 10.3 Trends in prosecutions, convictions and sentences for burglary

Figure 10.11 shows the outcomes of burglary prosecutions in New Zealand from 1997 to 2004, as a percentage of burglary charges   Prosecutions resulting in convictions decreased from 77.0% to 69.8% of burglary charges from 1997 to 2004. Prosecutions that were not proved increased from 22.4% to 28.7% of burglary charges from 1997 to 2004. Prosecutions that were discharged without conviction and other prosecutions from 1997 to 2004 were a relatively minor percentage.

Figure 10.11:   Outcomes of burglary prosecutions in New Zealand from 1997 to 2004[1,2]

1   The outcomes of burglary prosecutions labelled 'Not proved' were comprised of 'Dismissed', 'Discharged', 'Withdrawn', 'Acquitted' and 'Other not proved' prosecution outcomes.

2   This data was obtained from the Case Monitoring Subsystem of the Law Enforcement System. This subsystem records the court processing of charges. A database has been established consisting of depersonalised information that has been extracted from the Case Monitoring Subsystem. Every offence for which an offender is apprehended can result in a 'charge' (or prosecution) being laid. For example, if a person is apprehended for having committed two burglaries and one assault, then this may result in three separate charges being laid against the person. The analysis was based on individual charges using the Final Court Hearing Date to ensure that every charge laid was finalised. For example, a charge might be laid in 2004 but not finalised in court until 2005.

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Figure 10.12: Outcomes of burglary prosecutions in the Christchurch District Court from 1997 to 2004[1, 2]


[1] The outcomes of burglary prosecutions labelled 'Not proved' were comprised of:
   • 'Dismissed'
   • 'Discharged
   • 'Withdrawn''Acquitted'
   • 'Other not proved'.
[2] Prosecutions in the Christchurch District Court may include prosecutions for offences committed in the former Sydenham Police Area as well as other Police Areas in the Canterbury Police District.

Figure 10.12 shows the outcomes of burglary prosecutions in the Canterbury District Court from 1997 to 2004, as a percentage of burglary charges. Prosecutions resulting in convictions ranged from 63.6% to 75.1% of burglary charges from 1997 to 2004. Prosecutions that were not proved ranged from 24.7% to 35.9% of burglary charges. Prosecutions that were discharged without conviction and other prosecutions from 1997 to 2004 were relatively minor.

Figure 10.13: Number of burglary convictions in the Christchurch District and High Courts and in the New Zealand District and High Courts from 1997 to 2004

Convictions in the Christchurch District and High Courts generally pertain to offences committed in the Canterbury Police District. However, it must be taken into account that convictions in the Christchurch District and High Courts may include offences committed in the former Sydenham Police Area as well as other Police Areas in the Canterbury Police District.

Figure 10.13 shows the number of convictions for burglary in the Christchurch District and High Courts and in the New Zealand District and High Courts from 1997 to 2004. National burglary convictions were trending down from 2000 to 2003 but increased in 2004. Overall, there was a 4.1% decrease in national burglary convictions from 1997 to 2004. The burglary conviction trend in the Christchurch High and District Courts decreased by 8.9% from 1997 to 2004.

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Figure 10.14:   Types of sentences imposed for burglary offences in New Zealand from 1997 to 2004, as a percentage of cases [1, 2]

1   In general terms, a 'case' in this report is defined as all charges being dealt with against an offender at the same point in time. For example, in a case that involves more than one charge, the charge taken to represent the case is one that resulted in the most serious penalty.

2   The types of sentences imposed were as follows: custodial (life imprisonment, preventive detention, imprisonment or corrective training); community (community work, periodic detention, community service, community programme or supervision); monetary (fines or reparation) and other sentences (e.g. a conviction and discharge, or an order to come up for sentence if called upon).

Figure 10.14 shows the percentage of cases for sentences imposed for burglary offences in New Zealand from 1997 to 2004.   There was a decreasing trend in community-based sentences from 1997 to 2004, whereas there was an increasing trend in custodial sentences for the same period. The trends for monetary and other sentence types were relatively stable from 1997 to 2004.

Figure 10.15: Types of sentences imposed for burglary offences in the Christchurch High and District Courts from 1997 to 2004

Sentences imposed in the Christchurch High and District Courts may include sentences for offences committed in the former Sydenham Police Area as well as other Police Areas in the Canterbury Police District.

Figure 10.15 shows the percentage of cases for sentences imposed for burglary offences in the Christchurch High and District Courts from 1997 to 2004. The trend was for community-based sentences to gradually decrease from 1997 to 2003 and then increase in 2004. Custodial sentences gradually increased from 1997 to 2003 and then decreased in 2004. Monetary sentences decreased from 1998 to 2000 and then gradually increased in 2001 to 2004. Other types of sentence trends were relatively stable from 1997 to 2004.

10.4 Summary

In the Sydenham Police Area, the rate of recorded dwelling burglary decreased by 5% more than the decrease in the national rate from 2000 to 2004. This suggests that at least some of the reduction in recorded dwelling burglary may be attributed to the specific burglary reduction initiatives put in place in Sydenham over the period.

Over the same period in Sydenham, the rates of non-dwelling burglary, car conversion, and theft ex car increased while the national rates decreased. The trends in other offence types, such as violent offences, drug and antisocial offences, and theft ex dwelling, were similar in Sydenham to national trends. These findings suggest there may have been some displacement from dwelling burglary to non-dwelling burglary and car offences in the Sydenham Police Area during the period.

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 While the proportion of clearances for dwelling burglary decreased in Sydenham for 2000–2004 (compared with an increase nationally), clearances for other offence types, such as non dwelling burglary, theft ex dwelling, theft ex car, and car conversion, increased substantially more than nationally.

Convictions as a proportion of charges prosecuted showed a decreasing trend, while the proportion of custodial sentences for burglary showed an increasing trend both in the Christchurch Court District and nationally from 1997–2004.

11 Perceived effectiveness of overall burglary reduction effort

In 2002 all respondents were convinced that the strategies adopted by the Sydenham Break Squad in conjunction with District Break Squad were effective in reducing dwelling burglaries. They believed that the burglary statistics represented their efforts, but due to the Area's inability to maintain the proactive squad, the figures rose again after the squad disbanded.

In 2003 the Area was short staffed, with no Intel officer for half of the year, and some serious homicides in the early part of the year. A proactive squad was assembled for six weeks in order to address burglaries, but no permanent squad could be established for the remainder of the year.

In 2004, the new structure was put in place with a strongly developed Intel, a Volume of Crime Unit and a Tactical Coordinator all working to focus on strategic initiatives to reduce burglary. Despite setbacks such as the backload of files and delays in data entry, Police were far more optimistic about reducing burglaries. Due to concern about the delay in attendance, they were about to institute a burglary desk, which would be manned by officers who would take ORs by phone. This, it was hoped, would increase the attendance time for SOCO, as appointments would be set up on the first phone call. It was also hoped that it would free patrol staff to undertake more proactive patrolling and targeting. Police in the Area were pleased that the burglary figures had steadily fallen during the year.

The crime statistics and household surveys provide a mixed message on the overall effectiveness of Sydenham Burglary Strategies.

- The total crime rate per 10,000 population for Sydenham decreased by 5.1% from 2002 to 2004, whereas the national total crime rate per 10,000 population decreased by 9.6%.
- The rate of burglary offences (which include dwelling and non-dwelling burglary offences) per 10,000 population decreased in Sydenham by 12.5% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 17.7%.
- Sydenham's dwelling burglary rate per 10,000 population decreased by 20.6% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 15.4% decrease in the national dwelling burglary rate per 10,000 population for the same period.
- Dwelling burglary rates per 10,000 population were higher in Sydenham than national rates in 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004, but were lower in 2002.
- The clearance rate for dwelling burglary offences in Sydenham in 2000 and from 2002 to 2004 was lower than the national rates, but it was higher in 2001.

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- There was a 17.2% decrease in the clearance rate for dwelling burglary offences in Sydenham from 2000 to 2004, whereas there was a 6.5% increase in the clearance rate for dwelling burglary offences nationally for the same period.

- Dwelling burglary rates per 100 households were higher in Sydenham than the national rates in 2000 and 2004 but were lower from 2001 to 2002. The rates were the same in 2003 for both Sydenham and New Zealand.

- There was a 17.1% decrease in dwelling burglary rates per 100 households in Sydenham compared to a 12.7% decrease nationally.

Figure 11.1 illustrates three-monthly moving averages of recorded dwelling burglary rates per 10,000 population for Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Dwelling burglary rates for Sydenham overlapped with the national rates. Sydenham's moving average trend line showed dwelling burglary varied substantially from 2000 to 2004, after a marked decrease during 2000. Compared to Sydenham, the national recorded monthly and moving average dwelling burglary rate per 10,000 population fluctuated less markedly from 2000 to 2004.

Figure 11.1:   Monthly rates and moving averages of recorded dwelling burglary per 10,000 population for Sydenham Police Area and New Zealand

Monthly rates and moving averages (2000–2004)

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
11.1 Strengths of implementation of the overall burglary reduction effort

Strengths identified included:

- focus
- coordination and communication
- specialised sections
- centralisation of file management
- dedicated personnel
- Intel.

11.1.1   Focus

- Burglary was seen as a crime against the person and taken more seriously, as evidenced by the focused effort of the Police in Canterbury.
- Local knowledge of the Sydenham Area and offenders was regarded as an important factor in the success attributed to the Sydenham Break Squad.
- Local ownership of the initiatives was also identified as an important factor in the successful implementation of the squad as this allowed them to focus on local crime problems.
- Most Police interviewed thought proactive and well focused policing strategies, particularly targeting offenders, yielded very positive results in terms of the resolution of burglaries.

11.1.2   Coordination and communication

- The District Break Squad maintained an overview of the District burglary offences, which was identified as important for being able to identify and target burglars and receivers and overcoming issues to do with boundary policing.
- Communication in regards to burglary between Police Areas and the District Break Squad, YCU, Crime Prints and Intel had improved and become more focused with the implementation of the First Fifteen initiative.

11.1.3 Specialised sections

The District sections such as the District Break Squad, YCU, Crime Prints and Intel provided specialised services to support the Police Areas.

11.1.4 Centralisation of file management

The District Break Squad's centralised auditing process of the District's burglary files ensured consistency and standardisation of recording practices.

11.1.5 Dedicated personnel

Personnel in various positions from the Police, the justice sector and community organisations stood out as an invaluable resource in terms of leadership, institutional knowledge, dedication, and initiative.

11.1.6 Intel

After the restructuring, the Area was pleased with the improved product from having a local Intel. They believed that Intel was better being closer to the patrol group (although they were still not in the same building). Intel commented that people were getting more familiar with the opportunities provided by Intel and were asking better questions.

11.2 Barriers to implementation of the overall burglary reduction effort

11.2.1 Barriers in 2002, 2003

Barriers identified in 2002 and 2003 included:

- staffing
- information technology
- communication
- the number of Neighbourhood Support groups
- identification of property.

11.2.1.1 Staffing

The reduction in staff compounded by the serious crime wave Sydenham experienced severely hampered their burglary reduction effort. Their Break Squad had to be disbanded, and while they still conducted investigative work they were unable to implement the proactive strategies that had reportedly helped to apprehend more burglars. Consequently there was a high level of frustration at their inability to be more proactive because of the lack of staff.

The Area Intel officer left in August 2002 and could not be replaced for the rest of the year due to leave entitlements. This imposed an extra workload on staff and the expertise and local knowledge of the Intel officer was missed.

At the District level, both the District Break Squad and YCU were understaffed. The shortage of Police patrol units hampered Comms' ability to efficiently dispatch patrols to attend burglaries. Comms' workload had increased significantly but the staff numbers were down. This caused concern as this job was extremely high-pressure and stressful.

11.2.1.2   Information technology

Entering data into NIA was seen as more labour-intensive than previous localised databases. Data entry operators were frustrated when changes were made to the NIA system without consultation or timely notification. Generally respondents found NIA slow and frustrating, which some believed inhibited frontline officers from utilising the system more.

Respondents were critical of the lack of training regarding the new systems such as NIA, Business Objects and MAPS. The appointment of a national Intel Training Manager in mid-2002 was seen as a positive move to address this issue, as was the development of a training suite at Christchurch District Headquarters.

11.2.1.3   Communication

A common theme was the amount of information and paperwork frontline Police were inundated with. Patrol supervisors and the Sydenham Intel Officer tried to filter some of this information for patrol staff.

Sydenham patrol base and watch house/CIU were in different buildings down the street from each other, which was regarded as a barrier to more effective communication between CIU and patrol staff.

11.2.1.4   Number of Neighbourhood Support groups

The Household Survey showed that significantly fewer respondents in Sydenham (15%) were members of Neighbourhood Support compared to the average of the other Police Areas. The main reason given for not being a member was that their household had not been approached to join.

While Neighbourhood Support and community constables did utilise the media and public speaking to advertise the benefits of the organisation, generally they waited for people to approach them to set up a group. Police interviewed thought that it was more difficult to set up and maintain groups in low socio-economic areas where people tended to live in rental properties and be more transient.

11.2.1.5   Identification of property

A major barrier in the recovery of stolen property was the difficulty in trying to identify items because many people did not record serial numbers of electronic goods or mark their

property in some way. The Police encouraged burglary victims to record serial numbers and adequately identify property by sending them a property schedule.

11.2.2 Barriers in 2004

After the restructuring the lack of a central station was seen by all respondents to be a barrier to effectiveness; the Area staff was divided between Hornby and Sydenham, which were 15 kilometres apart. At Sydenham Station the Tactics Coordinator, Intel and Volume of Crime Unit were based in a separate building from the patrol group, and the Area Commander, Youth Aid and CIB were based at Hornby. Weekly meetings were established to improve the communication, but, as several respondents noted, this does not allow for the informal exchange of crucial information at each shift changeover and in the tea room. Youth Aid said that they used to have daily access to Intel, now it was only weekly.

> *We haven't seen an I-car here for months—only the occasional visit from the officer who used to work here.*

Central Break Squad was frustrated about the lack of communication between the Areas and the Break Squad, with examples cited of surveillance being carried out on the same target by different squads.

Data entry was still being seen as a major barrier, with only one data entry operator for the District. Technological problems were also being experienced with Hornby and Sydenham on separate servers, and typing having to be sent through to Sydenham.

The attendance time was also a barrier to effectiveness as all respondents were aware of the frustration experienced by victims of burglary. It was hoped that the burglary desk would address this issue.

11.3 Trends and changes in overall burglary reduction effort

The deployment of five staff from Sydenham Police to STU in 2002, as well as the additional removal of two other vacancies, was thought to have had a negative impact on the Area's ability to address burglary. Other staff losses during the year were further exacerbated by an increase in serious crime from late in 2001 to mid-2003. On the positive side, the District Break Squad was having some good results and was well thought of by respondents. The First Fifteen initiative was thought to be successful in that it facilitated better communication between Areas and focused attention of the worst offenders.

Changes in the Crimes Act meant that a wider range of incidents were to be coded as dwelling burglary, and some staff thought this might be affecting their statistics.

At the end of 2002 there was a district-wide push on curfew checks and Police thought that this was yielding good results. Respondents noted that when prolific burglars were incarcerated the burglary occurrences dropped markedly.

With the District restructuring in 2004, the new Southern Area was feeling a lot more confident about being able to address burglary and several respondents remarked that the occurrence figures were steadily dropping. The attendance time was still a problem and plans were being put in place to address that at the end of 2004.

11.4 Relationships with the community

Police recognised the importance of the input of other agencies and community organisations to reduce burglary offending. The main community organisations Sydenham worked with were Neighbourhood Support, Victim Support, Community Watch and organisations that helped at-risk youth, such as the Hoonhay Youth Centre. The YES worked with the schools and Youth Aid worked with Truancy Services. The Area Controller had also developed links with local iwi. The Sydenham Break Squad had started to build up relationships with second-hand dealers and pawnbrokers to identify stolen property and offenders, which was reportedly a very worthwhile strategy.

The responsibility for crime prevention initiatives had shifted away from Police to community organisations. For example, Neighbourhood Support was no longer coordinated by Police but had become an incorporated society funded by the Christchurch City Council, community trusts and the Police. However, many Police interviewed still saw giving victims security advice as an important part of their role, and community constables in particular were still involved in crime prevention work. The Police endeavoured to encourage burglary complainants to take more responsibility for their property by recording serial numbers and adequately identifying possessions.

It was recognised by several respondents that the District had more resources for developing and maintaining strong relationships with community partners. For example, the Iwi Liaison officers, Pacific Liaison officer and Asian Liaison officer were all based at District Headquarters.

11.5 Relationships with justice sector departments

The Police who were interviewed had varying contact with other justice sector departments—Courts, Corrections, or CYF—depending on their roles.

Generally Police who were interviewed felt that they were well supported by the courts in regards to decisions concerning bail, as the following respondent from the District Break Squad stated.

> *Good support on bail and keeping them in custody and setting bail conditions, curfews in particular. We follow that up with not only the First Fifteen targets but with all burglars on curfews or bail conditions, the group staff or section staff with cars that are on night shift and late shift, they follow up by doing the curfew visits at the suspect's address.*

At the beginning of 2002 many Police expressed disappointment with the sentences burglary offenders were given. However, by the end of 2002 several Police respondents commented

that they thought judges had really come on board with longer sentences for burglary offences.

A Police respondent was critical of defence counsel who persuaded their clients to take matters to Status Hearing and beyond, when there was compelling evidence either by admission, fingerprints or DNA. This was very time-consuming and resource-intensive for Police.

Youth Aid officers had a very good relationship with the Sydenham Youth Justice social workers from CYF. They regularly exchanged information and had meetings together with the YCU about every six weeks to discuss cases.

11.6 Relationships within Police

In regards to National and District policies, Police interviewed thought that the emphasis on burglary as a priority area was very positive. Most had witnessed first-hand the devastation felt by many burglary victims and thought Police and the Courts should regard this as a crime against the person rather than property.

As stated, the Canterbury District had centralised many Police services to provide specialised support to Police Areas. The First Fifteen initiative was regarded as important in coordinating the different Police Areas to target recidivist burglars.

However, there was a tension between performance management requirements of Areas to attain burglary targets and the resources available to achieve them. The Sydenham staff interviewed generally felt disappointed that resources, especially staff, had been reallocated elsewhere. The reallocation of four patrol staff to the STU at the beginning of 2002 was particularly commented on.

While no one doubted the importance of the work that STU performed, they did question the direction policing was being driven by LTSA, ACC and Councils in regards to traffic operations that pulled resources from other areas. One respondent commented, 'to be fair to them they pay the Police to supply services in the area of traffic'. Sydenham patrols were required to do two safety administration programme hours a shift, which were targeted at traffic violations. These hours were funded by LTSA and the Council. It was also noted that STU patrols did not attend traffic accidents and Area patrols were required to do this, which was very time-consuming and consequently 'a huge bone of contention'.

Respondents commented that while the Sydenham Break Squad was in operation there was much more communication with the Crime Prints Section about identifying suspects than when the squad was disbanded. This could be due to the increased volume of burglary work Sydenham was doing at the time and the connections Crime Prints were able to make with personnel dedicated to burglary.

After the restructuring the Area was more confident about being able to address burglary locally whilst maintaining good liaison with District units. At the District level there was some frustration at the loss of a strong Intel base, which was central to the effectiveness of

the District Break Squad and the YCU. Some believed that there was a duplication of effort by having local burglary units rather than one central one. However, by the end of 2004 some effort was being made to strengthen the capacity of District Intel and with the development of the burglary desk, things were more optimistic.

There was also a degree of frustration over the integration of the Sydenham and Hornby staff, but by the end of 2004, this was also diminishing as the effectiveness of the new structure was becoming apparent.

11.7 Suggested improvements to the overall burglary reduction effort

Respondents thought that the dedicated squad approach was very effective, as were the proactive policing strategies, particularly targeting offenders. Therefore ring-fenced squads would be ideal, but many realised that priority offences such as homicides were always going to take resources away.

The centralised structure of the Canterbury District and the accountability placed on the Areas to meet KRAs meant it was important to continue to develop mechanisms for good communication and liaison between District and Area Police.

Many respondents stated how important public awareness was in regards to increasing security and taking note of suspicious behaviour and reporting to Police. Two crime prevention measures that respondents often mentioned were the use of burglar alarms and getting neighbours to watch their house. Burglar alarms should be properly fitted, including being put in the bedroom, where most people kept valuables. Many burglaries occurred during the day and areas where neighbours were at home and vigilant were reported to be less likely to be burgled. Increasing the Neighbourhood Support groups would therefore be beneficial.

Some Police believed that they were inadequately resourced compared with other Areas in the country. One respondent made the comparison with Wanganui Police Area, which had a ratio of 100 Police to a population of 42,000, or 1:420, while Canterbury Southern had 125 Police to a population of 156,000, or 1: 1,248.

The introduction of the Burglary Desk was thought to be a key initiative which would:

- address the attendance time
- be more satisfactory for victims
- free patrol staff for more proactive work.

11.8 Unintended outcomes

While there was no evidence to show displacement to other offence types or to other Police Areas, respondents did mention possible unintended outcomes.

Several Police respondents noted that dedicated resourcing was effective in addressing the offence being targeted but this was at the expense of something else, because of the limited resources Police had to work with. A Police respondent made the following comment in regards to displacement to other offence types:

> *What I have found though is that when you take a group of people and put them into a particular squad to investigate that crime, Police statistics go down for that crime and they look very good and it reduces that crime. But then it goes up in other areas that they are neglecting at the time so the focus goes back on there. You prevent crime in that area and the burglary rate goes back up again. So whatever area squads tend to target they do quite well, but it just means that really you are just taking from one to the other.*

Another possible outcome was that by targeting burglars other offence types would go down, as burglars were often involved in other offending such as car theft. For example, Sydenham Police noted that there was a noticeable flow-on effect from the work of the Sydenham Break Squad in regards to a drop in domestic violence and consequently a reduction in I-car call-outs.